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 ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis evaluates the design of monetary and macroprudential policies. Different models 
of expectation are examined to get a comprehensive understanding about the work of 
monetary and macroprudential policies. It is begun by assuming agents are boundedly rational 
under Recursive Least Square (RLS) and Stochastic Gradient (SG) learning, followed by fully 
rational agents under rational expectation (RE).  
When agents follow RLS learning, both determinacy and E-stability criteria are required to 
find preferred policies. We focus on the effect of habit in consumption in the design of 
preferred policies. We found the presence of habit in consumption enlarges both determinacy 
and E-stability region, under plausible policy parameters. The same methodology is then used 
in another model that features housing market and financial constraint. The result showed that 
a response to the growth of housing prices via the LTV rule may increase determinacy and E-
stability. Yet, this benefit depends on the quality of housing price data and the data used in 
monetary policy.  
We also conduct a refinement in the design of preferred economic policies by incorporating 
SG-stability criteria, in addition to determinacy and E-stability. The result showed that central 
bank’s task gets more difficult since the Taylor Principle is insufficient to ensure a robust 
learnability of REE. In other works, we deviate from the assumption of boundedly rational 
agents and consider fully rational agents (RE). We examine the issue of monetary policy, 
banks’ lending decisions and business cycles in Indonesia. This thesis completes its analysis 
by evaluating the role of news in the formation of agents’ expectations. 
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 Introduction  
 
 
Understanding the way of agents form their expectation and how it relates to the economy is a 
key factor in the successful of modelling any economy. An early effort of modelling the 
expectation was begun in which researchers equate the expectation with the actual outcomes 
under the framework of perfect foresight. In this way, it is assumed that economic agents 
know not only the probability distribution of future endogenous variables, conditional on 
exogenous variables, but also a specific value of future exogenous variables. Given its strong 
assumption, this framework is viewed by researchers to be unrealistic.  
The framework of perfect foresight is then relaxed by introducing a new notation called the 
rational expectation (RE), following Muth (1961). Under the RE, it is assumed that economic 
agents know the structure of the economy and all structural parameters, though they cannot 
observe a specific value of future exogenous variables. This framework is different from 
perfect foresight in terms of agents’ ability to observe future values of random shocks. When 
they are observed, then the assumption of perfect foresight is imposed in the model. In 
contrast, when they are unknown, a model under the RE is assumed. Since the assumption of 
RE is less restrictive compared to perfect foresight, then this notation becomes a useful 
benchmark in recent dynamic macroeconomic models.   
In the context of economic policy design, there are three possible outcomes for the 
equilibrium condition under the RE, i.e. determinacy, indeterminacy and non-existence of 
determinate equilibrium (or explosive path). Determinacy is defined as a condition where 




described as a condition where there is more than one stationary REE. In a situation where 
there is no stationary solution to the system, then we say the equilibrium goes to an explosive 
path. We argue that a preferred policy is the one that leads the economy to a determinate 
equilibrium under the RE.  
Although the assumption of RE is very standard in modelling the expectation, there are 
researchers who view this framework as a strong assumption. The reason is that it is too ideal 
for economic agents to observe the true value of structural parameters. In practice, economic 
theory sets the model framework and describes the structure of the economy, while 
econometricians try to estimate the true parameter values using any data that are updated 
regularly. The notion where economic agents behave like econometricians who use a 
particular least square method to estimate the true parameter values, rather than having the 
RE, is known as the learning in the literature. Our interest is, given a particular economic 
policy, under what condition does this learning process lead to a determinate REE?  
Based on the literature, there are two types of learning algorithm that are commonly used, i.e. 
recursive least square (RLS) learning and stochastic gradient (SG) learning. The first 
algorithm is different from the second one in terms of the ability of economic agents to 
observe the variance of state variables during the process of forming their belief. When they 
are all observed, then we say economic agents follow the RLS learning algorithm for 
estimating the structural parameters. In contrast, when they are observed with a probability of 
zero, then we say agents have followed the SG learning algorithm. These two different 
learning algorithms consequently lead to two different principles in relation to their 
convergence conditions to the REE. The first principle is known as E-stability. This principle 




stable (E-stable)1. The second one is SG-stability. This principle states that the REE is 
asymptotically stable under the SG learning algorithm iff it is stochastic gradient stable (SG-
stable)2. Given these two definitions, the preferred economic policy should be the one that 
leads the equilibrium into E-stable (under RLS learning) or SG-stable (under SG learning). A 
rule that leads the equilibrium into E-unstable or SG-unstable should be avoided by policy 
makers even if it offers higher welfare. 
Although there are some earlier studies that analyse determinacy, E-stability and SG-stability 
issue of economic policy, there is still a gap in the literature in which stability policy has not 
yet been considered, that is in a model with the feature of (1) habit in consumption, (2) 
housing market and financial constraint. Motivated by this, we try to close this gap by 
evaluating determinacy and learning stability of monetary and macroprudential policies for 
the above macroeconomic models. In addition to this, we research on monetary policy, banks’ 
lending decision and business cycles in Indonesia. Unlike the issue of determinacy and 
learning stability, the study about the Indonesian economy is carried out under the assumption 
of fully rational agents since we want to focus on the estimation of some structural 
parameters. Yet, to ensure that work is in line with the broad topic of this thesis, we also 
attempt to address the role of news in the formation of agents’ expectation in the context of 
the Indonesian economy.  
Concerning economic policy, there are different ways of modelling monetary policy under 
dynamic macroeconomic models. These include an optimal monetary policy and a simple 
Taylor-type interest rate rule. An optimal monetary policy is a complex monetary policy that 
is derived from the underlying state variables of the model where this policy is set in such a 
way to maximise the overall welfare, given all the frictions in the economy. In contrast, the 
                                                          
1 See Evans & Honkapohja (p.30, 2001) 




Taylor interest rate rule (1993) is a simple policy rule that links the level of policy rate to the 
deviation of inflation from its target and of output from its potential (the output gap).      
Although the Taylor interest rate rule may not deliver the highest welfare to the economy, for 
the purpose of studying determinacy and learning stability of monetary policy, we choose this 
simple rule due to some reasons: Firstly, the Taylor interest rate rule is easily understood so 
that policy makers can easily communicate their policy to public. Secondly, policy makers, 
researchers and the public can well establish an effective discussion about monetary policy 
since they have the same level of understanding. Thirdly, this policy rule is useful in 
evaluating the stance of monetary policy for both developed and developing countries.  
In this thesis, we consider three alternatives of the simple Taylor-type interest rate rule based 
on data availability, i.e. contemporaneous interest rate rule, lagged/backward looking interest 
rate rule and forecasted/forward looking interest rate rule. Our definition of the Taylor rule is 
slightly different from a standard definition earlier in which the level of policy rate does not 
link to the deviation of inflation and output from inflation target and potential output, but 
from their steady state values. In an environment of a small open economy, this standard 
Taylor-type interest rate rule can be extended by incorporating the exchange rate variable as 
one of policy rate’s targets, in addition to inflation and output. 
The recent US financial crisis has taught a lesson concerning ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy in dampening a bubble in housing prices and the financial markets. This happens as the 
adjustment of monetary policy through interest rate does not only affect financial markets and 
asset prices, but also other economic variables e.g. unemployment, investment and price level. 
Motivated by this, alternative targeted rules are introduced to minimise a volatility in the 
financial markets and asset prices. These rules are known as macroprudential policy that 




(CAR) that ensures banks hold enough money on their balance-sheets, (2) a reserve 
requirements that limits the size of banks’ expansion in lending, (3) a leverage caps that limits 
the amount of loan that banks can borrow, (4) a loan to value (LTV) ratio that controls the 
amount of loan that borrowers can obtain, (5) a loan to value income (LTI) that puts a 
restriction on the size of loan relative to borrowers’ income, etc.   
In practice, not all the above macroprudential instruments are applied by each country. The 
same situation happens in Indonesia in which a particular lending parameter, i.e. the LTV 
ratio had not been explicitly regulated by Bank Indonesia (BI) until the beginning 2012. 
Before this period, this lending ratio is set by individual banks based on their level of risk 
appetite. Motivated by this, as mentioned earlier, we provide this thesis with a study about 
banks’ lending decisions in Indonesia. In other parts of this thesis, we also evaluate the role of 
macroprudential policy in dampening a bubble in housing prices or the financial markets. To 
be specific, we assume that the ratio of loan to value (LTV) is operational so that it can be 
adjusted at any time to respond a change in the growth of housing prices or credit.  
 
1.1. The Objective 
In general, there are two objectives of this thesis: Firstly, analysing determinacy and learning 
stability issue of monetary and macroprudential policies. Secondly, analysing the issue of 
monetary policy, banks’ lending decisions and business cycles in Indonesia. The first 
objective is achieved by examining some versions of the calibrated dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Meanwhile, the second objective is attained by estimating 
a specific version of DSGE model for Indonesia, where its features and specifications closely 




objectives, there is a “red line” that links them, that is the interest of studying monetary and 
macroprudential policies under different models of expectation.   
The study about determinacy and stability issue of monetary policy is not new. There has 
been a bunch of previous studies about this subject either under a closed-economy or an open-
economy environment. It was began by the seminal paper of Bullard & Mitra (2002) who 
examine determinacy and learning stability issue of a simple Taylor-type interest rate rule 
under a standard closed-economy New Keynesian (NK) model of Woodford (1999). Their 
work is then extended by other researchers in which different features and assumptions are 
introduced to a standard closed-economy NK model, for instance: inertia in policy rate, inertia 
in inflation, the existence of cost channel for monetary policy, etc. Within an open-economy 
framework, the study of determinacy and stability of monetary policy becomes more 
challenging as additional features, which are not found in a closed-economy model, have been 
incorporated that bring some economic policy implications.  
There is still a gap in the literature where the study about determinacy and learning stability of 
monetary policy has not been yet carried out, i.e. in a case where habit in consumption 
matters. As we may know, the feature of habit in consumption is important in describing the 
movement of aggregate consumption and in generating the hump-shaped impulse response to 
demand and supply shocks. It is shown that incorporating this ad-hoc assumption in the model 
of consumption can help researchers in explaining the business cycle behavior. To close this 
gap, in chapter 2 we examine the effect of habit in consumption in the study of determinacy 
and E-stability issue of monetary policy. Some research questions arise:  
 How do different levels of habit persistent in consumption affect the design of monetary 
policy when agents are boundedly rational under the recursive least square (RLS) learning 




 When consumption habit matters, among different alternatives of the Taylor-type interest 
rate rule, i.e. contemporaneous, lagged and forward looking rule, which one does offer the 
highest probability of leading the economy into a determinate and E-stable REE?    
 If there are many policy rules that take the economy to a determinate and E-stable REE, 
which one among them is the most favorable?  
For the first and second questions, we employ the criteria of determinacy and E-stability for 
choosing preferred policies. While for the third question, we use the concept of the optimal 
constrained interest rate rule, following Evans & McGough (2007). Unlike similar studies 
about the optimal policy, in our work, the optimal interest rate rule only can be chosen from 
determinate and E-stable policy rules. For this purpose, we assume that central bank 
minimises their expected loss of function in terms of inflation and output variation. Then, 
among all determinate and E-stable policy rules, we find a specific rule that gives a minimum 
loss. We do this analysis for each version of the Taylor-type interest rate rules, i.e. 
contemporaneous, lagged and forward looking, and compare all the results in order to choose 
the one that is the most advantageous. Note that Evans & McGough (2007) study the issue of 
the optimal constrained interest rate rule for a model of McCallum & Nelson (1999), Clarida, 
Gali & Gertler (2000) and Woodford (2003).  
Unfortunately, a standard NK model with one good sector and two markets (i.e. consumption 
goods and bond market), as used in Chapter 2, is too simple to characterize the real economy. 
As a result, this model is difficult to explain the movement of other economic variables as 
shown on the empirical evidence. Given this limitation, we consider another version of NK 
model, where housing market is present. The reasons that motivate researchers to incorporate 
housing market/sector in a standard NK model can be summarised as follows: Firstly, housing 




relationship between housing investment and aggregate consumption is interesting to analyse. 
Third, a theory that explains housing prices volatility and both propagation and amplification 
of shock is important to develop.  
In Chapter 3, we extend the analysis of determinacy and E-stability issue of economic policy 
to a simple version of Iacoviello’s model (2005) in which housing market and financial 
constraint are introduced. Since monetary policy is tied to the target of inflation and output, 
we need the additional targeted rule to prevent a bubble in housing prices. This additional rule 
is known as macroprudential policy that operates through the LTV ratio. We assume that this 
ratio is operational such that it gets lower when there is a tendency for a bubble in housing 
prices and gets higher when there is a down turn in the economy. Since macroprudential 
policy has been introduced, then the study about determinacy and E-stability issue of REE is 
evaluated for both monetary and macroprudential policies. Some relevant research questions 
emerge: 
 Is it necessary for central bank to target housing prices or financial variable i.e. credit via 
the LTV rule when agents are boundedly rational and follow the RLS learning algorithm 
in forming their expectation? 
 What is the best combination of rules, between monetary and macroprudential policies, 
that delivers the highest probability of getting a determinate and E-stable REE? 
 Among determinate and E-stable policy rules, which one gives the optimal constrained 
interest rate rule? 
Up to now, we have assumed that private agents follow the recursive least square (RLS) 
learning algorithm in forming their expectation and we look for a policy that ensures the 




Recall that E-stability principle states that a REE is asymptotically stable, under RLS 
learning, iff it is expectational stable (E-stable). Although the assumption of RLS learning 
makes the model more realistic, compared to the assumption of RE, such a setting is still too 
perfect from the view of modellers. The reason is that, under RLS learning, private agents are 
assumed to precisely know the variance of state variables in forming their expectation. 
Motivated by this, we relax this RLS learning assumption, by considering an alternative 
learning mechanism, namely, stochastic gradient (SG) learning, following Barrucci & Landi 
(1997).   
SG learning is different from RLS learning in which the algorithm of the former is much 
simpler than that of the latter. Technically, SG learning ignores the variance of state variables 
used by agents in forming their forecasts. Since the algorithm of these two learning rules is 
different, it affects a convergence condition of private agents’ belief to rational expectation 
equilibrium (REE). In general, there are two possible relationships concerning a convergence 
condition of RLS and SG learning to REE: Firstly, these two conditions are identical. This 
means, for a given economic policy, these learning algorithms lead private agents’ belief to a 
unique stationary and stable REE. Secondly, a convergence condition of SG learning to REE 
is independent of a convergence condition of RLS learning.     
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, we continue the study of determinacy and learning stability issue 
of economic policy in which we are uncertain about the type of learning algorithm used by 
agents in forming the expectation, whether it is RLS or a classic SG learning. Under this 
condition, we apply two learning criteria for finding robust policy rules, i.e. E-stability and 
SG-stability. This study is carried out using a simple version of Iacoviello’s model (2005), as 




be avoided since it leads to an inferior equilibrium. Two relevant research questions are 
addressed: 
 How to find robust monetary and macroprudential policies that remain stable under both 
the RLS and the SG learning class?  
 Is using more recent data in economic policy useful when the learning rule is uncertain 
between RLS and SG learning? 
In regards to the study of monetary and macroprudential policies, it is also interesting to learn 
how a specific country conducts their monetary or macroprudential policy. As previously 
mentioned, in addition to the study of monetary and macroprudential policies under 
boundedly rational agents, this thesis contributes to the study of monetary policy in Indonesia 
under the framework of fully rational agents as discussed in Chapter 5. We use the framework 
of RE here as our objective is estimating some structural parameters in the model using a 
Bayesian technique. This chapter also equips its analysis with a study about banks’ lending 
decisions and business cycles in Indonesia. Moreover, the role of news in the formation of 
agents’ expectation is also evaluated. Note that under the assumption of boundedly rational 
agents, for instance: adaptive learning, the estimation process may become computationally 
expensive since we use a relatively large scale of a DSGE model.      
The topic about banks’ lending decisions is interesting to analyse since it shows how prudent 
banks are operated in Indonesia. This is motivated by the fact that the ratio of loan to value 
(LTV) had not been explicitly set by Bank Indonesia until the beginning of 2012. Having 
studied this issue, we expect that a better understanding of banks’ lending decisions is 
established. This topic is very relevant, especially in the context of constructing a reliable 




motivated by the fact that Bank Indonesia has adopted the Inflation Targeting Framework 
(ITF) since 20003. Under this framework, a low and stable inflation rate is targeted so that 
agents’ expectation needs to be managed to ensure policy rate effectively reaches its target. 
Some research questions that try to be addressed are: 
 How does Bank Indonesia conduct its monetary policy since the ITF was implemented? 
 How lending parameters are set by banks and how this relates to the current setting of 
macroprudential policy in Indonesia? 
 What are the main drivers of the Indonesian economy?  
 
1.2. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of six related chapters. In this present chapter, we describe the 
background and motivations for conducting a research. In this chapter, we also briefly display 
relevant research questions and our contributions. The core of the thesis is discussed in 
chapter 2 to 5, where in each chapter we study about the issues related to monetary and 
macroprudential policies either under the assumption of boundedly rational agents (adaptive 
learning) or under fully rational agents (RE). To help readers easily follow the analysis, the 
relevant literature, methodology and data are provided in each chapter. 
In Chapter 2, we focus on the study of monetary policy that operates through a simple Taylor-
type interest rate rule in an environment where consumption habit matters and agents follow 
RLS in forming their expectation. We begin the analysis by assuming no habit in 
consumption initially and use this result as the baseline. We continue the exercise by 
                                                          
3 Officially, the ITF was announced by Bank Indonesia in 2005. However, Bank Indonesia had introduced this 




assuming habit in consumption is present and analyse how this additional assumption affects 
the choice concerning preferred policies, i.e. a policy rule that leads to a determinate and E-
stable REE. Since preferred rules are not unique, then we adopt the concept of the optimal 
constrained interest rate rule to find a rule that can minimise economic volatility. 
In Chapter 3, we study about monetary and macroprudential policies using the same learning 
framework as used in Chapter 2. Here, macroprudential policy works through the changing of 
loan to value (LTV) ratio and is used to dampen a bubble in housing prices or financial 
variable (credit). We evaluate various combinations between monetary and macroprudential 
policy rules that may lead the system to a unique stationary and E-stable REE. Again, since 
preferred policy rules may be not unique, we extend the analysis by examining the optimal 
constrained interest rate rule to find a combination of rules that minimises central banks’ loss 
of function in terms of output and inflation variation.  
Chapter 4 is an extension of Chapter 3. If in Chapter 3, we assume that agents follow the RLS 
learning algorithm, in Chapter 4 we are uncertain about the kind of learning algorithms used 
by agents, whether it is RLS or SG learning. In this situation, robust monetary and 
macroprudential policy rules are the ones that satisfy both E-stability and SG-stability criteria. 
Note that the SG learning algorithm differs from the RLS learning algorithm in terms of 
agents’ ability to observe the variance of state variables in the economy.  When it is fully 
observed, we say agents follow RLS learning, while if it is not, agents are assumed to follow 
SG learning.  
In Chapter 5, we study about monetary policy, banks’ lending decisions and business cycles 
in Indonesia. Unlike, earlier chapters that assume agents are boundedly rational, in this 




model that matches with the Indonesian characteristics. Finally, we summarise all the results 
from all chapters in Chapter 6.  
Overall, this thesis reflects a good combination of methodologies between theoretical-
calibrated models and empirical models based on the class of economic models. We define a 
theoretical-calibrated model as one which does not use data in the analysis but, instead, 
calibrates the parameters of the model to answer a specific research question. We follow this 
approach from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4. Meanwhile, we define an empirical model as one in 
which an economic model uses data to verify the qualitative predictions of theoretical-
calibrated models. This methodology is used in Chapter 5. With respect to modelling the form 
of expectation, this thesis is also sufficiently complete, since it covers both the assumption of 








Learning about Monetary Policy Rules when  
Consumption Habit Matters 
 
 
2.1. Background and Motivation 
It is believed that there are different economic characteristics between developed and 
developing countries. Among them is the motion of aggregate consumption4. Existing studies 
show that households in developed countries easily smooth their consumption as they have 
access to the financial markets that allow them to transfer resources across periods. Under 
such condition, they comfortably save (or lend) when their income is high and dis-save (or 
borrow) over the current consumption when it is low and below their current consumption. 
Unfortunately, consumption smoothing behaviour is not always possible in developing 
countries due to some reasons5: Firstly, most people still live in rural areas and work in a 
primary sector with a relatively low income. Secondly, even when their income is high, they 
mostly store it in the form of non-financial assets which are difficult to transform into a liquid 
asset for consumption. Thirdly, it is difficult to access different financial assets due to the 
absence of well-established financial markets. 
In the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE), the assumption in 
which households smooth their consumption by transferring resources across periods 
unfortunately cannot entirely explain a high persistence of aggregate consumption in 
developed countries, e.g. the US. In order to match the movement of aggregate consumption 
                                                          
4 Agénor & Montiel (2008) make a list of characteristic features of developing countries that make them 
different from developed ones.  




generated from the theoretical model with business cycle stylized facts, the feature of habit 
formation in consumption is required to be introduced6. By doing so, the motion of aggregate 
consumption improves significantly and a better hump shape response of consumption to 
exogenous shock is generated. In line with this finding, we argue that the motion of aggregate 
consumption in developing countries is also different from the ones in developed countries in 
terms of the degree of habit persistence. It is likely that consumption habit in developing 
countries is less persistent compared to those in developed ones.  
Table 2.1 
Business cycles summary of the US and Indonesia7 
(Quarterly data, 1990 – 2013, index 2010 = 1) 
 Correlation 





 US Indonesia US Indonesia US Indonesia 
Real GDP 1.000 1.000 0.869 0.852 1.000 1.000 
Real Consumption 0.921 0.568 0.885 0.419 0.852 1.067 
Real Investment 0.952 0.684 0.896 0.563 3.091 3.899 
          Source: OECD, Main Indicators-Complete Data Base 
We assess the above argument by evaluating quarterly macroeconomic data for Indonesia 
during the period of 1990 to 2013 and compare the result with data for the United States (US). 
We select Indonesia as a representative country for developing countries and the US as a 
representative country for developed countries. As reported in Table 2.1, the auto-correlation 
of aggregate consumption in Indonesia during the year 1990 to 2013 is of 0.419, which is 
lower than in the US of 0.885. As well, consumption volatility in Indonesia is much higher, 
with a value of 1.067, than in the US, with a value of 0.852. Note that we measure the 
volatility of consumption as the ratio of the standard deviation of aggregate consumption over 
                                                          
6 The feature of habit formation is initially introduced by Abel (1990).  
7 All series are measured in percentage deviations from trend using a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with 




the standard deviation of GDP in real term. Based on this empirical data, we argue that the 
motion of aggregate consumption in Indonesia or possibly in other developing countries are 
less persistent and more volatile compared to the US or other developed countries. 
In what follows, we simply use the assumption of different degrees of habit parameter to 
characterise the motion of aggregate consumption between developed and developing 
countries. Note that we assume that developing countries are not different from developed 
ones, except in terms of their degree of consumption persistence. Although this assumption 
seems very strong, it enables us to understand the effect of consumption habit in the study of 
monetary policy, in particular for the purpose of finding the preferred policy rules.  
What rules are preferred by policy makers? According to the literature, there are some 
common criteria for choosing preferred policy rules, for example: determinacy, learning 
stability, optimality, etc. A criterion of determinacy is established under the framework of a 
rational expectation (RE). In this way, preferred rules are ones that lead the economy to a 
unique stationary REE. Technically, the chosen policy rules must deliver a unique solution of 
RE model. Unfortunately, determinacy condition cannot be obtained all the time, as argued by 
Woodford (1999) and Clarida (2000). In some cases, we may expect that a particular policy 
rule takes the economy into an inferior equilibrium, where agents fail to coordinate towards a 
unique stationary REE, or follow an explosive path, where no stationary REE exists. 
Although the framework of rational expectation (RE) is a very useful benchmark, many 
researchers view it as a strong assumption. This happens as under RE, it is assumed that 
economic agents understand that they are rational and know what others know. In addition, 
they have knowledge about the correct form of the model and all its parameters.  In practice, 
economic theory will set the framework to describe a structure of the economy while agents 




estimating the parameter values. This approach is known as an adaptive learning in the 
literature. When agents learn adaptively, it is assumed that the economy temporarily deviates 
from the REE. The question is that whether it will approach the REE over time? In this case, 
agents will update the parameter estimates towards the true value of model parameters as new 
data becomes available. The expectational stability or E-stability principle states that the REE 
is locally stable under RLS learning iff it is E-stable. If a policy rule leads to the REE which is 
not E-stable, then under RLS rule, economic agents can collaborate towards the REE with a 
probability of zero. Obviously, this policy rule should be avoided by policy makers, even if it 
offers a high welfare gain under the RE. In summary, there are two criteria for choosing the 
preferred policy rules when the RLS learning rule is used by economic agents, i.e. 
determinacy and E-stability. Under this condition, the chosen policy rules become more 
restrictive compared to the ones used under the framework of the RE.  
The study of determinacy and E-stability, in the context of a DSGE New Keynesian (NK) 
model, is not new. There have been many earlier studies that try to address this issue either in 
an environment of a closed economy or a small open economy. In a closed economy 
environment, it was began by the seminal paper of Bullard & Mitra (2002) who examine 
determinacy and E-stability issue of simple Taylor rules in a forward looking model of 
Woodford (1999). Their work is then extended by incorporating the feature of inflation inertia 
in the Philip Curve, as discussed by Wang & Wong (2005), and policy inertia, as explored by 
Bullard & Mitra (2007). Further, Llosa &Tuesta (2007) study the same issue where it is 
assumed that the cost of monetary channel matters. In a small open economy environment, the 
model has brought some additional features that have implications for the analysis of 
determinacy and E-stability. Such implications include, but are not limited to, the issue of 




rate regime and the issue of the degree of openness in trade. All these issues are discussed in 
Wang (2006), Bullard & Schaling (2006) and Llosa & Tuesta (2008), among others.  
Although, there are many earlier studies that have tried to examine determinacy and E-
stability issue of simple Taylor rules, under different structures of the model, there is still a 
gap in the literature where the issue of learning stability has not been explored, i.e. a case in 
which households endow with habit formation in consumption. Most of the foregoing studies 
on the NK model with habit formation in consumption and all its variations focus on the 
ability of the model to explain the business cycle behaviour. This means that they rely on this 
feature to explain the movement in aggregate consumption and to generate the hump-shaped 
impulse response to demand and supply shocks. Unlike these earlier works, we consider an 
otherwise version of NK model with the feature of habit in consumption for the study of 
determinacy and E-stability. We calibrate all the structural parameters using the values which 
are commonly used in a DSGE NK model with the feature of consumption habit.  
We decide not to fix the value of habit parameter. This is due to the interest of evaluating the 
relationship between an interest rate rule and the degree of habit parameter in the analysis of 
determinacy and E-stability. This is motivated by the fact that there are different values of 
habit parameter used in previous studies, from no habit as reported by Woodford (1999), to a 
moderate value of 0.59 as reported by Smets & Wouters (2003) and to an extremely high 
value of 0.98 as reported by Bouakez et al. (2005).8 In fact, from Table 2.1 earlier, we have 
shown empirically that there might be different degrees of consumption persistence among 
countries in the world.  
                                                          





In addition to the issue of determinacy and E-stability, we extend the work by evaluating the 
optimal constrained policy rule where consumption habit matters. Unlike similar studies that 
derive the optimal policy rule from determinate ones, in our work, the optimal policy rule 
only can be chosen among determinate and E-stable policy rules. If not, the economy takes to 
undesired equilibrium. For this purpose, it is assumed that central bank minimises an expected 
loss of function in terms of the variability of inflation and output. Then, among all 
determinate and E-stable policy rules, we try to find the one that gives the minimum loss. We 
evaluate this within and between the Taylor-type class of interest rate rules and compare the 
results to find the most advantageous one. Our approach closely relates to the work of Evans 
& McGough (2007) who study the optimal constrained interest rate rule in a model of 
McCallum & Nelson (1999), Clarida, Gali, & Gertler (2000) and Woodford (2003). They 
claim that if policy makers compute the optimal unconstrained interest rate rule, within the 
Taylor-type class, they may lead to the rule that generates indeterminacy and/or E-instability. 
This problem becomes critical by the uncertainty of the structural parameters since an optimal 
rule that is determinate may be E-unstable under learning assumption. Unfortunately, the way 
that they have set the model is ad-hoc while in our work we try to derive it using a micro-
founded approach as shown in Appendix 2.2.  
In the following section, we present the model and discuss the parameter values employed. 
We start the analysis by considering a case where households are endowed with habit in 
consumption with no cost of monetary channel and no inertia in policy rate. For each type of 
Taylor rules considered, we present the analysis of determinacy and E-stability of REE. We 
extend the analysis by assuming the cost of monetary channel and policy inertia are presented 
in the model, subsequently. After identifying determinate and E-stable policy rules, we 




rule and compare the results to find the most advantageous rule that offers the highest welfare, 
i.e. the lowest loss of function in terms of inflation and output variation. Finally, we conclude 
the analysis with a summary of our findings in the last section.  
 
2.2. The Model 
The model used is a DSGE model within the New Keynesian (NK) theoretical framework that 
captures the behaviour of some sectors in a closed economy environment. The economy 
consists of households, monopolistically competitive firms and central bank. There is a 
continuum of goods that enter the households’ consumption basket. Households are endowed 
with habit in consumption and get utility from consuming habit-adjusted goods. Since habit is 
superficial, they are formed at the level of aggregate goods9. Initially, we assume that habit is 
external to the households and internal latter on. Habit is external when households’ 
consumption depends on what other households are consuming and the desire to catch up to 
what others are consuming10. In contrast, habit is internal if his own consumption that 
influences his habit stock and does not create a consumption externality11.  
The households supply labour to a production sector but have no monopoly power to set their 
wages. In addition, it is assumed that the wage is flexible such that it can be set in every 
period. Firms set their prices in order to maximise a profit subject to demand for their goods. 
Prices are staggered and follow the Calvo (1983) where a fraction of  of the firms set their 
prices according to rule of thumb and the remainder (1 − ) is based on current optimisation. 
Unlike equations in households and firms that are based on microeconomic foundations, the 
                                                          
9 Habit in consumption formed in individual good is known as deep habit.  
10 See Fuhrer (2000) and Smets & Wouters (2003). 




monetary sector in the model is typically rudimentary. This sector is represented by the 
Taylor-type interest rate rule. Below is an explanation of each sector.  
 
2.2.1. Households 
There is a continuum household 𝑗 ∈ [0,1] whose utility consists of consumption (𝐶) and 
leisure (𝑙 = 1 − 𝑁). The household divides its unit of time into labour (𝑁) and leisure (𝑙) and 
gets utility from consuming habit-adjusted goods and disutility from worked hour.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸0




)          2.1 




  where 𝑔𝑡 is a preference shock that follows an AR (1) 
process as  𝑔𝑡 = 𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡
𝑔
 while 𝐻𝑡 = ℎ{𝐶𝑡−1
𝐷(𝐶𝑡−1
𝑜 )1−𝐷} is the habit stock endowed by 
household 𝑗12. Note that 𝑢𝑡
𝑔
 is a zero mean white noise process with variance 𝜎𝑔. 
Parameter 𝐷 ∈ [0,1] indicates the way of habit is formed while parameter ℎ ∈ [0,1) denotes 
the habit parameter. We set 𝐷 = 0 when habit is external and 𝐷 = 1 when it is internal to 
households. Other parameters are 𝛽 ∈ (0,1) denoting a discount factor and 𝛼 > 0 and > 0 
corresponding to a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion of consumption and labour, 
respectively. Note that 𝐸0
∗ represents the subjective expectation of household, conditional on 
information available time 𝑡 = 0. Under rational expectations, 𝐸𝑡
∗ corresponds to 
mathematical expectation operator 𝐸𝑡 evaluated using the objective distributions of the 
stochastic shocks, which are assumed known by the rational household. Thus, the expectation 
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operation is taken to describe the aggregate behaviour regardless of the true nature of the 
agents’ expectation formation.  
Household’s utility function is constrained by her budget constraint as follows: 






+ 𝐹𝑡         2.2 
They earn income from wage (𝑊) received by allocating their time to work (𝑁) and portfolio 
(𝐵) they hold at the end of time 𝑡 − 1. In addition to consumption, they leave some portfolio 
at the end of period 𝑡. In this model, we do not explicitly introduce money in which its role is 
only for the unit of account.  
Maximising their utility as shown in equation (2.1), subject to the budget constraint in 









) = 1     2.3 
Differentiating with respect to 𝑁𝑡 and 𝐵𝑡 gives the intertemporal setting the marginal rate of 








      2.4 
Log-linearising equation (2.3) and (2.4) and using the fact that ?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 in equilibrium, we 

























[(?̃?𝑡 − ℎ?̃?𝑡−1) − ℎ𝛽𝐷(𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ?̃?𝑡)] + ?̃?𝑡   2.6 
Note that variable in log is represented by a small case letter, e.g.  𝑦𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡), and its log 
deviation around the stead state is represented by a small letter with tilde ?̃?𝑡 = log(𝑌𝑡) −
log (𝑌). 
In addition to maximising their life time utility, a representative household 𝑗 also minimises 
their expenditure by deciding the composition of aggregate goods (𝐶) subject to its constraint.  
𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∫ 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖
1
0








= 𝐶?̅?      
where 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] is an index of differentiated goods 𝑖 and  is the elasticity substitution of 
consumption goods.  






𝐶𝑡       ∀ 𝑖          2.7 
and consumer price index (CPI), 







         2.8 
 
2.2.2. Firms 
Similar to households, firm 𝑖 ∈ [0,1]  face two problems, i.e. minimising the cost of using any 




differentiated goods they produce, which are imperfect substitutes. They set the price 
considering the demand for their products. They can set their own prices based on an 
optimisation as well as a rule of thumb, so there is presumably price stickiness in this sector. 
We follow the Calvo (1983) to model price rigidity of the firm since it is relatively more 
tractable and mathematically convenient. For simplicity, we also assume that production 
technology is the same across all goods.  
The firms employ labour supplied by the households. In every period 𝑡, they minimise their 
cost of production consisting of wages (𝑊𝑡) by choosing labour input 𝑁𝑖𝑡 subject to the 




)𝑁𝑖𝑡   𝑠. 𝑡.  𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡       2.9 
𝐴𝑡 represents a technology and follows an autoregressive process 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑡) = 𝜌𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑡−1) +
𝑢𝑡
𝑎 where 𝜌𝑎 is an autoregressive coefficient and 𝑢𝑡
𝑎 is a normal distributed shock to a 
technology with mean zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝑎. We normalize the steady-state value of 
technology to 1. 
First order condition with respect to 𝑁𝑖𝑡 gets labour demand for each firm:  
𝑁𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 𝐴𝑡⁄             2.10 




            2.11 
Notice that 𝑖 index is dropped since firms are identical.  




?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡          2.12 
𝑚?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡          2.13 
Combining equation (2.6), (2.12), and (2.13), we get the equation that relates real marginal 




+ ) ?̃?𝑡 − (
𝛼ℎ
(1−ℎ)(1−ℎ𝛽𝐷)




∗?̃?𝑡+1 − ( + 1)?̃?𝑡 
            2.14 
After choosing the level of labour input, firms simultaneously maximise their profit subject to 
three constraints, i.e. demand function, production function and restriction for some firms to 
adjust their price in each period. As previously mentioned, we follow the Calvo (1983) model 
where there is a fraction of firms  that cannot reset their price based on optimisation but 
simply follow previous price 𝑃𝑡+𝑠|𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡+𝑠−1 . There is also another fraction of firms 1 −  
that successfully change their price based on the optimisation behaviour 𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤. In this 
condition, firms maximise their profit which is discounted by 𝑠-step ahead stochastic discount 
factor 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 and the probability of not being able to set the price in the future periods as 
follows:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸0




−  𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑠) 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝑠])       2.15 
subject to the demand function for each product as follows:  











∗𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 is the stochastic discount factor and its relation to 𝑅𝑡 is given 
by 𝐸𝑡
∗𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1 = 1 𝑅𝑡⁄ . Meanwhile, parameter ∈ [0,1] represents a natural index of price 
stickiness and  𝑚𝑐𝑡 is real marginal cost.  
This maximisation problem yields the price set by firms: 
𝐸0
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Γ𝑡+𝑠 (( −1)  𝑀𝐶𝑡+𝑠) 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝑠    






)     2.17 
Log-linearising equation (2.17) around its steady state yields: 
𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽 )(?̃?𝑡 +𝑚?̃?𝑡) + 𝛽 𝐸𝑡
∗𝑝𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑤       2.18 
By using the definition of aggregate price level and the fact that all firms resetting their prices 
choose an identical price 𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤, we have the relation between an optimal price 𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 with 
aggregate price index 𝑃𝑡. 
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) 𝑝𝑡 − (1− ) 𝑝𝑡−1        2.20 
Substituting equation (2.20) for  𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 and 𝑝𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑤 in (2.18), we get 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡







Finally, we can substitute equation (2.14) into (2.21) to get the standard New Keynesian 













( + 1)?̃?𝑡                2.22 
 
2.2.3. Central Bank 
We assume that central bank uses a conventional interest rate rule that responds to inflation 
and output. However, when this policy rule is operated, central bank is constrained by data 
availability. Thus, in our model, we consider three alternatives in interest rate rule: Firstly, a 
case in which past data of inflation and output are used by central bank. Secondly, a case in 
which current data of inflation and output are not available and need to be estimated or 
forecasted. Thirdly, a case where current data of inflation and output are available. For each 
of these alternatives, we differentiate further by evaluating whether central bank does interest 
rate smoothing or not when conducting monetary policy. In total, there are six types of Taylor 
rule considered in this chapter with a specification for each rule as follows: 
Responds to lagged data,  
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝑟?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑦?̃?𝑡−1       2.23 
Responds to forward expectation,  
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝑟?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝜋𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑦𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1      2.24 




?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝑟?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦?̃?𝑡        2.25 
Parameter 𝜏𝑟, 𝜏𝜋  and 𝜏𝑦 are non-negative values that measure the degree of responsiveness of 
policy rule to past interest rate, inflation and output. Note that the other three types of Taylor 
rule are obtained by setting 𝜏𝑟 = 0 in equation (2.23) to (2.25), which imply no interest rate 
smoothing (no policy inertia). 
 
2.2.4. Equilibrium and Market Clearing 
The equilibrium of the model is a sequence of prices {𝑅𝑡, 𝑃𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡} and an allocation {𝑌𝑡, 𝐶𝑡, 𝐵𝑡} 
such that all first order conditions and constraints hold, and all markets are clear.  




)𝑌𝑡          2.26 
where this aggregate profit is rebated to the households. 
Good market is clear when,  
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡          2.27 
while for bond market, it is a zero net supply.  







2.3. Methodology and Calibration 
2.3.1. Methodology 
We begin the analysis of each system of equations by presenting the conditions for a unique 
determinate REE to exist (i.e. determinacy condition). In order to do so, the system of 
equations is set in the form of: 
𝐸𝑡𝐺𝑡+1 = 𝛺𝐺𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡          2.29 
where 𝐺𝑡 is a vector of endogenous variables including its lag and 𝑍𝑡 is a vector of exogenous 
variables.  
The above system is required to have the correct number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle, 
conditional on the number of free and predetermined variables. If that is the case, then there 
exists a unique stationary REE. If not, then a particular policy rule can yield several stationary 
REE (indeterminacy) or none at all that takes to undesirable economic outcome. Unlike a full 
forward looking model used by Bullard & Mitra (2002), in our model framework, we 
incorporate one additional feature, i.e. habit in consumption. As the result, there is at least one 
pre-determined variable along with the other free variables. Notice that the minimum size of 
Ω is 3 x 3 that encourages us to do most of determinacy analysis numerically, instead of 
analytically.  
With regards to E-stability analysis, we follow a method developed by Evans & Honkapohja 
(2001). At first, it is required that the system of equations has a unique stationary REE, e.g. in 
terms of minimum state variable (MSV) solution. We then relax the assumption of rational 
expectation by using the assumption of adaptive learning. Here, we imagine that economic 




parameters when the new data becomes available. Recall that a unique stationary equilibrium 
under the RE assumption is not necessarily stable under RLS learning. For this to happen, we 
need other criteria, i.e. E-stability. Although indeterminate and explosive solution could be E-
stable, we argue that such equilibrium should be avoided by policy makers13. 
In order to illustrate the concept of E-stability, consider the general class of log-stabilised 
model as follows: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 + 𝐵3𝑍𝑡       2.30 
𝑍𝑡 = ℱ𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡         2.31 
where 𝑆𝑡 is an 𝑛 𝑥 1 vector of endogenous variables, 𝐵0 is an 𝑛 𝑥 1 vector of constants, 
𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝐵3 and ℱ are 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrices of coefficients, and 𝑍𝑡 is an 𝑛 𝑥 1 vector of exogenous 
variables which is assumed to follow a stationary AR (1) process, so that 𝜖𝑡 is an 𝑛 𝑥 1 vector 
of white noise term.  
Following McCallum (1983), the MSV solution for the above system of equations takes the 
form14:  
𝑆𝑡 = ?̅? + ?̅?𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑐̅𝑍𝑡         2.32 
where ?̅? = 0, and ?̅? and 𝑐̅ are given by: 
?̅? = (I − 𝐵2?̅?)
−1𝐵1            2.33 
 𝑐̅ = (I − 𝐵2?̅?)
−1
(𝐵3 + ℱ𝐵2𝑐̅)       2.34 
                                                          
13 See Evan & Honkapohja (2001, p.219) for a discussion about learning stability of explosive solutions. 
14 The MSV solution of RE model can also be obtained using a method of Blanchard & Khan (1980). See 




in which matrix (𝐼 − 𝐵2?̅?)
−1 is assumed to be invertible. Note that equation (2.34) may yields 
multiple solutions for ?̅? and determinacy corresponds to a condition in which there is a unique 
solution for ?̅? with all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. 
In order to evaluate E-stability of the MSV solution, we assume that agents have a perceived 
law of motion (PLM) of the form:  
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑍𝑡         2.35 
We then compute the following expectation by assuming the time 𝑡 information set does not 
include 𝑆𝑡. 
𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑆𝑡 + 𝑐ℱ𝑍𝑡 = (𝐼 + 𝑏)𝑎 + 𝑏
2𝑆𝑡−1 + (𝑏𝑐 + 𝑐ℱ)𝑍𝑡    2.36 
Plug in the above expectation to the original system i.e. equation (2.30), we obtain an actual 
law of motion (ALM) as follows: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵2(𝐼 + 𝑏)𝑎 + (𝐵2𝑏
2 + 𝐵1)𝑆𝑡−1 + (𝐵2𝑏𝑐 + 𝐵2𝑐ℱ + 𝐵3)𝑍𝑡    2.37 
The mapping from the PLM to the ALM is then given by: 
𝑇(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) = [𝐵2(𝐼 + 𝑏)𝑎, 𝐵2𝑏
2 + 𝐵1, 𝐵2𝑏𝑐 + 𝐵2𝑐ℱ + 𝐵3]     2.38 
The E-stability condition is characterised by the following matrix differential equations: 
𝑑
𝑑𝜏
(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) = 𝑇(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) − (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐)          2.39 
The MSV solution (?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑐̅) is the fixed point of equation (2.39). We say that a particular 
MSV solution (?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑐̅) is E-stable if the MSV fixed point of the differential equation (2.39) is 




solution, assuming that the time 𝑡 information set (1, 𝑆𝑡−1
′ , 𝑍𝑡), the eigenvalues of the 
matrices:  
?̅?′⊗𝐵2 + 𝐼 ⊗ 𝐵2?̅? − 𝐼,                2.40 
ℱ𝐵2 + 𝐵2?̅? − 𝐼,                2.41 
𝐵2 + 𝐵2?̅? − 𝐼,             2.42 
need to have negative real parts, where 𝐼 denotes an identity matrix. If any eigenvalue of the 
above matrices has a positive real part, then MSV solution is not E-stable. This means a small 
expectation error can drive the system away from the REE. Notice that the MSV solution for  
?̅? is crucial for learning stability as it affects the E-stability conditions.  
After describing the concept of determinacy and E-stability, we convey a method of 
computing co-movement matrix, i.e. the variance-covariance matrix. The standard solution of 
the RE will take the form of a VAR (1) characterised by a subset of the state variables 𝑀𝑡, 
with the other variables of interest ?̂?𝑡 are given by specified linear function of the state 
variables.  
We consider a generic solution of the RE model as follows:    
𝛭𝑡 = Θ𝑀𝑡−1 + Υ𝑢𝑡 that is equivalent to equation (2.32)     2.43 
?̂?𝑡 = Γ𝑀𝑡          2.44 
Where parameter Θ, Υ and Γ are the relevant deep parameters. 𝛭𝑡 is a vector of state variables 
and the components of 𝑢𝑡 are exogenous white noise shocks, with mean zero and variance Σ𝑢. 




government spending, a monetary policy shock, etc. Since we are interested in the co-
movement of 𝑀𝑡, then we have to compute its variance-covariance as: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑀𝑡) = 𝐸𝑀𝑡𝑀𝑡
′         2.45 
In practice, there are two convenient ways to compute the variance-covariance matrix, i.e. 
numerically and analytically. We do this analytically and follow the procedure as the 
following15.  
By using the stationary assumption, we have: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑀𝑡) = Θ 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑀𝑡)Θ
′ + Υ 𝛴𝑢Υ
′      2.46 
This can be solved for 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑀𝑡) by vectorising the equation and using a formula of: 
𝑉𝑒𝑐 (𝐴𝐵𝐶) = (𝐶′⊗𝐴)𝑉𝑒𝑐 (𝐵)       2.47 
We obtain: 
𝑉𝑒𝑐 (𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑀𝑡)) = (𝐼 − Θ⊗ Θ)
−1𝑉𝑒𝑐 (Υ𝛴𝑢Υ
′)     2.48  
This allows us to evaluate the variance of each state variable. In addition to that, we can 
compute the variance-covariance of  ?̂?𝑡 as: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̂?𝑡) = Γ 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑀𝑡)Γ
′        2.49 
 
  
                                                          





2.3.2. Calibration  
We calibrate the parameters in the model using standard values used in a DSGE literature 
with a feature of habit in consumption. We begin by assuming an annual real rate of interest 
of 4% which implies a discount factor 𝛽 of 0.99. An inverse of intertemporal substitution in 
consumption 𝛼 is calibrated at 1.5 while an inverse of Frisch labour supply elasticity  is 
chosen at the value of 1. Smets & Wolters (2003) estimate parameter 𝛼 around 1.39 for the 
euro area while Leith et al. (2012) calibrate it equal to 2. These two studies have incorporated 
the feature of superficial habit in consumption in their model’s specification such that our 
choice for 𝛼 falls in within this range. Meanwhile, our choice for  is in line with the findings 
found in Faberman (2010) and Fiorito & Zanella (2012) who estimate the value of macro 
Frisch elasticity between 0.6 and 1.6. Notice that all the above choices are also used in 
Ravenna & Walsh (2006). 
For the degree of price stickiness , we set this parameter equal to 0.75 which is fairly 
standard in the DSGE literature. This implies an average duration of optimal price changes of 
four quarters. Concerning habit parameter ℎ, we allow this parameter to vary. The argument is 
that there might be different levels of habit persistence in aggregate consumption among 
countries, as argued in the section of introduction. Thus, we consider three different values of 
habit parameter ℎ, i.e. 0, 0.3, and 0.6 and evaluate how these values affect determinacy and E-
stability of simple Taylor rules. For the purpose of computing the optimal constrained policy 
rule, we calibrate the persistence of taste shock 𝜌𝑔 equal to 0.85 and technology shock 
𝜌𝑎  equal to 0.8 with standard deviation of these two shocks 𝜎𝑔 and 𝜎𝑎 are 0.35 and 0.55, 
respectively. Based on the existing literature, the standard deviation of taste shock and 
technology shock varies considerably and depends on the structure of the models and any 




these values, under a 95% of confidence interval, within the range of 0.23 to 0.63 and 0.46 to 
0.87, respectively. Notice that our calibrations differ in some respects from Bullard & Mitra 
(2002, 2007) e.g. the intertemporal elasticity substitution and the parameter relating to the 
degree of price stickiness, among other parameters. Fortunately, it does not affect the ability 
of our model to replicate their findings and conclusions, especially in a case where habit in 
consumption is absent in our model. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
Calibration used in the numerical analysis 
Quarterly frequency 
Parameter Description Value 
𝛽 Discount Factor 0.99 
𝛼 Coefficient of risk aversion 1.5 
 Inverse of Frisch labour supply elasticity 1.0 
 Degree of price stickiness 0.75 
𝜏𝑦 Reaction to output  0 ≤ 𝜏𝑦 ≤ 10 
𝜏𝜋 Reaction to inflation 0 ≤ 𝜏𝜋 ≤ 5 
𝜏𝑟 Policy rate smoothing 0 ≤ 𝜏𝑟 ≤ 1 
𝛿 Dichotomous parameter for cost channel 0 or 1 
𝜌𝑔 AR (1) coefficient of taste shock  0.85 
𝜌𝑎 AR (1) coefficient of productivity shock 0.80 
𝜎𝑔 Std. Deviation of taste shock 0.35 







2.4. Learning about Monetary Policy Rules 
2.4.1. Responds to Lagged Data  
After presenting the model’s derivation, the methodology and the calibrated value of the 
structural parameters, then we convey the analysis to the discussion about the numerical 
outcomes. First, we consider a case in which lagged data are used in monetary policy. Under 
this condition, policy rate is adjusted based on past performance of inflation and output. This 
policy rule is probably the most practical one as at the time it is executed past data have been 
collected and are ready to be used in the analysis.  
We consider lagged data in policy rule as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑦?̃?𝑡−1         2.50 
Before we proceed with the simulation results, we explain briefly how our numerical 
approach works. In all simulation exercises, we begin by setting the value of habit parameter 
ℎ equal to 0 and varying the policy parameter 𝜏𝜋 and 𝜏𝑦 in the interest rate rule. When ℎ is set 
at 0, it is assumed that households are not endowed with habit in consumption. In such cases, 
the model shrinks to the model of Bullard & Mitra (2002), i.e. a forward looking NK model. 
We set the upper bound of 𝜏𝜋 and 𝜏𝑦 at the value of 5 and 10, respectively, and use the value 
of 0 as their lower bound. We use an increment step size of 0.05 and search over a fine grid of 
values within 0 and 5 for 𝜏𝜋 and within 0 and 10 for 𝜏𝑦. For each possible pair of policy 
parameters (𝜏𝜋, 𝜏𝑦) in this grid, we evaluate whether the Eigenvalues satisfy the condition for 
determinacy and E-stability. If both conditions are satisfied, we plot this in the figure using a 




order to analyse the effect of consumption habit on the study of determinacy and E-stability 
issue of simple Taylor-type interest rate rules.  
When consumption habit exists and central bank responds to past data, the system of 
equations is characterised by equations (2.5), (2.22) and (2.50). For the analysis of 
determinacy, the system of equation is set in the form of equation (2.29) by defining two 
artificial variables, i.e. ?̃?𝑡
𝑙  and ?̃?𝑡
𝑙 that correspond to past inflation and past output, 




 as a vector of endogenous 
variables and 𝑍𝑡 = (𝑔𝑡, ?̃?𝑡)
′ as a vector of the exogenous variables. We also obtain a matrix Ω 
that contains relevant deep parameters, as shown in equation (2.51). Note that the exogenous 
disturbance processes of  will be ignored in further analysis since the calibration of this 
parameter will not affect the study of determinacy and E-stability.  





















1 0 0 0





   2.51 
Ideally, it would be good if we could provide analytic results concerning determinacy and E-
stability of REE. Unfortunately, since the dimension of Ω is quite large, i.e. a matrix form 
with a size of 4 x 4, it is a bit complicated to reduce the system that allows for analytic 
findings16. This happens as there are two extra endogenous variables, i.e. ?̃?𝑡
𝑙 and ?̃?𝑡
𝑙  that are 
included in the system of equation. As an alternative, we consider a numerical approach 
instead of an analytical approach. Yet, as far as possible, we try to provide some intuitions for 
our numerical findings.  
                                                          
16 We can only obtain the analytic result up to three dimensions by following the method conveyed by Woodford 




As there are two predetermined variables, the above system of equation has a unique solution 
only if two Eigenvalues of Ω are inside the unit circle. Under such condition, a unique 
stationary of REE exists which means the condition for determinacy is obtained. If there are 
more than two Eigenvalues of Ω inside the unit circle, then the system faces indeterminacy 
problem since there are multiple solutions to the model. Meanwhile, if there are less than two 
Eigenvalues of Ω inside the unit circle, then the system has no solution which implies non-
existence of locally unique stationary equilibrium.  
For the analysis of E-stability, we evaluate the system of equations in the form of minimum 
state variable (MSV) solution. We substitute equation (2.50) into equation (2.5) and reduce 
the system into two equations involving the endogenous variables ?̃?𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡. Defining 𝑆𝑡 =
(?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡)
′, then the system of equations can be constructed in the form of equation (2.30) 
where 𝐵0 = 0, 



















}        2.53 
The methodology for finding the MSV solution and E-stability condition can be followed as 
sub section 2.3.1 from equations (2.30) to (2.42), where the element of 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 are given by 







Determinacy and E-stability results  
under lagged data rule 
 
𝑁𝑜 ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡 ℎ = 0.3 ℎ = 0.6 
   
 
 
Blue – B : Determinate and E-stable policy rules  
White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules 
 
 
Green – G : Determinate but E-unstable policy rules           
Red – R : Explosive path 
 
When central bank uses past data in their policy rule and we assume that no habit in 
consumption (ℎ = 0), it turns out that only a subset of policy parameter space which is 
consistent with determinacy is also consistent with E-stability (the first panel of Figure 2.1). A 
determinate and E-stable REE is attained for the values of 𝜏𝜋 > 1 and a low to moderate 
values of 𝜏𝑦 (< 3) which is denoted by a blue region. This implies out of this area, the 
economy potentially takes to an inferior equilibrium. As an illustration, the economy may be 
guided to a determinate but E-unstable equilibrium when central banks’ reaction function to 
inflation 𝜏𝜋 is lower than 1 and to output 𝜏𝑦 is higher than 3 (a green area). Under such 
condition, economic agents fail to coordinate to achieve such a unique stationary equilibrium. 
As well, the economy may be lead to more than one stationary REE but these equilibriums 
turn out to be E-unstable under RLS learning (white colour). In an extreme case, it may be 
conveyed to an explosive path where there is no stationary REE (red colour). Our finding here 











We repeat the simulation for different values of habit parameter ℎ, in particular we plot the 
result for ℎ = 0.3 and ℎ = 0.6, respectively. As discussed in the introductory section, it is 
likely that each country has different levels of habit persistence in consumption. For 
developed countries, the movement of aggregate consumption is more persistent and less 
volatile. In contrast, for developing countries we may expect that it becomes less persistence 
and more volatile. Our result shows when consumption habit becomes matter, the region of 
determinate and E-stable policy rule enlarges. As shown in the second panel of Figure 2.1, 
setting ℎ equal to 0.3 does not only increase determinacy but also E-stability. For 
determinacy, this can be observed by comparing the total area of the blue and green region 
between the second and the first panel of Figure 2.1. While for E-stability, it can be seen from 
a larger region of a blue colour (only) between the second and the first panel of Figure 2.1. 
Based on this result, we argue when habit parameter increases and lagged data rule is used, it 
becomes easier for central bank to lead the economy to a determinate and E-stable REE. We 
confirm this argument by increasing the parameter value of ℎ to 0.6. As illustrated in the third 
panel of Figure 2.1, in a situation in which habit in consumption is highly endowed by the 
households (ℎ = 0.6), it turns out that a larger region of determinate policy rules is attained. In 
addition, all these determinate policy rules become stable under learning assumption (E-
stable). 
Up to now, we have considered a situation in which households are endowed with external 
habit in consumption. Are the results significantly different if habit is internally endowed by 
households? Note that when habit is internal, the system of equations is characterised by 
equation (2A.33) and (2A.34) in Appendix 2.2 plus equation (2.50). Using a similar procedure 
to external habit and assuming central bank responds to lagged data, we can show that the 




parameter, i.e. 0.3. This means a determinate and E-stable REE is much more easily attained 
when households are endowed with an internal habit rather than an external habit. A possible 
explanation is that no externality arises when habit is internal so that the consumption 
becomes less volatile.  
What is the intuition behind the above findings? In general, a presence of the superficial habit 
in consumption increases both determinacy and E-stability. An increase in determinacy 
happens since the movement of aggregate consumption becomes less volatile which makes a 
particular response of interest rate rule on output that leads to indeterminacy problem, in an 
environment where consumption habit is absent, it now conveys to determinacy in an 
environment with consumption habit. This happens especially for a relatively high response 
of interest rate to output, in which the Taylor principle holds. Unfortunately, consumption 
smoothing only can be done at the cost of a higher volatility of inflation. As a result, a 
particular response of monetary policy to inflation that leads to determinacy, in an 
environment where no habit in consumption, it now leads to indeterminacy, in an 
environment with habit in consumption. This happens specifically for a relatively low 
response of interest rate to inflation or when the Taylor principle violates. This can be 
confirmed by seeing a larger white region in the second and third panel of Figure 2.1.   
A phenomenon where consumption smoothing increases the volatility of inflation can be seen 
from the Philip Curve equation (2.22). Intuitively, when households are endowed with habit 
in consumption, then they try hard to smooth their consumption such that a small change in 
the level of consumption easily drives inflation away from its normal rate. Meanwhile, an 
increase in E-stability is due to a relatively stable economic condition as the result of 
consumption smoothing behaviour although at the expense of more volatile inflation. This 




path will not deviate too much from a unique stationary REE. As the parameter of habit 
increases, the region of determinacy and E-stability enlarges and collides. 
 
2.4.2. Responds to Forward Expectation 
This policy rule is commonly used by a modern central bank, specifically who adopts an 
inflation targeting framework (ITF). The ITF has been widely implemented not only in 
developed countries but also in many developing countries. Under this simple rule, monetary 
authority is more forward looking by responding to future expectations of inflation and 
output. To make it obvious, we consider a policy rule as follow: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑦𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1        2.54 
When consumption habits matter and central bank responds to future expectations, our system 
of equations is characterised by equations (2.5), (2.22) and (2.54). As before, we analyse both 
determinacy and E-stability issue of this particular Taylor-type rule. For the analysis of 
determinacy, we substitute equation (2.54) into equation (2.5) and define one artificial 
variable of  ?̃?𝑡
𝑙 that associates with the variable of past output. Then, we construct the system 
of equations in the form of equation (2.29) in which 𝐺𝑡 = (?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡
𝑙)
′
 corresponds to a vector 
of endogenous variables including its lag and 𝑍𝑡 = (?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡)
′ denotes a vector of the 
exogenous variables. By doing this, we obtain a matrix Ω in which its elements are shown in 
equation (2.55) bellow. 
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Notice that the dimension of Ω is now 3 x 3 which is lower than a case where monetary 
authority responds to lagged data previously. In order to have a unique stationary REE, it is 
required that one Eigenvalues of Ω be inside the unit circle. Otherwise, the equilibrium will be 
indeterminate, if it is higher than one, and takes to an explosive path if it is less than one.   
We relax the assumption of rational expectation (RE) above by assuming agents use the RLS 
algorithm in estimating the true parameter values of the model. E-stability of REE is then 
evaluated in the form of its minimum state variable (MSV) solution. We substitute equation 
(2.54) into (2.5) and reduce the system into two equations, involving the endogenous 
variables ?̃?𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡. Defining 𝑆𝑡 = (?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡)
′, the system of equations can be written in the 
form of equation (2.30) with 𝐵0 = 0, 



















}      2.57 
The methodology for finding a MSV solution and E-stability condition is the same as the 
previous sub-section. 
When households do not endow with habit in consumption, a response to forward expectation 
easily leads to indeterminacy problem. As shown in the first panel of Figure 2.2, the white 
and light blue region correspond to a combination of policy parameters that takes the 
economy into indeterminate equilibrium. In details, indeterminate and E-unstable equilibrium 
exists when the Taylor principle is violated, i.e. 𝜏𝜋 < 1, while E-stable but indeterminate 




mentioned previously, the only rule that should be considered by monetary authority is the 
one that leads to determinacy and E-stability. This can be obtained by considering the 
combination of policy parameters within the region of 𝜏𝜋 > 1, where the Taylor principle is 
satisfied, and 𝜏𝑦 < 3. Notice that unlike the response to lagged data, when monetary authority 
responds to forward expectation all the subset of the parameter space which is consistent with 
determinacy is also consistent with E-stability. Again, we successfully replicate the result of 
Bullard & Mitra (2002) for a case where central bank responds to forward expectation when 
habit in consumption is absent. 
Figure 2.2 
Determinacy and E-stability results under  
forward expectation rule  
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Blue – B : Determinate and E-stable policy rules 
White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules 
 
 
Light Blue – L : Indeterminate but E-stable policy rules 
 
 
We now consider a situation in which households endow with habits in consumption (ℎ is set 
at 0.3) and central bank uses future data in its interest rate rule. As shown in the second panel 
of Figure 2.2, the existence of habit in consumption enlarges both determinacy and E-stability 
within policy parameters while indeterminacy region, at the same time, get smaller. The 









data. When households smooth their consumption, output becomes less volatile while 
inflation gets more volatile. As a result, a particular response of interest rate to output, 
specifically when 𝜏𝜋 > 1, that leads to indeterminacy problem in a model without the feature 
of consumption habit, now it leads to determinacy in the model with habit in consumption. An 
increase in determinacy region is then followed by an increase in E-stability region. This 
happens as in general the economy gets more stable such that economic agents are easier to 
learn this unique stationary REE. As habit parameter increases, i.e. ℎ = 0.6, E-unstable and 
indeterminate region disappears and is replaced by E-stable and determinate region, as shown 
in the third panel of Figure 2.2. Notice that this result is similar to the third panel of Figure 
2.1.  
 
2.4.3. Responds to Contemporaneous Data  
The last policy rule considered in the analysis is a policy rule that responds to 
contemporaneous data of inflation and output. A response to contemporaneous data seems 
impractical since monetary authority does not have complete information on variables, such 
as inflation and output, in the period where they are making a decision. However, assuming 
one quarter is long enough to collect all data and monetary authority uses these data 
instantaneously, then it becomes plausible for us to consider this policy rule in the analysis. 
We consider a policy rule that responds to contemporaneous data as follows: 




Alternatively, we can assume that monetary authority responds to contemporaneous 
expectation data17. Either the latter or the former, it turns out that both of these policy rules 
give the same result for the study of determinacy and E-stability.  
A procedure for analysing determinacy and E-stability condition is exactly the same as 
discussed earlier. Setting the system in the form of equation (2.29), we have Ω in which its 
elements are given by equation (2.59) below. 

















1 0 0 }
 
 
   2.59 
For determinacy, it is required that one Eigenvalue of Ω is inside the unit circle since only one 
predetermined variable includes in the model, i.e. past output ?̃?𝑡
𝑙. If not, the economy takes to 
indeterminate equilibrium or goes to an explosive path. Meanwhile for the analysis of E-




















In an environment where there is no habit in consumption, i.e. a full forward looking NK 
model, responds to contemporaneous data easily leads the economy to a determinate and E-
stable REE, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. E-unstable and indeterminate equilibrium are attained 
                                                          





when the Taylor principle is violated, that is an interest rate reaction function to inflation is 
lower than 1. In contrast, a determinate and E-stable REE exists when the Taylor principle is 
satisfied. Surprisingly, determinacy and E-stability region does not alter although the feature 
of habit in consumption is introduced with different values of habit parameter. This is an 
important finding since it allows us to claim the superiority of this type of policy rule over the 
others.  
Based on the above result, there are at least two advantages of considering this simple policy 
rule: Firstly, it leads to a higher probability of getting determinate and E-stable policy rules in 
the case where the value of habit parameter is low. Secondly, it is effective for a model with 
parameters uncertainty, i.e. when the level of habit persistence is not easily observed. Notice 
that Figure 2.3 is similar to the third panel of Figure 2.1 and 2.2, above. 
Figure 2.3 
Determinacy and E-stability results under 
contemporaneous data rule  
 
0 ≤ ℎ ≤ 0.6 
Figure 2.4 
Determinacy and E-stability results with cost 
channel under various Taylor-Type policy rules 
 
ℎ = 0.6 
 
 
          
         Blue – B : Determinate and E-stable policy rules  
         White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules                      
                 
                Blue – B : Determinate and E-stable policy rules 








2.4.4. Cost of Monetary Channel 
In earlier work, we have shown when households are endowed with habit in consumption, it 
becomes easier for central bank to lead the economy to a determinate and E-stable REE. 
Moreover, as consumption habit is highly persistent, the type of Taylor rules used by central 
bank becomes irrelevant since it leads to the same probability of getting a determinate and E-
stable REE. Now, we slightly modify the environment of the model by assuming there is a 
cost of monetary channel and learn how this additional assumption makes a difference to the 
earlier results. In particular, we are interested in analysing the effect of the cost channel of 
monetary transmission, under an otherwise version of NK model with habits in consumption, 
on determinacy and E-stability issue of simple Taylor-type rules.  
Based on the existing literature, there have been some earlier studies that have analysed the 
cost channel of monetary transmission. Among them is Ravenna & Walsh (2006) who 
provide the empirical evidence of the cost channel in the U.S. They also show the effect of 
cost channel in terms of monetary policy and find that a trade-off between stabilising inflation 
and output arises endogenously as a consequence of the cost channel. In the same spirit, we 
assume an endogenous cost channel for central bank. To be specific, we assume that the cost 
channel is present when marginal cost depends directly on the nominal interest rate. Unlike 
Tuesta & Llosa (2007) who employ this assumption under a full forward looking NK model, 
we employ it by assuming households are endowed with a high persistence of habits in 
consumption in an otherwise version of NK model. Since a marginal cost depends directly on 
the nominal interest rate, it is assumed that firms must borrow an amount of wage income 
from intermediaries at the gross nominal interest rate. Hence, equation (2A.11) in Appendix 
2.2 needs to be changed slightly to  𝜑𝑡 =
𝑅𝑡𝑤𝑡
𝐴𝑡
 in which 𝑅𝑡 correspond to the nominal interest 




Following the same derivation procedure for the rest of the equations, we end up with an 
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Notice that the nominal interest rate does not only appear in aggregate demand side but also in 
aggregate supply side. In this way, our system of equations is now characterised by equations 
(2.5), (2.62) and any simple policy rule adopted by central bank. As before, we analyse both 
determinacy and E-stability issue under a particular Taylor-type interest rate rule.  
Our numerical result shows when habits in consumption are highly persistent, i.e. ℎ = 0.6 and 
the cost channel of monetary transmission matters, different types of simple rules lead to 
almost similar region of determinacy and E-stability although with a smaller size compared to 
the case where the cost of channel is absent (see Figure 2.4)18. This result confirms our earlier 
findings in which the presence of habit in consumption has made the type of simple policy 
rules used becomes less relevant. The result also shows that standard instrument rules can 
easily induce indeterminacy and instability under RLS learning when the cost channel is 
present. This result is in line with the findings of Llosa & Tuesta (2007). 
 
2.4.5. Policy Inertia  
Bullard & Mitra (2007) have shown the benefit of policy inertia in leading the economy to a 
determinate and E-stable REE in a full forward looking New Keynesian model. We follow 
                                                          
18 We obtain a similar region of determinacy and E-stability under policy parameters regardless the type of 




their approach but with a slightly different environment, where consumption habit matters 
with or without the cost channel of monetary transmission. As before, we set the habit 
parameter ℎ of 0.6 and consider all policy rules in equation (2.23) to (2.25) with 𝜏𝑟 > 0. 
When the cost of monetary channel is absent, an increase in the weight of policy inertia (𝜏𝑟) 
enlarges the region of determinacy and E-stability regardless of the type of simple rules 
applied by central bank (see Figure 2.5)19. Again, this result confirms about the irrelevant use 
of different simple rules in monetary policy when consumption habits matter and are highly 
persistent. Following Bullard & Mitra (2007), we also support the benefit of policy inertia in 
an increase of determinacy and E-stability region under policy parameters in a New 
Keynesian model with a feature of consumption habits either with or without the cost channel. 
Figure 2.5 
Determinacy and E-stability results with policy inertia 
 
No cost of monetary channel  
(ℎ = 0.6 and 𝜏𝑟 = 0.5) 
With cost of monetary channel 
(ℎ = 0.6 and 𝜏𝑟 = 0.5) 
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2.5. The Optimal Constrained Policy Rule when Consumption Habit Matters 
From the perspective of policy makers, an increase in a determinate and E-stable region in a 
DSGE model that features consumption habit is favourable. However, they may question 
which combination of policy parameters should be chosen in practise if many of them lead to 
a determinate and E-stable REE. We follow the concept of the optimal constrained policy 
rule, as discussed in Evans & McGough (2007). Under this concept, it is assumed that 
monetary authority has an objective to maximise the economic welfare by choosing a policy 
rule that ensures the variability of inflation and output at the minimum, conditional on 
determinacy and E-stability criteria.  
We define central banks’ objective function as follow: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜏𝜋,𝜏𝑦,𝜏𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑡) + 𝜍𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑡)         2.63 
Parameter 𝜍 represents the relative weight assigned to the variance of output that reflects the 
importance of output volatility from the perspective of central bank. When the weight is low, 
more concerns are given to inflation variation relative to output variation. We set the weight 
of this parameter equal to 1 which means both inflation and output variations are equally 
important from the perspective of central bank. The reason is that households are not only 
concerned about price stability or inflation but also about consumption volatility by trying to 
smooth their consumption in each period. Meanwhile, parameter  𝜏𝜋, 𝜏𝑦 and 𝜏𝑟 corresponds to 
monetary policy reaction function to inflation, output and inflation, respectively.  
For the purpose of evaluating the optimal constrained policy, it is necessary that some 
disturbances are introduced to the model. We assume that two exogenous shocks may hit the 
economy, i.e. a preference shock and a technological shock in which they follow an AR (1) 




preference shock equal to 0.85 and technology shock equal to 0.8 with the standard deviation 
of these two contemporaneous shocks are 0.35 and 0.55, respectively. Under different types of 
simple rule as equations (2.23) to (2.25), either with or without interest rate smoothing, we 
compute the variance-covariance of state variable ?̃?𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡 in 𝑀𝑡 using a procedure shown in 
equations (2.43) to (2.49). After vectorising the variance-covariance  𝑀𝑡, we obtain the second 
moment of ?̃?𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡 that are used to evaluate the loss function in equation (2.63). Note that 
in evaluating the optimal constrained policy rule, it is assumed that households endow with 
habit in consumption with a persistent level of 0.6 (highly persistent). The analysis starts by 
assuming no cost of the monetary channel, initially, and with the cost of monetary channel, 
later on.  
 
2.5.1. No Cost of Monetary Channel  
We have shown earlier that using current data of inflation and output in policy rule is 
favourable when there is uncertainty with regards to the degree of habit in consumption. We 
also found that the type of simple rules used by central bank turns out to be irrelevant when 
habit in consumption is highly persistent. Yet, a question that remains is how to find the 
optimal rule? The answer relies on the kind of exogenous shock that hits the economy. As 
mentioned, we assume that there are two possible types of exogenous shocks, i.e. a preference 
shock and a technology shock. For each of these shocks, we evaluate a policy rule that offers 
the minimum loss either within or between the Taylor-type interest rate rules (among the 
contemporaneous, lagged or forward policy rules). For completeness, we also consider a case 




When a positive preference shock hits the economy, among all types of policy rules 
considered, a rule that employs current data delivers the minimum loss. As illustrated in Table 
2.3, the optimal constrained policy rule is obtained when central bank responds to 
contemporaneous data of inflation and output with a combination of policy parameter 𝜏𝜋 =
4.96 and 𝜏𝑦 = 9.96, respectively. This finding holds by assuming no interest rate smoothing 
is employed by central bank.  
Table 2.3 
Optimal constrained policy rule without policy inertia   
(a preference shock) 
 Mix A* Mix B Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 9.96 5.21 9.96 
𝝉𝝅 4.96 4.96 4.96 
𝝈𝒚 0.02 0.09 0.02 
𝝈𝝅 0.02 0.05 0.04 
Loss 0.00131 0.01069 0.00161 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss of function 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 
Mix C: Forward looking interest rate rule  
The loss function gets lower when policy inertia is considered in monetary policy. Under such 
condition, the optimal constrained policy rule is attained when central bank has accessed to 
current data at the combination of policy parameter  𝜏𝜋 = 4.96,  𝜏𝑦 = 9.96 and 𝜏𝑟 = 0.7, 
respectively. This result is well reported in Table 2.4. Note that we set the upper bound of 












Optimal constrained interest rate rule with policy inertia 
(a preference shock) 
 Mix A* Mix B Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 9.96 9.81 9.96 
𝝉𝝅 4.96 1.11 4.96 
 𝝉𝒓 0.7 1 0.3 
𝝈𝒚 0.02 0.07 0.03 
𝝈𝝅 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Loss      0.00069   0.00566    0.00149  
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 
Mix C: Forward looking interest rate rule  
 
What is the intuition behind the finding? A response of policy rate to current inflation and 
current output is required since a preference shock causes output and inflation move to the 
same direction. As an illustration, a positive preference shock increases aggregate 
consumption and output that cause a price of goods to rise. To dampen this increase and 
stabilise the economy back to its steady state level, monetary policy is required to give a 
response to current inflation and current output.  Unfortunately, the above result should be 
interpreted with highest caution as it is required a very strong response of policy rate to 
output. 
Unlike a preference shock, in a case where the disturbance comes from a technology shock, 
responding to output is unnecessary. This happens as a technology shock cause inflation and 
output move to an opposite direction. Under a technology shock, the optimal constrained 
policy rule holds when central bank responds to lagged data of inflation and output at the 
combination of policy parameter  𝜏𝜋 = 1.96, and  𝜏𝑦 = 0.01, respectively (see Table 2.5). 




inertia in policy rule, the value of loss function gets lower and the optimal constrained policy 
rule is obtained when they respond to current data at the policy combination of 𝜏𝜋 = 0.26, 
 𝜏𝑦 = 0.01 and  𝜏𝑟 = 1 (see Table 2.6).  
Table 2.5 
Optimal constrained policy rule without policy inertia 
(a technological shock) 
 Mix A Mix B* Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.01 
𝝉𝝅 2.06 1.96 2.81 
𝝈𝒚 0.18 0.17 0.18 
𝝈𝝅 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Loss 0.04536 0.04194 0.04435 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 




Optimal constrained policy rule with policy inertia 
(a technological shock) 
 Mix A* Mix B Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.01 
𝝉𝝅 0.26 0.26 0.76 
 𝝉𝒓 1 1 1 
𝝈𝒚 0.14 0.14 0.15 
𝝈𝝅 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Loss 0.03349 0.03350 0.03441 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 
Mix C: Forward looking interest rate rule  
 
In a situation where a preference shock and a technology shock are jointly active, but no 
correlation between these shocks, we argue that the optimal constrained interest rule is 




value of inflation and output with the combination of policy parameter  𝜏𝜋 = 4.96 and 𝜏𝑦 =
0.21, respectively (see Table 2.7). Considering policy inertia in the analysis, the loss of 
function attains its lowest value. Under such condition, the optimal constrained rule holds 
when central bank responds to forecasted data of inflation and output at the combination 
of 𝜏𝜋 = 4.96,  𝜏𝑦 = 0.96 and  𝜏𝑦 = 0.8 (see Table 2.8).  
Table 2.7 
Optimal constrained policy rule without policy inertia 
(all shocks) 
 Mix A Mix B Mix C* 
 𝝉𝒚 0.11 0.51 0.21 
𝝉𝝅 4.96 4.96 4.96 
𝝈𝒚 0.22 0.23 0.21 
𝝈𝝅 0.10 0.12 0.12 
Loss 0.05949 0.06671 0.05767 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 




Optimal constrained interest rate rule with policy inertia 
(all shocks) 
 Mix A Mix B Mix C* 
 𝝉𝒚 0.76 0.96 0.96 
𝝉𝝅 3.16 4.31 4.96 
 𝝉𝒓 1 1 0.8 
𝝈𝒚 0.21 0.23 0.20 
𝝈𝝅 0.10 0.10 0.12 
Loss      0.05515  0.06126   0.05371 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 





2.5.2. Cost of Monetary Channel 
We extend the analysis of the optimal constrained policy rule by considering the cost of 
monetary channel in the model’s framework. Under this assumption, some earlier results have 
changed, especially for the case where a preference shock is active. When the cost channel of 
monetary transmission is present, whist at the same time habit in consumption is highly 
persistent, a high response of policy rate to output does not always required when a positive 
preference shock hit the economy. This happens as higher response to this variable leads to 
indeterminacy problem. As shown in Table 2.9, an optimal constrained interest rate rule is 
attained when central bank responds to current data of inflation and output at the combination 
of 𝜏𝜋 = 4.96 and 𝜏𝑦 = 0.01, respectively. Assuming central bank does interest rate 
smoothing, a lower loss of function is attained which implies a less variability of state 
variables or a higher economic welfare. Under such condition, the optimal rule is obtained 
when central bank responds to current data of inflation and output at the combination of 𝜏𝜋 =
4.96, 𝜏𝑦 = 0.01 and 𝜏𝑟 = 0.8, respectively (see Table 2.10). 
 
Table 2.9 
Optimal constrained policy rule without policy inertia when cost channel matters  
(a preference shock) 
 Mix A* Mix B Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.61 
𝝉𝝅 4.96 4.96 4.96 
𝝈𝒚 0.07 0.1 0.06 
𝝈𝝅 0.10 0.09 0.13 
Loss 0.01407 0.01729 0.02116 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 







Optimal constrained policy rule with policy inertia when cost channel matters 
(a preference shock) 
 Mix A* Mix B Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 1.21 0.01 
𝝉𝝅 4.96 4.96 4.96 
 𝝉𝒓 0.8 1 0.5 
𝝈𝒚 0.06 0.1 0.05 
𝝈𝝅 0.05 0.04 0.08 
Loss   0.00549  0.01258 0.00875 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 
Mix C: Forward looking interest rate rule  
 
Table 2.11 
Optimal constrained policy rule without policy inertia when cost channel matters 
(a technological shock) 
 Mix A Mix B* Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.36 
𝝉𝝅 2.16 1.91 3.41 
𝝈𝒚 0.22 0.2 0.22 
𝝈𝝅 0.13 0.12 0.17 
Loss 0.06743 0.05516 0.07488 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 
Mix C: Forward looking interest rate rule  
 
Table 2.12 
Optimal constrained policy rule with policy inertia when cost channel matters 
(a technological shock) 
 Mix A Mix B* Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.01 
𝝉𝝅 0.21 0.26 0.56 
 𝝉𝒓 1 1 1 
𝝈𝒚 0.14 0.15 0.15 
𝝈𝝅 0.13 0.11 0.13 
Loss 0.03653 0.03586    0.03840  
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 




Since a response to output is not as freely as the case of no cost of monetary channel, we 
continue a simulation exercise by evaluating this issue in which both preference and 
technology shock hit the economy simultaneously while at the same time the cost of monetary 
channel matters. In such condition, the optimal constrained policy holds when central bank 
uses a backward policy rule with the combination of policy parameters 𝜏𝜋 = 4.96 and 𝜏𝑦 =
0.01, respectively (see Table 2.13). Again, considering policy inertia in the analysis helps 
central bank to get the lowest loss in terms of the variability of inflation and output. Under 
such assumption, the optimal constrained policy rule is obtained when central bank uses a 
forward looking interest rate rule with the combination of policy parameters  𝜏𝜋 = 4.96, 𝜏𝑦 =
0.01 and  𝜏𝑟 = 1, respectively (illustrated in Table 2.14). In a case where a positive 
technology shock hits the economy, the result is not much different between a model that 
features the cost of monetary channel and a model where the cost of monetary channel is 
absent. The results are summarised in Table 2.11 and Table 2.12, respectively.  
Table 2.13 
Optimal constrained policy rule without policy inertia when cost channel matters 
(all shocks) 
 Mix A Mix B* Mix C 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.61 
𝝉𝝅 4.71 4.96 4.96 
𝝈𝒚 0.28 0.27 0.25 
𝝈𝝅 0.13 0.10 0.20 
Loss 0.09229 0.08165 0.09868 
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 







Optimal constrained policy rule with policy inertia when cost channel matters 
(all shocks) 
 Mix A Mix B Mix C* 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.01 
𝝉𝝅 2.36 3.56 4.96 
 𝝉𝒓 1 1 1 
𝝈𝒚 0.25 0.26 0.24 
𝝈𝝅 0.08 0.07 0.10 
Loss   0.06818  0.07337   0.06519  
The upper sign of * denotes a policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rate rule  
Mix B: Lagged data in interest rate rule 




We have addressed two issues in this chapter: Firstly, how determinacy and expectational 
stability (E-stability) of rational expectation equilibrium (REE) is affected by monetary policy 
when consumption habit matters. Secondly, how the optimal constrained policy rule is 
attained when consumption habit matters and the cost of monetary channel is present or 
absent. Notice that the optimal rule is constrained not only by determinacy but also E-stability 
criteria. We focus the analysis on simple Taylor-type interest rules, i.e. contemporaneous, 
lagged and forward looking rule either with or without policy inertia.  
We conclude that the presence of superficial habit in consumption does not only increase 
determinacy but also E-stability. An increase in determinacy happens as the movement of 
aggregate consumption is smoother which makes a particular response of policy rate to output 
that leads to indeterminacy, in an environment with no habit in consumption, now it leads to 
determinacy, in an environment where consumption habit matters. Yet, consumption 




result, a particular response of policy rate to inflation that leads to determinacy, in an 
environment with no habit in consumption, now it takes to indeterminacy, in an environment 
where consumption habit matters.  
Meanwhile, an increase in E-stability is due to a relatively stable economic condition as a 
result of smoothing consumption behaviour. This condition makes economic agents easier to 
learn the equilibrium dynamic so that the equilibrium path does not deviate too much from a 
unique stationary REE. As habit in consumption gets persistent, a determinate and E-stable 
region enlarges and collides regardless of the type of simple rules employed by central bank. 
This result has allowed us to claim that contemporaneous policy rule is superior to other 
simple rules. The reason is that not only in leading the economy to a determinate and E-stable 
REE with higher probability but also it is immune to the model uncertainty, i.e. when the 
degree of consumption habit is not easily observed.  
The study also shows when the cost channel of monetary transmission matter, then the 
probability of getting a determinate and E-stable REE reduces. This finding is valid not only 
in a case where consumption habit is less persistent but also when they are highly persistent. 
This happens as monetary policy does not only affect a demand side of the economy but also 
its supply side with an opposite direction. As a result, a smaller region of determinacy and E-
stability is occurred. However, considering policy inertia in interest rate rule helps central 
bank to increase this probability, regardless the type of rules adopted.   
Concerning the optimal constrained policy rule, we conclude that a decision, to choose the 
optimal policy relies on the assumption of exogenous shock that hits the economy. When a 
positive preference shock hits the economy, then responses to inflation and output are 
necessary to dampen economy volatility. In contrast, when a positive technology shock hits 




direction. The result also shows that considering policy inertia in monetary policy is very 
useful in dampening the volatility of aggregate economy. This can be confirmed by 
comparing the value of loss function in which its lowest value always attains for a policy rule 
that incorporates policy inertia.   
Overall, the above findings enrich the existing studies about determinacy and E-stability issue 
of simple Taylor-type policy rules. Unlike earlier studies that mostly incorporate the feature 
of consumption habit to improve the motion of aggregate consumption in business cycles 
analysis, in this chapter we consider it for the study of determinacy and E-stability. Although 
the model used in this chapter performs quite well in addressing some important issues 
concerning to determinacy, stability under learning and the optimal constrained policy rule, 
still, it is subject to criticism. One aspect is the way of how we set the objective function of 
central bank. In this work, central banks’ objective function is set in an ad-hoc manner where 
they try to minimise the loss of function in terms of inflation and output variation. In this way, 
our earlier results about the optimal constrained policy rule is potentially sensitive to the way 
of how we model the objective function of central bank. One way to improve this limitation is 
by modelling central banks’ objective in a way where they maximise the unconditional 
expectation of households’ welfare. Here, the welfare function is obtained by taking a second-
order approximation to the utility of the representative agents, as used in Erceg et al. (2000) 
and Woodford (2003), among others.      
Another aspect where we believe the current model can be improved is by introducing the 
feature of housing assets and financial constraint. One sector with one market of goods, as we 
use here, is too simple to characterise a real economy. Therefore, introducing housing assets 




suggestion by analysing determinacy and E-stability issue of simple Taylor-type interest rate 






Appendix 2.1. Notation 
 
Parameter Description 
𝛽 The discount factor for households 
 The elasticity of substitution among individual goods 
𝛼 The inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption 
 The inverse of the elasticity of labour supply 
 The fraction of firms that keep their price unchanged 
ℎ The habit parameter 
𝜏𝜋 Interest rate reaction function to inflation 
𝜏𝑦 Interest rate reaction function to output 
𝜏𝑟 Interest rate inertia 
𝜍 Relative weight assigned to the variance of output 
𝜌𝑔 Coefficient of preference shock AR (1) model 
𝜌𝑎 Coefficient of productivity of technology shock AR (1) model 
𝜎𝑔 Standard deviation of preference shock 






𝑁 Working Hour 
𝐵 Bond 
𝜋 Inflation 
𝑤 Real wage 
𝐹 Real lump sum profit 
𝑚𝑐 Marginal cost 
𝑅 Gross nominal interest rate 
𝑔 Exogenous taste 
𝐴 Exogenous technology 
𝑢𝑔 Normally distributed shock to taste  







Appendix 2.2. Model Derivation 
 
Households  
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by 𝑗 ∈ [0,1]. The 
composite consumption good 𝐶𝑡 that enters household’s utility function is defined as an 
aggregate of a continuum of goods, indexed by 𝑖 and of measure 1. 








                                 2A.1 
Household 𝑗 decides the composition of the consumption basket to minimise the expenditures 
subject to the constraint. 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∫ 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖
1
0








= 𝐶?̅?    
ℒ ≡ ∫ 𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖
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𝐶𝑡      ∀ 𝑖            2A.2 
Solving for 𝜓𝑡 by substituting (2A.2) into (2A.1) yields: 



































≡ 𝑃𝑡        2A.3         






𝐶𝑡      ∀ 𝑖               2A.4 
A representative household 𝑗 gets utility from habit adjusted consumption goods and disutility 









)     
S.t.     𝐶𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡 +
𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡






   
𝐻𝑡  = ℎ(𝐶𝑡−1
𝐷{𝐶𝑡−1
𝑜 }1−𝐷) with 𝐶𝑡
𝑜 is the average consumption. 
ℒ ≡ 𝐸𝑡




+ 𝑡 [𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡 +
𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡])     
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐶𝑡
= 𝛽𝑡(𝑈𝐶(𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) − 𝑡) + 𝛽
𝑡+1𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑡+1, 𝐻𝑡+1) ℎ𝐷(𝐶𝑡)
𝐷−1 {𝐶𝑡
𝑜}1−𝐷 = 0   
In equilibrium 𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡
𝑜 which allow us to write the above and upcoming equation as, 
𝑈𝐶(𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) − 𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑡+1, 𝐻𝑡+1) 𝐷𝐸𝑡
∗ 𝐻𝑡+1
𝐶𝑡
= 0       2A.6 
Note that,   
𝑈𝐶(𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) = 𝑒
𝑔𝑡(𝐶𝑡 − 𝐻𝑡)
−𝛼        
𝑈𝐻(𝐶𝑡+1, 𝐻𝑡+1) = −𝑒
𝑔𝑡+1𝐸𝑡
∗(𝐶𝑡+1 − 𝐻𝑡+1)
−𝛼             











−𝛼 = 𝑡                   2A.7 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐵𝑡
= 𝛽𝑡 𝑡 − 𝛽
𝑡+1𝐸𝑡
∗( 𝑡+1𝜋𝑡+1𝑅𝑡) = 0           
 𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡
∗( 𝑡+1𝜋𝑡+1𝑅𝑡)       2A.8 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑁𝑡
= 𝛽𝑡(𝑤𝑡 𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡 ) = 0           
 𝑤𝑡 𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡          2A.9 
                     
Firms 
A continuum of firms indexed by 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] operates under monopolistically competitive 
market with demand scheduled given by (2A.4) and a constant return to scale (CRS) 
production function. The firm employs labour provided by households and every period 





𝑀𝑖𝑛  𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑡   
𝑆. 𝑡.     𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡         2A.10 
ℒ ≡ 𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡(𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
 
Differentiating with respect to labour yields: 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑁𝑖𝑡




≡ 𝑚𝑐𝑡          2A.11 
We follow the Calvo (1983) model where there is a fraction of  of firms that does not change 
their price and another fraction 1 −  reset their price based on optimisation. The Calvo price 
setting suggests 𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝑠 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 that the price will be set at the previous effective price with 
probability 𝑠 (𝑠 = 0,1,2, … ). As a result, the remainder (1 − ) of the firms maximise the 
present value of their profit as follow: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸0




−  𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑠) 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝑠}    






 𝑌𝑡+𝑠   
𝐸𝑡
∗𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 is stochastic discount factor and its relation to 𝑅𝑡 is given by 𝐸𝑡
∗𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1 = 1 𝑅𝑡⁄   
The unconstrained optimisation problem becomes, 
𝑉 = 𝐸0










 𝑌𝑡+𝑠}   
𝑉 = 𝐸0












 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑠] 𝑌𝑡+𝑠)}  
It is possible to write 𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 instead of 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 because all firms share the same production 
technology and are price takers at the labour market.  
𝑉 = 𝐸0












 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑠] 𝑌𝑡+𝑠)}   









































































)  𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑠] 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝑠}    





) 𝑌𝑖𝑡    






 𝑌𝑡   




















)𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 0  
𝑃𝑡










 is the desired mark up in the absent of constraints on the frequency of price 
adjustment and all firms charge the same price, i.e. 𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = 𝑃𝑡  
If price is sticky, i.e. ≠ 0, then we have, 
0 = 𝐸0











)𝑀𝐶𝑡+𝑠] 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝑠  













∗𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1𝒬𝑡+1,𝑡+2…𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠  and  𝐸𝑡
∗𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝐸𝑡
∗𝐸𝑡+𝑠1
∗ 𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 are 
employed. 
Therefore, the optimal re-set price 𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 solves: 
𝐸0





















]  𝑀𝐶𝑡+𝑠)𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝑠  
           
          2A.13 
Given the fraction  of retailers do not change their price in period t; the aggregate price 




𝑃𝑡 = [(1 − )(𝑃𝑡












       2A.14 
 
Equilibrium and Market Clearing 
The equilibrium of the model is a sequence of prices {𝑅𝑡, 𝑃𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡} and an allocation {𝑌𝑡, 𝐶𝑡, 𝐵𝑡} 
such that all first order conditions and constraint hold, and all markets clear.  
The aggregate profit from the firm is: 




𝐹𝑡 = ∫ (
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡




𝐹𝑡 = ∫ (
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡






















































 from 2A.3. 




)𝑌𝑡, by assuming  𝑃𝑡 ≡ ∫ 𝑃𝑡
1
0
(𝑖)    2A.15 
This aggregate profit will be rebate to the households. 
Good market is clear when  
 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡         2A.16 
 
Steady State Level  
We assume that the steady state inflation rate and production technology are zero. 
Given (2A.13), 
0 = 𝐸0
∗∑  (𝛽 )𝑠∞𝑠=0 (𝑃
𝑁𝑒𝑤 − [
−1












]𝑀𝐶)                
The term is square bracket in above equation should be zero since 
𝑌(𝑖)
1−𝛽
 is positive.  
𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (
−1
)𝑀𝐶        2A.17 
 
Given (2A.14), 





       
 𝑃 = 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑤         2A.18 
 
Log-Linearisation around Steady State 
The variable in log-linearised around its steady state is denoted by tilde.  
For example ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) 
 
From (2A.7), 
[−𝛼(?̃?𝑡 − ℎ?̃?𝑡−1) + ℎ𝛼𝛽𝐷𝐸𝑡
∗(?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ?̃?𝑡)] (1 − ℎ)(1 − ℎ𝛽𝐷)⁄ + (1 − ℎ𝛽𝐷)𝑔𝑡 = ̃𝑡
           
          2A.19 
From (2A.8), 
 ̃𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡
∗ ̃
𝑡+1 + (?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1) − 𝜌      2A.20 
 where, 𝜌 = −𝑙𝑛(𝛽)  
From (2A.9), 
?̃?𝑡 + ̃𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡        2A.21 
Combining (2A.19) and (2A.20), we get Euler equation for the optimal intertemporal 










∗?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝜌 − 𝑔𝑡)     




















Combining (2A.19) and (2A.21), we get the intertemporal optimality condition setting the 




[(?̃?𝑡 − ℎ?̃?𝑡−1) − ℎ𝛽𝐷(𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ?̃?𝑡)] + ?̃?𝑡   2A.23 
 
From (2A.10), 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡         2A.24 
From (2A.11), 
𝑚?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡         2A.25 




[(?̃?𝑡 − ℎ?̃?𝑡−1) − ℎ𝛽𝐷(𝐸𝑡




+ ] ?̃?𝑡 − [
𝛼ℎ
(1−ℎ)(1−ℎ𝛽𝐷)





( + 1)?̃?𝑡           2A.26 
 
From (2A.13),  
𝐸0
∗∑  (𝛽 )𝑠∞𝑠=0 (1 + ?̃?𝑖𝑡+𝑠 + 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑠 + ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤) = 𝐸0
∗  ∑  (𝛽 )𝑠∞𝑠=0 (1− )𝑚𝑐
(1 +





[(1 + ℎ2𝛽𝐷)?̃?𝑡 − ℎ?̃?𝑡−1 − ℎ𝛽𝐷?̃?𝑡+1 − (1 + ℎ
2𝛽𝐷)?̃?𝑡+𝑠 + ℎ?̃?𝑡+𝑠−1 +
ℎ𝛽𝐷?̃?𝑡+𝑠+1]    
 
𝐸0
∗∑ (𝛽 )𝑠∞𝑠=0 (1 + ?̃?𝑖𝑡+𝑠 + 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑠 + ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤) = 𝐸0
∗∑ (𝛽 )𝑠∞𝑠=0 (1 + ?̃?𝑖𝑡+𝑠 + 𝑝𝑡 −
𝑝𝑡+𝑠+?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡+𝑠 +𝑚?̃?𝑡+𝑠)    
𝐸0
∗∑  (𝛽 )𝑠∞𝑠=0 𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = 𝐸0
∗∑  (𝛽 )𝑠∞𝑠=0 (?̃?𝑡+𝑠 +𝑚?̃?𝑡+𝑠)   
𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽 )𝐸𝑡
∗∑  (𝛽 )𝑠∞𝑠=0 (𝑝𝑡+𝑠 +𝑚?̃?𝑡+𝑠)      
The last equation can be cast in the recursive form. 
𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽 )(?̃?𝑡 +𝑚?̃?𝑡) + 𝛽 (1 − 𝛽 )∑  (𝛽 )
𝑠∞
𝑠=0 𝐸0
∗(𝑝𝑡+𝑠+1 +𝑚?̃?𝑡+𝑠+1)    
𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽 )(?̃?𝑡 +𝑚?̃?𝑡) + 𝛽 𝐸𝑡
∗𝑝𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑤      2A.27 
From (2A.14), 
𝑝𝑡 = (1 − )𝑝𝑡








) 𝑝𝑡 − (1− ) 𝑝𝑡−1       2A.28 
Substituting RHS of (2A.28) for  𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 and 𝑝𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑤 in (2A.27), we get 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽(𝐸𝑡
∗𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡) + 𝑚?̃?𝑡 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡

















( + 1)?̃?𝑡         2A.30 
 
Reduced Forms 
The system of equations is characterised by (2A.22) and (2A.30) which denote investment 
saving (IS) and Philip Curve (PC) equation, respectively. 

















+ ) ?̃?𝑡 −
𝛼ℎ𝜆
(1−ℎ)
?̃?𝑡−1 − ( + 1)?̃?𝑡   2A.32 




































Appendix 2.3 Solving RE Model using the Method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) 
 
We briefly explain the procedure of solving RE model using the method of Blanchard and 
Kahn (1980). This method is commonly used as a standard method of solving a RE model. 










𝑗] + Ψ𝜖𝑡+1       2B.1 
where Γ0, Γ1 and Ψ are matrices coefficient of the linearised stochastic model that are often 
composed by a combination of deep parameters. 𝑧𝑡
𝑠 is an 𝑚 𝑥 1 vector of pre-determined state 
variables and Et𝑧𝑡+1
𝑗
 is an 𝑛 x 1 vector of the jump (non-predetermined) variables with 
endogenous expectations of their forward-looking values. Meanwhile, 𝜖𝑡 corresponds to a 
vector of exogenous variables that follows a stationary process. Note that the values of jump 
variables at 𝑡 + 1 depend on the shock at 𝑡 + 1, while the values of pre-determined variables 
do not.  









𝑗] + Bϵt+1         2B.2 
where A = Γ0
−1Γ1 and B = Γ0
−1Ψ. At this point, we can evaluate the existence and the 
uniqueness of solution of the model based on the number of stable eigenvalues of matrix A. If 
the number of stable Eigenvalues is equal to the number of pre-determined variables 𝑚, then 
the solution of this RE model is exist and unique. Under this condition, the Blanchard-Kahn 
condition for determinacy is satisfied. If the number of stable eigenvalues is higher than pre-
determined variables, then the solution is still exist but not unique (multiple solution). This 
condition is defined as indeterminacy condition. In contrast, if the number of stable 
eigenvalues is lower than pre-determined variables, then there is non-existence of locally 
solution of the model. Under such condition, we says the system of equations go to explosive 
path or do not have an equilibrium path.   
Yet, identifying the existence and the uniqueness of the solution of the model is not enough. 




follows. Assuming eigenvectors of matrix A are linearly independent, matrix A is decomposed 
into A = 𝑀Λ𝑀−1 where Λ corresponds to a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of Λ along 
its diagonal, and M is a matrix of the corresponding eigenvector. For convenient, we re-order 
the composition of these eigenvalues between the ones that are lower than 1 and the ones that 
are higher than 1, in absolute value. Having this, matrix Λ transforms into a new matrix Λ̅. 
Similarly, the element of matrix M also requires to be re-ordered to ensure each element in the 










𝑗] + Bϵt+1        2B.3 












𝑗] + B̂ϵt+1       2B.4 
where B̂ =  M̅−1B and the variables with a hat are the multiplication of the variable  ?̂?𝑡
𝑖 and  
?̂?𝑡+1
𝑖  𝑖 ∈{s, j} with matrix  M̅−1, respectively.  
The strategy of finding the solution for the above system of equations is started by solving the 
unstable equation, followed by stable equation. Since eigenvalues of Λ̂22 is higher than one, 




 is obtained when 
?̂?𝑡+1
𝑗
 is set at 0 for all 𝑡. Using this result, it can be shown that the original variable 𝑧𝑡
𝑗
  can be 
written in terms of the pre-determined variables 𝑧𝑡
𝑠. After the unstable equation is solved, we 
continue solving for the stable one. Since eigenvalues of Λ̂11 is lower than one, then there is 
no instability problem arises for system of equations Et?̂?𝑡+1
𝑠 = Λ̂11?̂?𝑡
𝑠. Plug in the result for 
unstable equation into the stable equation, it can be shown that the solution for the future 
values of state variables Et𝑧𝑡+1
𝑠  can be written in terms of pre-determined variables 𝑧𝑡
𝑠 and the 
exogenous variables 𝜖𝑡+1. As the final step, plug in back the last result into the result for 
unstable equations, we obtain the solution for future values of jump variables Et𝑧𝑡+1
𝑗
 in terms 
of pre-determined variables 𝑧𝑡
𝑠 and exogenous variables 𝜖𝑡+1. Notice that, at this stage, all 
variables including forward looking or jump variables can be written as the function of the 


















] ϵt       2B.5 
So far, the methodology of solving the RE model has assumed matrix Γ0 is invertible. 
Unfortunately, this is not always a case. When matrix Γ0 is non-invertible, we need to adopt 
the Scur or QZ method to decompose matrices Γ0 and Γ1, following Klein (2000) and Sims 
(2002). 










𝑗] + Ψϵt+1       2B.6 
where matrix Q and Z have a property as follows: QQ′ = Q′Q = I = ZZ′ = Z′𝑍.  
T and S are the upper triangular matrices where 𝑠𝑖𝑖 and  𝑡𝑖𝑖 are the diagonal elements of 




remove 𝑄 by multiplying both side of the last equation with 𝑄′. From here, the procedure will 










3.1. Background and Motivation 
In Chapter 2, we have studied determinacy and E-stability issue of Taylor-type interest rate 
rules in an otherwise version of New Keynesian (NK) model with the feature of habit 
formation in consumption. We have seen when consumption habit matters, it eases the task of 
central bank to lead the economy to unique stationary rational expectation equilibrium 
(REE)20. As the parameter of habit increases, the type of simple rules used by central bank 
becomes less important since it delivers almost similar region of determinate and E-stable 
policy rules within plausible policy parameters. Unfortunately, a standard NK model with one 
sector and one market of goods, i.e. consumption goods, as used in earlier chapter, is too 
simple. This causes the model is less realistic and unable to explain the movement of other 
economic variables as shown in the empirical evidence. Thus, we add a complexity in this 
chapter by introducing durable goods, i.e. housing, in addition to consumption goods, and the 
feature of financial friction in the model. 
According to the existing literature, there are some reasons why researchers want to bring 
housing market and/or housing sector in a standard NK model: Firstly, housing investment is 
highly volatile and potentially can be used to explain the variability of aggregate output. 
Secondly, the co-movement property between housing investment and aggregate consumption 
is interested to study. Rather than moving into an opposite direction, empirical data shows 
                                                          
20 With a slight abuse of notation, the terms “unique stationary rational expectation equilibrium (REE)” and 





that housing investment tends to have a positive correlation with aggregate consumption. 
Third, a theory that explains the volatility of housing prices and a theory that explains both 
propagation and amplification of shocks are required to develop.  
The recent financial crisis has also given a good lesson about the importance of understanding 
housing and the financial markets to prevent crisis in the future. It is believed that this crisis 
was born in a housing sector which grew in a financial sector and had an impact to a real 
sector. This situation gets more difficult to manage as the financial system becomes more 
complex and interconnected to each other due to a financial innovation, leading to the 
expansion of systemic risk, especially through the mortgage market. As the result, it is argued 
that a traditional monetary policy that mainly focuses on inflation and output is not sufficient 
to avoid similar crisis in the future.  
The design of prevention and recovery policies has led to the discussion about two important 
issues: Firstly, the benefit of responding housing prices and/or financial variables (e.g. credit 
growth). Secondly, the most effective policy rule to dampen the volatility of housing prices 
and/or financial variables. In regards to the first issue, some researchers suggest that it is 
necessary for central bank to lean against surges in asset prices bubbles in order to avoid 
macroeconomic and financial instability21. While others believe that central bank should react 
to asset prices only to the extent that they contain information about future inflation and 
output growth. Greenspan (2002) explains that, since it is very difficult to identify a bubble 
before its existence is confirmed by the bursting, the Federal Reserve does not directly react 
to financial imbalances. Meanwhile, Bernanke & Gertler (1999) suggest that it is unnecessary 
for monetary policy to respond to changes in asset prices since rules that directly target asset 
                                                          




prices might have undesirable side effects of stifling the beneficial impact of the technology 
boom.  
Concerning the second issue, there is unsettled agreement among researchers whether bubbles 
in asset prices should be handled using monetary policy, via a modified Taylor-type interest 
rate rule, or an explicit macroprudential policy. For example, Kannan et al. (2012) combine 
the macroprudential instrument with an augmented interest rate rule that also reacts to 
nominal credit growth by incorporating a financial sector into the model of Iacoviello & Neri 
(2010). They find a strong monetary reaction to credit growth and houses prices increase 
macroeconomic stability. In contrast, Angelini et al. (2011) advise about the benefit of 
introducing macroprudential policy that differs from monetary policy especially when there is 
a financial or a housing market shock. In their model set up, they do not only set a clear 
distinction between macroprudential and monetary policies but also have assumed that there 
is a different institution assigned to it. Given this assumption, they evaluate the interaction 
between monetary and macroprudential policies both under and without coordination. The 
result shows that a cooperative central bank will lend a hand to the macroprudential authority, 
working for broader objectives that not just price stability in order to improve overall 
economic stability.  
Nevertheless, most of the existing studies about macroprudential policy have assumed that 
agents have a rational expectation (RE). Under this framework, it is assumed that economic 
agents are rational and know what others know in precise manner. As well, they have 
knowledge about the correct form of the economic model including all the structural 
parameters. It is worth to note that a RE framework differs from a perfect foresight 
framework in the sense that the first one has assumed that agents do not know the future 




under the RE framework agents know the probability of distribution of future exogenous 
variables, conditional on exogenous variables, but they do not know precisely the specific 
values of future exogenous variables.  
Although a RE is a useful benchmark, it turns out that it is too strong assumption. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, in practice economic theory will set the frameworks to describe the 
structure of the economy while agents behave like an econometrician by using the recursive 
learning least square (RLS) algorithm to estimate the parameter values. This approach is 
known as RLS learning in the literature. Under RLS learning, agents update the parameter 
estimates towards the true value of model parameters as new data becomes available. Recall 
that the E-stability principle states that the REE is locally stable under RLS iff it is E-stable. If 
a policy rule leads to the REE that is not E-stable, then under RLS learning, economic agents 
can collaborate with a zero probability. Such policy rule should be avoided by policy makers, 
even if it offers a high welfare gains under the RE assumption.   
In this chapter, we enrich the existing studies about determinacy and E-stability of REE in an 
environment where housing market is present and macroprudential policy interacts with 
monetary policy. We analyse the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies 
that may lead the economy to unique stationary and learnable equilibrium22. From here, the 
analysis is extended by evaluating the optimal constrained policy rule by assuming some 
exogenous shocks hit the economy, i.e. housing demand shock and technological shock. 
Unlike similar studies about optimal policy, in our work, the decision for choosing optimal 
policy is not only be constrained by determinacy criterion but also E-stability criterion since 
economic agents do not possess a rational expectation (RE).   
                                                          
22 The term “unique stationary and learnable equilibrium” can also be written as “a determinate and E-stable 




The model used is based on a simple version of Iacoviello (2005) where housing assets do not 
enter the production function. As well, no entrepreneurs and physical capital investment are 
introduced to the model. From the perspective of learning literature, our work closely relates 
to Wei (2012) who studies about learnability of REE in the framework of NK model with 
housing market but it is different from ours in two aspects: Firstly, Wei (2012) has assumed 
that policy rate reacts directly to the movement of housing prices or nominal credit, whilst in 
our work we explicitly model an operational macroprudential policy via the changing of the 
ratio of loan to value (LTV). Secondly, we assume that macroprudential policy rule reacts to 
the growth of housing prices or nominal credit while Wei (2012) has assumed that interest 
rate responds to the percentage deviation of housing prices and nominal credit from its steady 
state level.   
Our motivation to consider the growth of housing prices or nominal credit comes from the 
fact that observing the growth of these variables is putatively easier and practical than 
identifying the percentage deviation of housing prices and credit from its steady state level. 
Several authors have argued in favour of targeting growth over the gap on the grounds that the 
gap is difficult to observe in real time e.g. McCallum (2001), Orphanides (2002), and 
Orphanides & Williams (2006). Recently, Sim (2013) have analysed the welfare 
consequences of responding the growth rate of output and the output gap in a standard DSGE 
NK model with both nominal and real friction. He concludes that a response to the growth 
rate of output, which is easier to observe than the gap, is often welfare improving, with the 
gains from growth-targeting larger under the same sets of circumstances under which gap-
targeting is costly. 
Meanwhile, a requirement to explicitly model a macroprudential policy is in line with some 




others is Antipa et al. (2010) who argue that macroprudential policies would have been 
effective in smoothing the past credit cycle and in reducing the intensity of the recession. 
Another is Angelini et al. (2011) who found that macroprudential policies are most helpful to 
counter financial shocks that lead the credit and asset prices booms. There are also some 
studies that show ineffective use of policy rate in handling a bubble in asset prices. Kohn 
(2010) claims that an aggressive use of central bank policy rate to address the built-up of 
financial imbalances, or to deflate an incipient bubble in some asset categories, is view by 
some as too blunt a response, as other sectors of the economy will be adversely affected as a 
consequence. Gelain et al. (2013) also suggest that a direct response to either housing prices 
or credit growth in the central bank interest rate rule has a serious drawback of substantially 
magnifying the volatility of inflation. Under the same spirit as the above mentioned literature, 
we consider an operational macroprudential policy, based on the Taylor-type automatic rule. 
To be specific, we consider rules for the loan to value (LTV) ratio that react inversely to the 
growth of housing prices or nominal credit. These rules can be a simple illustration of how a 
macroprudential policy could work in practice.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model. It explains the 
behaviour of households (patient and impatient households), firms (wholesalers and retailers), 
and central bank who conducts both monetary and macroprudential policies. Section 3.3 
discusses the methodology and the calibration for parameters used in the model. Section 3.4 
explains the result of our study about determinacy and E-stability for various combinations of 
monetary and macroprudential policy rules. Section 3.5 discusses the optimal constrained 






3.2. The Model 
We use a simple version of Iacoviello (2005) in our analysis in which asset market 
fluctuations can have real effects to the economy through a credit channel. Similar to Wei 
(2012), we assume that housing assets do not enter the production function, and we do not 
model any entrepreneurs and physical capital investment. Yet, the model is different by which 
policy instrument is used by central bank to respond to housing prices or nominal credit. In 
our model, it is assumed that there is an active macroprudential policy that works through the 
LTV rule as a way to moderate housing prices or credit growth. Meanwhile, Wei (2012) has 
used policy rate to dampen the variability in housing prices, while the LTV is set at a fix ratio 
and does not respond to economic conditions, following Iacoviello (2005).  
The model features patient and impatient households, wholesaler and retailer firms, and 
central bank that conducts both monetary and macroprudential policies. Households supply 
their labour to wholesaler firms and get utility from consumption goods and housing service. 
Housing is the main vehicle for accumulating wealth in the economy. Patient and impatient 
households are savers and borrowers, respectively. Borrowers are credit constrained and need 
collateral to obtain loans. We assume that savers can lend to borrowers directly, but the 
amount is controlled by central bank through the LTV ratio. Wholesaler firms convert 
households labour into intermediate goods in which retailer firms convert it further into final 
goods. We remark central bank follows the Taylor-type rule for setting interest rate and the 







3.2.1. Patient Households 
A representative of patient households (savers) maximises her utility by choosing 




𝑡=0 (ln 𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 ln 𝐻𝑠,𝑡 −
𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝜂
)       3.1 
where the symbol 𝐸𝑡
∗ represents the subjective expectation of savers conditional on 
information available at time 𝑡. Under the rational expectation, 𝐸𝑡
∗ corresponds to a 
mathematical operator 𝐸𝑡 evaluated using the objective distributions of the stochastic shocks 
which are assumed known by the rational households. Note that this subjective expectation is 
assumed to be equal among savers, borrowers, firms and central bank which imply there is no 
heterogeneity in expectation in the economy. Parameter 𝛽𝑠 ∈ (0,1) governs the patient 
discount factor while 𝐶𝑠,𝑡, 𝐻𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑠,𝑡 represent consumption, housing stock and working 
hours of savers at time 𝑡, respectively. Parameter > 0 denotes the inverse of labour supply 
elasticity, while 𝑗𝑡 is a time-varying weight of housing in the utility. We assume log(𝑗𝑡) =
𝜌𝑗 log(𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝑗𝑡 where 𝜌𝑗 is the autoregressive coefficient and 𝑗𝑡 is a normally distributed 
shock to housing demand with standard deviation 𝜎𝑗. We normalize the steady-state of 
housing preference 𝑗 to 1.  
Saver’s utility function is constrained by her budget constraint as follows: 
𝐶𝑠,𝑡 +𝐷𝑠,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡(𝐻𝑠,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑠,𝑡−1) =
𝑅𝑡−1𝐷𝑠,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑤𝑠,𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡      3.2 
where 𝐷𝑠,𝑡 denotes bank deposits, 𝑅𝑡 is the gross return from deposits, 𝑞𝑡 is the real price of 
housing in units of consumption and 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 is saver’s real wage rate. 𝐹𝑡 is real lump-sum profits 











)        3.3 
𝑤𝑠,𝑡 = (𝑁𝑠,𝑡)
−1









         3.5 
where equation (3.3) is a conventional Euler equation, equation (3.4) denotes the labour 
supply condition and equation (3.5) represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in 
which, at the margin, benefit for consuming housing equate costs in terms of consumption. 
Since we are interested in the equilibrium dynamic around the steady state, the above non 
linear optimality conditions are then log-linearised around the steady state values to obtain the 
following equations: 
?̃?𝑠,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑠,𝑡+1 − (?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1)       3.6 
?̃?𝑠,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑠,𝑡 + ( − 1)?̃?𝑠,𝑡        3.7 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗(?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑠,𝑡+1) − (1 − 𝛽𝑠)(ℎ̃𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑗?̃?)    3.8  
Note that a variable in log-linearised form is denoted by tilde. 
 
3.2.2. Impatient Households 








𝑡=0 (ln 𝐶𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 ln 𝐻𝑏,𝑡 −
𝑁𝑏,𝑡
𝜂
)       3.9 
where 𝛽𝑏 ∈ (0,1) is impatient discount factor and 𝐶𝑏,𝑡, 𝐻𝑏,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑏,𝑡 corresponds to 
consumption, housing stock and working hours of borrowers at time 𝑡, respectively. Borrower 
faces two constraints when maximising her utility, i.e. the budget constraint and the collateral 









∗𝑞𝑡+1𝐻𝑏,𝑡        3.11 
where 𝐷𝑏,𝑡 denotes bank loans and 𝑚𝑡 represents the loan to value (LTV) ratio. Notice that 
equation (3.11) is the channel via which asset market fluctuations can have real effects in the 
economy. This borrowing constraint pegs a loan that borrowers can obtain to the present 
discounted value of their housing holdings. In a standard model of Iacoviello (2005), the ratio 
of LTV is constant which is not affected by economic conditions, while in our model set up 
this ratio is assumed to be operationally adjusted to respond economic conditions, following 
Rubio et al. (2014) among others. 
The optimality condition of impatient households is characterised by a decision to choose the 







) + 𝜑𝑡𝑅𝑡       3.12 
𝑤𝑏,𝑡 = (𝑁𝑏,𝑡)
−1














where 𝜑𝑡 denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. These first order conditions can 
be interpreted analogously to those of savers previously. 
The above optimality conditions are then log-linearised around their steady state values to get 
the following equations: 
?̃?𝑏,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝑏𝑅(𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑡)      3.15 
?̃?𝑏,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑏,𝑡 + ( − 1)?̃?𝑏,𝑡        3.16 
𝑗
𝐻𝑏




∗(?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1) −
𝑞
𝐶𝑏
(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑏,𝑡) + 𝜑𝑚𝑞𝜋𝐸𝑡
∗(?̃?𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡)   
           3.17 
Combining equation (3.15) and (3.17) yields: 
?̃?𝑡 − (1 −𝑚𝛽𝑠)?̃?𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑐𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑏(1 − 𝑚)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 −𝑚𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡+1) − (1 −
𝛾𝑐)(ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 − 𝑗?̃?) + (𝛾𝑐 − 𝛽𝑏)?̃?𝑡        3.18 
where 𝛾𝑐 = 1 −
𝐶𝑏
𝑞ℎ𝑏
  comes from the steady state relation.      
In addition to the above optimality conditions, the equilibrium dynamics is also characterised 
by borrower’s budget constraint and financial constraint where after log-linearising them 






(ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡−1) +
𝐷𝑏
𝛽𝑠𝑌






(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡) 3.19  
?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑏,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡+?̃?𝑡+1 + ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡







The wholesaler firms operate under perfect competition and flexible price to produce a 
homogenous intermediate good 𝑌𝑡. The intermediate goods are produced according to the 
following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑏,𝑡
1−𝛼          3.21 
where 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] measures the relative size of different types of households in terms of labour, 
while 𝑁𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑏,𝑡 correspond to labour of patient households (savers) and impatient 
households (borrowers), respectively. Given the above specification of production function, it 
is assumed that saver’s labour and borrower’s labour are imperfect substitutes. Meanwhile, 𝐴𝑡 
governs an exogenous technology variable that follows an autoregressive process log(𝐴𝑡) =
𝜌𝑎 log(𝐴𝑡−1) + 𝑎,𝑡 where 𝜌𝑎 is the autoregressive coefficient and 𝑎,𝑡 is a normally 
distributed shock to the technology with a standard deviation 𝜎𝑎. We normalize the steady-
state value of technology 𝐴 to 1.  








)          3.22 






)        3.23 
Log-linearised the above production function and optimality conditions yields: 











(?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑏,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑏,𝑡)         3.26 
A continuum of retailers indexed by 𝑧 then buys intermediate goods produced by wholesaler 
firms at the wholesale price  𝑃𝑡
𝑤   in a competitive market. They transform it into differentiated 
goods 𝑌𝑡(𝑧) and sell it at 𝑃𝑡(𝑧). In this way, the mark-up on price 𝑋𝑡 arises in which the value 
is determined by 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡
𝑤⁄ . It is also assumed that retailers have a monopolistic power and, 
when allowed to, will set their prices to maximise their profit, subject to demand for each 
differentiated product 𝑌𝑡(𝑧), following Bernanke et al. (1999). The final goods 𝑌𝑡
𝑓
 consist of a 












          3.27  
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between individual final goods.  









          3.28 
The price index is then given by: 






        3.29 
The price-setting problem for the retailer is a standard Calvo-setting. Each retailer sells its 
good at price 𝑃𝑡(𝑧) and (1 − ) ∈ [0,1] is the probability of being able to change the sale 























 ; 𝑋 = ( − 1)⁄  and 1 𝑋𝑡⁄ = 𝑚𝑐𝑡 (mark-up is the inverse of marginal 
cost). Given the fraction  of retailers do not change their price in period 𝑡, the aggregate 
price evolves according to: 
𝑃𝑡 = [ 𝑃𝑡−1
1− + (1 − )(𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤)1− ]1/(1− )      ` 3.31 
The last two conditions, i.e. equation (3.30) and (3.31) can be combined to generate a 
standard New Keynesian Philip curve (in log-linearised version) as: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡         3.32 
where =
(1− )(1− 𝛽𝑠) and ?̃?𝑡 = −𝑚?̃?𝑡     
 
3.2.4. Central Bank 
We assume that central bank conducts both monetary and macroprudential policies. For 
monetary policy, they use a conventional Taylor-type interest rate rule that responds to 
inflation and output. However, when they are operated, central bank is constrained by data 
availability. We consider two alternatives in conducting monetary policy: Firstly, a case in 
which current data of inflation and output are available. Secondly, a case in which current 
data of inflation and output are not available and required to be estimated or forecasted. To 
make it clear, we consider some variations of Taylor-type interest rate rule as follows: 






∗?̃?𝑡+1        3.34 
In this case, 𝜏𝜋 and 𝜏𝑦 are monetary reaction function to inflation and output, respectively. All 
variables are log-linearised around the steady state values and denoted by tilde.  
In addition to monetary policy, central bank conducts macroprudential policy via the LTV 
rule that reacts inversely to economic condition. The LTV rule is used to dampen the increase 
of housing prices or credit growth. However, we are unclear on the benefit of responding 
these two economic variables: should central bank respond to housing prices growth or credit 
growth in the first place, when there is a bubble in the financial markets driven by housing 
market. Similarly to monetary policy, when conducting macroprudential policy, central bank 
is constrained by the availability of housing prices or credit data. Therefore, some alternatives 
of the LTV rules considered are as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞∆?̃?𝑡          3.35 
?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞𝐸𝑡
∗∆?̃?𝑡+1         3.36 
?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑑∆?̃?𝑏,𝑡         3.37 
?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑑𝐸𝑡
∗∆?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1         3.38 
where 𝜏𝑞 and 𝜏𝑑 are the LTV reaction function to the growth of housing prices and credit, 
respectively. Again, all variables are presented in a log-linearised form around their steady 
state values (denoted by tilde).  
In a standard model, the LTV ratio is a fixed parameter which is not affected by economic 
conditions. However, we can think of regulation of LTV ratio as a way to moderate housing 




tight. And since the constraint is binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed 
to. Lowering the LTV ratio tightens the constraint and therefore reduces the loans that 
borrowers can obtain. Recent studies in macroprudential policy has proposed the Taylor-type 
rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such as the growth rates of GDP, 
credit, the credit to GDP ratio or house prices. Here, we assume that there exists a 
macroprudential Taylor-type rule for LTV ratio that reacts to the growth of housing prices or 
credit. 
 
3.2.5. Equilibrium and Market Clearing 
The equilibrium of the model is a sequence of prices {𝑞𝑡, 𝑅𝑡, 𝑃𝑡, 𝑋𝑡, 𝑤𝑠,𝑡, 𝑤𝑏,𝑡} and an 
allocation {𝑌𝑡, 𝐶𝑠,𝑡, 𝐶𝑏,𝑡, 𝐷𝑠,𝑡, 𝐷𝑏,𝑡, 𝐻𝑠,𝑡, 𝐻𝑏,𝑡} such that all first order conditions and constraints 
hold, and all markets are clear.  





)𝑌𝑡         3.39 
where it will be rebated to savers since it is assumed that retailers are owned by them. 
Meanwhile, the market of consumption goods, housing and bonds are clear when23: 
𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑏,𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡         3.40 
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐻𝑏,𝑡 = 𝐻 = 1         3.41 
𝐷𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑏,𝑡 = 0          3.42 
                                                          



















ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡          3.44 
?̃?𝑠,𝑡 = −?̃?𝑏,𝑡          3.45 
 
3.3. Methodology and Calibration 
3.3.1. Methodology 
The methodology for learning analysis follows the standard approach of Evans & Honkapohja 
(2001)24. We take log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions around the steady 
state, and reduce the economic model into a system of linear dynamic equations. The 
linearised system consists of eight expectational dynamic equations (see Appendix 3.2 for 
details derivation).  
We write the system as: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 + 𝐵3𝑧𝑡      3.46 
where 𝑆𝑡 = (?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑏,𝑡, ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡, ?̃?𝑡)
′
 is a vector of endogenous state variables and  𝑧𝑡 =
(𝑗?̃?, ?̃?𝑡) is a vector of exogenous state variables that follows AR (1) process, i.e. 𝑧𝑡 = ℱ𝑧𝑡−1 +
𝑒𝑡. For simplicity, we assume that ℱ is known where all its roots lie inside the unit circle. We 
also remark 𝑒𝑡 as an exogenous white noise shock with the variance 𝛴𝑒. 
                                                          




For the analysis of the recursive least square (RLS) learning, we assume that economic agents 
have the perceived law of motion (PLM) as:  
𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑡𝑧𝑡        3.47 
The above PLM is consistent with the minimum state variable (MSV) solution of the system. 
As Bullard & Mitra (2002), we focus on this class of PLMs when examining the E-stability 
properties of the economy.  
Given the PLM, agents form their forecasts as:  
𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡𝑆𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡ℱ𝑧𝑡        3.48 
Any given PLM gives an actual law of motion (ALM) that describes the temporary 
equilibrium value of 𝑆𝑡. This is obtained by substituting 𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 into equation 3.46.  
For PLM estimates 𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑡 and 𝑐𝑡, we obtain ALM as: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵𝑜 + 𝐵2(𝐼 + 𝑏) + (𝐵2𝑏
2 + 𝐵1)𝑆𝑡−1 + (𝐵2(𝑏𝑐 + 𝑐ℱ) + 𝐵3)𝑧𝑡  3.49 
We need to slightly modify the representation of our system of equations. We introduce the 
notation 𝑤𝑡
′ = (1, 𝑆𝑡−1
′ , 𝑧𝑡
′) for all state variables including the exogenous state variables and 
𝜑𝑡
′ = (𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑡, 𝑐𝑡) for the parameters.  
We can re-write the previous PLM at time 𝑡 as:  
 𝑆𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡
′𝑤𝑡           3.50 
and the ALM at time 𝑡 as: 
 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑇(𝜑𝑡)






′ = {𝐵𝑜 + 𝐵2(𝐼 + 𝑏), (𝐵2𝑏
2 + 𝐵1), (𝐵2[𝑏𝑐 + 𝑐ℱ] + 𝐵3)}   3.52 
The MSV solution is given by the fixed point of T, that is, ?̅?′ = (?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑐̅) where ?̅? = 0; ?̅? =
(𝐼 − 𝐵2?̅?)
−1
𝐵1 and 𝑐̅ = (𝐼 − 𝐵2?̅?)
−1
(𝐵3 + ℱ𝐵2𝑐̅), by the assumption (𝐼 − 𝐵2?̅?) is invertible.  
Under this current setting, the RLS learning algorithm for estimating and updating 𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑡, 𝑐𝑡 is 
given by:  
𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝛾ℛ𝑡−1
−1𝑤𝑡−1(𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝜑𝑡−1
′ 𝑤𝑡−1)
′     3.53 
with 𝛾 > 0 is a small gain parameter and ℛ𝑡 is symmetric and positive definite matrix of 
second moments of the state variables.  
Substituting in the ALM, we can write: 





 𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝛾ℛ𝑡−1
−1𝑤𝑡−1(𝑤𝑡−1
′ [𝑇(𝜑𝑡−1) − 𝜑𝑡−1]) 
where, 
ℛ𝑡 = ℛ𝑡−1 + 𝛾[𝑤𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1
′ − ℛ𝑡−1]       3.54 
Marcet & Sargent (1989a) show that the associated ordinary differential equation (ODE) is 
the vectorised version of the following ODE: 
𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝜏
= ℛ−1𝑀𝑤[𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑]  
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑀𝑤 − ℛ  
where 𝑀𝑤 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(1,𝑀𝑠, 𝑀𝑧) is a symmetric and positive definite matrix of second moments 




Latter, they can show that the local stability of REE is entirely determined by the local 
stability, at the same point, of the following small ODE: 
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐𝜑
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)  




= 𝐿(𝜑) − 𝐼        3.55 
The local asymptotic stability of REE ?̅? under least squares learning is determined by the 
stability of the matrix 𝐽𝐿𝑆(?̅?). The least squares algorithm converges locally to the REE iff the 
real parts of the eigenvalues of 𝐽𝐿𝑆(?̅?) are strictly negative.  
For determinacy analysis, the system is slightly modified and re-written as:  
𝐸𝑡𝐺𝑡+1 = Ω𝐺𝑡 + Γ𝑧𝑡         3.56 
where 𝐺𝑡 represents a vector of endogenous state variables of the model including its lag and 
𝑧𝑡 governs a vector of exogenous state variables. The REE is determinate if the number of 
stable Eigenvalues of Ω is equal to the number of predetermined variables of the system. If 
the number of stable Eigenvalues is higher than predetermined variables, then we have 
multiple equilibria or indeterminate equilibria. In contrast, if the number of stable Eigenvalues 
is lower than predetermined variables, then there is non-existence of locally unique stationary 
equilibrium. Note that the existence of locally unique stationary equilibrium is equivalent to 
the existence of unique solution to the model, for instance in terms of minimum state variable 
(MSV).  
After describing the concept of determinacy and E-stability, we convey a method of 




optimal constrained policy rules25. The standard solution of a RE usually takes the form of a 
VAR (1), obey by a subset of variables 𝒲𝑡, often called the state variables (consist of 
endogenous and exogenous state variables), with the other variables of interest ?̂?𝑡 is given by 
specified linear function of state variables. 
Consider a generic solution of a RE that takes the form as follow, 
𝒲𝑡 = Θ𝒲𝑡−1 + Υ𝑒𝑡         3.57 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝐿𝒲𝑡          3.58 
where 𝒲𝑡 is vector of state variables and Θ, Υ and 𝐿 are the relevant deep parameters. The 
component of 𝑒𝑡 is a white noise shock with mean zero and the variance Σ𝑒. Since, we are 
interested in the co-movement of 𝒲𝑡, then we can compute its variance-covariance matrix as: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝒲𝑡) = 𝐸𝒲𝑡𝒲𝑡′         3. 59 
By using stationary assumption, we have: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝒲𝑡) = Θ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝒲𝑡)Θ
′ + ΥΣ𝑒Υ′       3.60 
where after vectorising, we obtain: 
𝑉𝑒𝑐(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝒲𝑡)) = (𝐼 − Θ⊗ Θ)
−1𝑉𝑒𝑐(ΥΣ𝑒Υ′)     3. 61 
This allows us to evaluate the second moment of each state variable. We can also compute the 
variance-covariance of ?̂?𝑡 using: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑡) = 𝐿 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝒲𝑡)𝐿′        3.62 
  
                                                          




3.3.2. Calibration  
In the model reduced forms, there are at least seven systems of equations that make the 
analysis of E-stability and determinacy issue of policy rules is not easy to be conducted 
analytically. As an alternative, we follow a numerical approach. We calibrate structural 
parameters of the model to conform to standard values used in the literature, in particular 
Iacoviello (2005), or with empirically estimated values in recent research. The discount factor 
𝛽 is set at 0.99 for patient households (savers) and at 0.98 for impatient households 
(borrowers). The elasticity of substitution across final goods  is set at 4, a value which is 
commonly used in the literature. The inverse of the elasticity of labour supply  is set to 1.01, 
which makes the labour supply curve virtually flat. The fraction of the firm that keeps their 
price unchanged  is given a value of 0.75 which corresponds to the average price duration of 
about one year (or 4 quarters). The wage income of saver’s labour 𝛼 is set at 0.5, which 
implies savers and borrowers are at the same age or have the same experience. At the steady 
state, the borrower’s down payment rate is set at 0.1 which implies the steady-state LTV 
ratio 𝑚 is of 0.9.  
To check the robustness of our numerical result, we consider an alternative calibration for 
some parameters. We experience with a lower LTV ratio at 0.8 in steady state and a lower 
value of borrower’s discount factor at 0.96 (this implies borrowers becomes more impatient). 
Although these alternative values change the required policy parameters that lead to a 
determinate and E-stable REE, the differences are not significant. Given this, our baseline 
results continue to hold. Therefore, for the rest of this chapter, we only report our numerical 
results generated under our baseline calibration. 





Calibration used in numerical analysis  
Quarterly frequency 
Parameter Description Value 
𝛽𝑠 Discount factor for patient households (savers) 0.99 
𝛽𝑏 Discount factor for impatient households (borrowers) 0.98 
 The elasticity of substitution across final goods 4 
 The inverse of elasticity labour supply 1.01 
 Degree of price stickiness  0.75 
𝛼 Saver’s wage income 0.5 
𝑚 Steady state LTV ratio 0.9 
𝜏𝑦 Monetary policy reaction function to output 4 
𝜏𝜋 Monetary policy reaction function to inflation 5 
𝜏𝑞 LTV rule reaction function to housing prices growth 1.2 
𝜏𝑏 LTV rule reaction function to credit growth 1.2 
𝜌𝑗 AR (1) coefficient of a housing demand shock 0.9 
𝜌𝑎 AR (1) coefficient of a technology shock 0.8 
𝜎𝑗 Std. Deviation of a housing demand shock  0.05 
𝜎𝑎 Std. Deviation of a technology shock 0.02 
 
 
For the purpose of computing the optimal constrained policy rules, we set the persistence of a 
housing demand 𝜌𝑗 and a technology 𝜌𝑎 at 0.9 and 0.8, respectively. In refer to the existing 
literature, the range for the standard deviation of a housing demand shock and a technology 
shock is sufficiently large. This happens as it depends on the way of how we de-trend the 
data, model the structure of economic model and the kind of data are used in the estimation. A 
common finding is that the standard deviation of housing demand shock is usually higher than 
technology shock. For example, Iacoviello & Neri (2010) estimate the standard deviation of a 
housing demand shock at 0.046 and a housing technology shock at 0.019. Meanwhile, 




demand shock and at 1.5% for the standard deviation of a TFP (technology) shock. In our 
numerical simulation, we follow Iacoviello & Neri (2010) by calibrating the standard 
deviation of a housing demand shock 𝜎𝑗 at 0.05 and a technological shock 𝜎𝑎 at 0.02. We 
summary all these calibrated parameters in Table 3.1. 
 
3.4. Learning about Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules 
In each scenario, we begin the analysis by assuming macroprudential policy responds to the 
growth of housing prices, initially, and to the growth of credit, afterwards. Macroprudential 
policy operates through the LTV rule that reacts inversely to the growth of housing prices or 
to the growth of credit. Due to data availability, there are two options available in conducting 
this LTV rule: Firstly, a case in which current data of housing prices and nominal credit are 
accurately available. Secondly, a case where current data of these variables are not available 
and need to be estimated or forecasted.    
Meanwhile, monetary policy works in a conventional fashion by responding to inflation and 
output, but without policy inertia. As a case of the LTV rule, it is assumed that central bank is 
constrained by the availability of data when conducting monetary policy. As a result, there are 
two possible alternatives to conduct monetary policy: Firstly, a case in which current data of 
inflation and output are accurately available. Secondly, a case where current data of these 
variables are not available and need to be forecasted. In total, there are eight possible 
combinations between monetary and macroprudential policy rules. We discuss each of these 





3.4.1. Current Data in Interest Rate and LTV Rules 
In this scenario, it is assumed that all current data, i.e. inflation, output and housing prices are 
accurately available to central bank. When this is a case, a combination of policy rules can be 
set as follows:  
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦?̃?𝑡  and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞∆?̃?𝑡      3.63 
where central bank adopts a conventional interest rate rule that responds to current inflation 
and output and the LTV rule that reacts inversely to current growth of housing prices.  
Before we proceed with the simulation result, we briefly explain how our numerical approach 
works. In all simulation exercises, we begin by setting the LTV reaction function parameter 
𝜏𝑞 (when responds to housing prices) or 𝜏𝑑 (when responds to credit latter) at zero and 
varying monetary policy reaction function 𝜏𝜋 and 𝜏𝑦. When 𝜏𝑞 or 𝜏𝑑 is set at zero, it is 
assumed that only monetary policy actively responds to economic conditions while 
macroprudential policy is assumed to be unresponsive. We set the upper bound of  𝜏𝜋 and 𝜏𝑦 
at 5 and 4 respectively, while their lower bound is constrained at zero. These parameter ranges 
are commonly used in both theoretical and empirical works. We use an increment step size of 
0.05 and search over a find grid of values between those ranges. For each possible pair of 
monetary policy parameter (𝜏𝜋 , 𝜏𝑦) in this grid, we evaluate whether their Eigenvalues satisfy 
the condition for determinacy and E-stability. If both conditions are satisfied, we indicate this 
in the figures using a blue/dark colour.  
We experiment with different values of macroprudential policy parameter 𝜏𝑞 and 𝜏𝑑   within 
the range of 0 and 1.2. We follow this approach as we want to analyse the benefit of giving a 




policy rules. Our decision to fix the upper bound of 𝜏𝑞 and 𝜏𝑑 at 1.2 is realistic. As an 
illustration, setting 𝜏𝑞  and 𝜏𝑑 at 1 implies a one percent increase in the growth of housing 
prices or the growth of credit lead to a one percent decrease in the ratio of LTV from its 
steady state value. In other words, a 10 percent increase in the growth of housing prices or the 
growth of credit leads to a 10 percent decrease in the ratio of LTV from its steady state value.  
Wei (2012) used a similar upper bound value of a reaction function to housing prices or credit 
growth, i.e. 𝜏𝑞 = 1, though with a different interpretation. In his model, it is assumed that 
central bank responds to the percentage deviation of housing prices from its steady state level 
by adjusting their interest rate policy. This implies one percent (positive) deviation of housing 
prices from its steady state value leads to one percent (positive) deviation of nominal interest 
rate from its steady state value. However, given a large variation in housing prices, one for 
one response in the interest rate seems excessive and unrealistic. Further to this, a decision to 
use a policy rate in dampening a boom in housing prices may give undesirable impact on the 
other economic variables as it can contradict to the objective of exchange rate stabilisation, 
price stabilisation, investment attractiveness, etc. Therefore, introducing macroprudential 
policy via the LTV rule and allowing it to respond to economic condition makes the model set 
up more realistic. 
Having considered this, we discuss the simulation result in detail. When all current data are 
accurately available, it turns out that, given the combination of  𝜏𝑦 and 𝜏𝜋, varying the value 
𝜏𝑞 within the range 0 and 1.2 does not give any significant changes in the region of 
determinate and E-stable policy rules. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, after simulating for three 
different values of 𝜏𝑞, i.e. 0, 0.6 and 1.2, we come to the conclusion that a response to current 




bank has responded to current data of inflation and output (through interest rate rule) and 
remains consistent with the Taylor Principle.  
Figure 3.1 
Stability results of REE under current data in interest rate rule  
and current growth of housing prices in the LTV Rule 
 
q = 0 q = 0.6 q = 1.2 
   
        
               
             Blue/Dark : Determinate and E-stable policy rules                                      
             White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules  
 
The above finding is similar to Wei (2012), who concludes a response to housing prices is 
redundant if central bank has access to current data of inflation and output, whilst the Taylor 
principle is satisfied. The difference is that Wei (2012) has used monetary policy for 
stabilising housing prices volatility through the adjustment of interest rate, while in our work 
we use macroprudential policy through the changing of LTV ratio. In addition, Wei (2012) 
assumes that central bank responds to the percentage deviation of housing prices from its 
steady state level, while in our work it is assumed that the LTV rule responds to the growth of 
housing prices. In practice, we argue that identifying housing prices growth is much easier 
than observing the percentage deviation of housing prices from its steady state value.  
If a response to current growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is not beneficial for central 
bank in a case where they have responded to current data of inflation and output through 




credit. Will similar result be attained? We consider an alternative LTV rule that interacts with 
monetary policy rule as follows:  
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦?̃?𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑑∆?̃?𝑏,𝑡      3.64 
It is assumed that current growth of credit is available along with current data of inflation and 
output. Although, having access to current data of inflation and output is a strong assumption, 
having access to current data of credit and housing prices seems realistic. It is common 
nowadays that firms or relevant institutions routinely collect the data of credit and housing 
prices. In fact, many central banks has a role in banking supervision, in addition to monetary 
authority, such that having access to the recent financial data e.g. credit seems plausible. In 
empirical work, the data of property loan is also commonly used by researchers as a leading 
indicator for housing prices development. 
Figure 3.2 
Stability results of REE under current data in interest rate rule  
and current growth of credit in the LTV Rule 
 
d = 0 d = 0.6 d = 1.2 
   
        Blue/Dark : Determinate and E-stable policy rules                                           
       White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules  
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, varying the value of macroprudential parameter 𝜏𝑑, within the 
interval 0 to 1.2, does not alter the region of determinacy and E-stability. This finding is 




Given this result, we can reinstate our previous argument that a response to the growth of 
housing prices or the growth of nominal credit via the LTV rule is neither stabilising nor less 
stabilising when central bank has used current data of inflation and output in interest rate rule 
and sticks to the Taylor principle. 
 
3.4.2. Current Data in Interest Rate Rule and Forecasted Data in LTV Rule 
In practise, having access to all current data, is a strong assumption. Therefore, a previous 
result is established under unrealistic assumption and needs to be relaxed. We precede the 
analysis by considering an interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies where 
central bank adopts a combination of policy rules as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦?̃?𝑡 and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞𝐸𝑡
∗∆?̃?𝑡+1      3.65 
Under the above setting, central bank adopts a conventional Taylor-type interest rate rule that 
responds to current data of inflation and output, but the LTV rule reacts inversely to 
forecasted growth of housing prices26.  
The result shows that the region of determinacy and E-stability, within plausible policy 
parameters, is unaffected when the LTV rule responds to forecasted growth of housing prices 
(illustrated in Figure 3.3). As before, we plot this result for three different values of 𝜏𝑞, i.e. 0, 
0.6 and 1.2 and come to a conclusion that a response to forecasted growth of housing prices is 
unnecessary, especially when central bank have used current data of inflation and output in its 
monetary policy. Combining this finding with the earlier one (where all current data are 
available) we argue that, among these three data, i.e. inflation, output and housing prices, the 
                                                          




accuracy of inflation and output data turns out to be the most important one. This implies in a 
situation where monetary and macroprudential policies are conducted by two different 
institutions, for instance, the quality of data owned by monetary authority is more important 
relative to the quality of data owned by macroprudential authority. 
Figure 3.3 
Stability results of REE under current data in interest rate rule  
and forecasted growth of housing prices in the LTV Rule 
 
q = 0 q = 0.6 q = 1.2 
   
        
         Blue/Dark : Determinate and E-stable policy rules                                           
         White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules  
 
Will a similar result be attained when central bank reacts to forecasted growth of credit 
instead of forecasted growth of housing prices? We consider a combination of policy rules in 
which a conventional Taylor-type interest rate rule responds to current data of inflation and 
output while the LTV rule responds to forecasted growth of credit. Explicitly, a combination 
of rules considered is as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦?̃?𝑡 and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑑𝐸𝑡
∗∆?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1      3.66 
Surprisingly, a response to forecasted growth of credit makes the system easily faces 
indeterminacy and instability problem under RLS learning. As an illustration, within the range 




destabilising so that determinacy and E-stability region is very similar to the case no response 
is given to credit growth. However, once this macroprudential parameter reaches 0.06 or 
more, it causes the equilibrium path easily goes to indeterminate and E-unstable REE. Based 
on this finding, we argue that the LTV rule that reacts to the growth of credit is less useful in 
general compared to the growth of housing prices. We will confirm this last argument by 
evaluating another type of the LTV rule below.         
 
3.4.3. Forecasted Data in Interest Rate Rule and Current Data in LTV Rule  
In practice, current data such as inflation and output have a delay until they are officially 
published by statistic agency or relevant institutions. The same limitation, however, needs not 
to apply for the data of housing prices and credit as they are more frequently updated, 
especially after the recent US financial crisis. Having access to current data for housing prices 
and credit may give central bank potential information gains. We investigate if such gain 




∗?̃?𝑡+1 and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞∆?̃?𝑡     3.67 
where the underlined assumption is that central bank cannot observe current value of inflation 
and output, but does observe current growth of housing prices. Under this condition, central 
bank must use lagged values of output and inflation to forecast their future values. In Figure 
3.4, we plot a series of three two-dimensional plots, each with a different macroprudential 




The first plot of Figure 3.4 simulates a condition where central bank uses forecasted data in 
interest rate rule while the ratio of LTV is assumed to be constant, i.e.  𝜏𝑞 = 0. Under this 
circumstance, as shown in Chapter 2, we easily face indeterminacy problem, especially when 
the Taylor principle is violated (𝜏𝜋 < 1) or when monetary policy reaction function to output 
is too strong (𝜏𝑦 > 1). Fortunately, a response to current growth of housing prices through the 
LTV rule has increased the probability of leading the economy to a determinate and E-stable 
REE. As an illustration, the increase of the LTV reaction function parameter  𝜏𝑞 from 0 to 0.6 
has significantly lifted up the line that splits the parameters space into determinate and 
indeterminate (also, E-stable and E-unstable) which means there are more parameter choices 
are available for central bank via policy rate to respond to output. The shifting increases as 
parameter 𝜏𝑞 reaches its upper bound value of 1.2.  
Figure 3.4 
Stability results of REE under forecasted data in interest rate rule  
and current growth of housing prices in the LTV rule 
 
q = 0 q = 0.6 q = 1.2 
   
         
         Blue/Dark : Determinate and E-stable policy rules                          Green/Grey : Indeterminate and E-stable policy rules                                         
        White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules  
 
In general, a response to current growth of housing prices via the LTV rule does not change 




responding output. As the parameter of the LTV reaction function increases, the region of 𝜏𝑦, 
𝜏𝜋 combination that leads to a determinate and E-stable REE gradually enlarge, and the region 
that leads to E-stable but indeterminate REE gradually moves up. As a result, the task of 
central bank in taking the economy to a determinate and E-stable REE becomes easier to 
obtain.  This is certainly a desirable situation for central bank. 
What will happen when the LTV rule responds to current growth of credit instead of current 
growth of housing prices in which central bank does not have accessed to current data of 
inflation and output when conducting monetary policy? We consider a combination of 
monetary and macroprudential rule as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑦𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1, and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑑∆?̃?𝑏,𝑡     3.68 
We can show that the previous result cannot be attained anymore. When central bank uses 
forecasted data in interest rate rule, a response to current credit growth via the LTV rule does 
not give a significant impact. This is well illustrated in Figure 3.5 where we have produced 
three plots of stability results of REE for different values of macroprudential parameter  𝜏𝑑. 
Again, as the value of  𝜏𝑑 increases, the line that splits the parameter space into determinate 
and indeterminate (as well, E-stable and E-unstable) region slightly shifts up, indicating that a 
stronger response of LTV rule to current credit growth minimises the requirement for policy 
rate reaction function parameter to output. Unfortunately, the line movement is so small and 
hardly to be seen. Under this condition, we conclude that, with empirically plausible 
parameter values for 𝜏𝑑, a response to credit growth is neither more stabilising nor less 
stabilising when central bank uses forecasted data in monetary policy.  
The last result confirms about the difference between responding to housing prices and to 




had never made a clear distinction between responding to housing prices and to financial 
variable (i.e. credit) when macroprudential policy is introduced. Using E-stability and 
determinacy criteria, we can show that a response to the growth of housing prices via the LTV 
rule potentially gives higher gains compared to a response to the growth of credit. This result 
holds especially in a situation where current data of inflation and output are not available, at 
the time of conducting monetary policy. We confirm the last finding once again using another 
alternative of policy combinations in which  the LTV rule reacts to forecasted growth of 
housing prices or of credit while interest rate rule responds to forecasted data of inflation and 
output. 
Figure 3.5 
Stability results of REE under forecasted interest rate rule  
and current growth of credit in the LTV rule 
 
d = 0 d = 0.6 d = 1.2 
   
       
        
        Blue/Dark : Determinate and E-stable policy rules                    Green/Grey : Indeterminate and E-stable policy rules                                         
       White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules  
 
3.4.4. Forecasted Data in Interest Rate Rule and LTV Rule 
In a situation where current data for housing prices or nominal credit are not available, central 
bank needs to make forecasts using past data. We consider a case in which central bank 




growth of credit. Concerning monetary policy, it is assumed that current data for inflation and 
output are also not available, resulting in central bank has to use forecasts for these variables 
in policy rate. To make it obvious, we consider a combination of policy rules between 
monetary and macroprudential policy as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑦𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1, and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞𝐸𝑡
∗∆?̃?𝑡+1    3.69 
We present the numerical result in Figure 3.6. When central bank reacts to forecasted growth 
of housing prices through the LTV rule, determinacy and E-stability region, under plausible 
policy parameter 𝜏𝑦 and 𝜏𝜋, is gradually reduced. A determinate and E-stable region in the 
third panel (𝜏𝑞 = 1.2) shrinks by around a quarter of the one in the first panel (𝜏𝑞 = 0). 
Given this, we observe a trade-off in policy reactions now. If the LTV reaction function to 
forecasted growth of housing prices is strong, a response to output via policy rate must be 
reduced to maintain stability under learning. In this situation, policy makers can observe that a 
response to forecasted growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is, to some extent, 
equivalent to forecasted output via interest rate rule; if it reacts strongly to one, it must behave 
more mildly to the other.  
A reduction of determinacy and E-stability region is faster when central bank adopts the LTV 
rule that reacts inversely to forecasted growth of credit as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑦𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1  and   ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑑𝐸𝑡
∗∆?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1    3.70 
In the above setting, a small reaction to credit growth via the LTV rule (for example: 𝜏𝑑 >
0.05) has caused the equilibrium path to fall easily to indeterminate and E-unstable region. As 
a result, it is not easy for central bank to find a combination of policy parameters that leads 




may find some combinations of determinate and E-stable policy rules. However, once this 
parameter value is sufficiently strong (higher than 0.05), we face a problem of indeterminacy 
and instability under RLS learning. This result confirms our previous finding concerning the 
advantage of responding to the growth of housing prices compared to the growth of credit 
when central bank uses the LTV ratio as their macroprudential instrument. When the growth 
of credit is mainly driven by the growth of housing prices, it is necessary for central bank to 
give a response to the growth of housing prices, at the first place, instead of credit growth. 
Figure 3.6 
Stability results of REE under forecasted data in interest rate rule  
and forecasted growth of housing prices in LTV Rule 
 
q = 0 q = 0.6 q = 1.2 
   
       
        Blue/Dark : Determinate and E-stable policy rules              Green/Grey : Indeterminate and E-stable policy rules                                         
        White : Indeterminate and E-unstable policy rules  
  
In general, the results from the above study are quite intuitive. For agents who learn 
adaptively, using accurate and updated data is essential for the purpose of estimating the 
economic model. Here, we follow the argument pointed out by Wei (2012) who studies the 
same issue under slightly different assumptions in modelling a policy used to tackle a boom in 
housing prices. We claim that the availability of current data for housing price growth 
improves the estimation by adding another dimension of certainty. In contrast, when this data 




accurate data in the estimation helps agents to learn the REE more easily. Therefore, for the 
REE to be learned, more restrictions must be imposed on policy parameters when there is less 
accurate data available, and vice versa. With regards to the appropriate variable that should be 
targeted by the LTV rule, we claim that a response to the growth of housing prices gives 
better outcomes compared to the growth of credit. This occurs because central bank’s decision 
on the ratio of LTV has an immediate effect on the level of nominal credit, such that a too-
early response to credit growth leads to potentially undesirable results. Under this condition, 
the most appropriate data to be responded to by the LTV rule is housing prices in general.   
 
3.5. The Optimal Constrained Policy Rule 
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that a response to the growth of housing prices 
through the LTV rule, in addition to inflation and output via interest rate rule, gives different 
results compared to a response to the growth of credit. Responding to the growth of credit via 
the LTV rule easily leads to indeterminate and E-unstable equilibrium that must be hindered 
by policy makers; whilst responding to the growth of housing prices may offer a benefit under 
certain circumstances. One of these situations is when central bank does not possess current 
data for inflation and output, but does observe current data of housing prices growth. In this 
case, giving a response to housing prices growth via the LTV rule is stabilising. However, 
when they cannot observe current data of housing prices growth, responding to it does not 
improve stability under learning. The advantage of giving a response to the growth of housing 
prices via the LTV rule turns out to be insignificant if central bank has accessed to current 




Unfortunately, determinate and E-stable policy rules are not enough from the perspective of 
the policy makers. They are also interested in finding the optimal policy rule that leads the 
whole economy to the highest welfare, i.e. a rule that places the economy in the most stable 
situation. Motivated by this, we follow the concept of Evans & McGough (2007), as used in 
Chapter 2, by evaluating various combinations of policy rules, that are determinate and E-
stable, of which they may lead the equilibrium to the highest welfare. For this purpose, we 
assume that central bank sets an ad-hoc objective function by minimising the sum of inflation, 
output and housing prices variation. A combination of policy parameters is then evaluated to 
find the one that minimises this loss of function. We do this analysis for all combinations of 
interest rate and the LTV rule. It should be noticed that in our setting, it is assumed that 
central bank is concerned not only with inflation and output volatility, but also with that in 
respect of housing prices. 
Based on the existing literature, there have been some earlier studies that analyse the issue of 
optimal macroprudential and (or) monetary policies in a model with the feature of housing 
market/sector. Among them are Kannan et al. (2012) and Rubio & Gallego (2013). Kannan et 
al. (2012) examines the Taylor-type interest rate rule that reacts to inflation, output and the 
growth rate of credit with a macroprudential policy instrument based on the LTV27. They 
conclude that a strong monetary reaction to accelerator mechanisms that push up credit 
growth and housing prices can dampen business cycles volatility. In addition, they show that a 
macroprudential instrument, specifically designed to dampen credit market cycles, can offer a 
stabilisation benefit in the case a financial sector or a housing demand shock hit the economy. 
They also suggest that it is irrelevant to use this macroprudential instrument when a 
                                                          




productivity shock hits the economy. Therefore, they suggest the importance of identifying 
the source of the shock of the housing prices volatility when accessing policy optimally.  
Meanwhile, Rubio & Gallego (2013) evaluate the implication of macroprudential and 
monetary policies for business cycles, welfare, and financial stability. They set a 
macroprudential rule based on LTV ratio that responds inversely to the deviation of output 
and housing prices from its steady state values. This macroprudential policy rule interacts 
with a traditional inflation-targeting Taylor rule with policy inertia. They conclude that 
introducing macroprudential policy via LTV rule minimises the effects of booms to the 
economy by controlling the amount of loan given. In addition, they can show that the LTV 
rule set in this way is welfare improving and suggest that the optimal LTV rule should give a 
higher response to housing prices than to output deviations. Unfortunately, when a shock 
comes from the supply-side of the economy, they found monetary and macroprudential 
policies may enter into a conflict. This finding, again, confirms about the importance of 
identifying the source of disturbances in the study of the optimal policy. Notice that the way 
of how we set a macroprudential rule is similar to Rubio & Gallego (2013), among others. 
Nevertheless, the above mentioned literature have assumed that agents endow with the 
rational expectation (RE). Under this framework, agents have knowledge about the exact 
structure of the economy and the correct form of an agent’s behaviour. It turns out this 
assumption is too strong, as discussed extensively in Chapter 2. The RE assumption also faces 
a difficulty in producing large swings in housing prices and household debt as observed in the 
empirical evidence. To overcome this limitation, Gelain et al. (2013) introduce a simple 
moving average forecast rule for a subset of households that can significantly magnify the 
volatility and the persistence of house prices and household debt relative to otherwise similar 




then they evaluate various policy actions that might be useful to dampen the resulting excess 
volatility, including: responding to the growth of housing prices and credit through interest 
rate rule, reducing the ratio of loan to value (LTV) and controlling the ratio of loan to income 
(LTI) in collateral, in addition to LTV ratio. Among these alternatives, they find that 
controlling the ratio of LTI is the most effective instrument for dampening overall excess 
volatility in the model economy. They also argue that while an interest rate response to house 
price growth or credit growth can stabilise some economic variables, it can significantly 
magnify the volatility of others, particularly inflation. 
In the same spirit as Gelain et al. (2013), we study the issue of optimal policy in an 
environment where agents in the economy are not fully rational. It is assumed that agents 
cannot observe the true parameters of the model and use the recursive least square (RLS) 
learning rule to update the parameter estimates towards the true value of model parameters as 
new data becomes available. Recall that E-stability principle states that rational expectation 
equilibrium (REE) is locally stable under RLS iff it is E-stable. If a policy rule leads to REE 
that is not E-stable, then under RLS learning, economic agents can collaborate with a zero 
probability. Given this restriction, we remark that the chosen optimal rule must satisfy two 
criteria, i.e. determinacy and E-stability. This approach is known as the optimal constrained 
policy rule in the literature.  
For finding the optimal constrained policy rule, we consider a case in which macroprudential 
rule responds to housing price growth via the LTV rule while monetary policy operates in a 
conventional way by responding to inflation and output. The LTV rule that responds to credit 
growth is not considered since we have seen earlier that such rule tends to lead to economy to 




economic welfare by minimising the loss function in terms of inflation, output and housing 
prices volatility as follows:  
Min
 𝜏𝜋,𝜏𝑦,𝜏𝑞
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̃?𝑡) + ς𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̃?𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̃?𝑡)       3.71 
where ς represents a relative weight assigned to the variance of output that shows the 
importance of output volatility from the view of central bank. We set the value of this 
parameter ς equal to 0.1 since central bank is assumed to focus more on assets and price 
stabilisation. Meanwhile, parameter  𝜏𝜋and 𝜏𝑦 represent monetary reaction function to 
inflation and output, respectively and parameter 𝜏𝑞 is the LTV reaction function to housing 
prices growth. Note that this loss function is consistent with studies that make a second-order 
approximation of utility of individuals and it differs from the standard case by incorporating 
housing prices. 
After explaining the way of how central bank sets their objective, for the purpose of analysing 
the optimal policy, some disturbances needs to be introduced in the model. Here, we assume 
only two exogenous shocks that may hit the economy, i.e. a housing demand shock and a 
technological shock that follow an AR (1) autoregressive process. As previously discussed in 
the section of calibration, we set the persistence of housing demand shock at 0.9 and of 
technology shock at 0.8 with the standard deviation of 0.02 and 0.05, respectively. Then, 
given various combinations of interest rate and the LTV rule, as equation (3.63), (3.65), (3.67) 
and (3.69), we compute the variance-covariance of state variables ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑏,𝑡, ℎ̃𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡 
in 𝒲𝑡 using a procedure in equation (3.57) to (3.61). After vectoring the variance-
covariance 𝒲𝑡, the second moment of  ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡 are obtained where these values will be 
used further for evaluating the loss function in equation (3.71). In what follows, we analyse 




that is present, starting from a housing demand shock, followed by a technology shock, and a 
case where these two shocks jointly hit the economy.  
 
3.5.1. A Housing Demand Shock 
When a positive housing demand shock hits the economy, among all types of policy 
combination, the lowest loss of function is obtained when central bank uses forecasted data 
for inflation and output in monetary policy and current data for housing price growth in the 
LTV rule with a combination of policy parameter  𝜏𝑦 = 0.06, 𝜏𝜋 = 1.11 and 𝜏𝑞 = 1.2, 
respectively (see Table 3.2). This is an interesting finding since the optimal policy can be 
attained even when current data for inflation and output is not available and needs to be 
estimated. The result reported in Table 3.2 also shows that the quality of housing prices data 
matters for obtaining the optimal constrained policy when a housing demand shock hits the 
economy. When current data for housing prices growth is available, then responding to it is 
beneficial since it brings down the value of a loss function relatively to a case in which no 
response is given. Recall that a lower loss implies higher efficiency which means less 
variability of inflation, output and housing prices. Notice that a benefit of responding to 
current growth of housing prices through the LTV rule holds regardless the quality of data 
used in monetary policy. As the LTV reaction function to current growth of housing prices 
gets higher, then a lower loss is attained. The grid search for finding the optimal constrained 
policy stops when the LTV reaction function parameter 𝜏𝑞 reaches its upper bound at 1.2 
while monetary reaction function to inflation 𝜏𝜋 and output gap 𝜏𝑦 will be constrained at 5 






Optimal constrained policy rule  
(a housing demand shock) 
 Mix A Mix B Mix C* Mix D 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 
𝝉𝝅 1.06 1.11 1.11 1.11 
 𝝉𝒒 1.2 0 1.2 0 
𝝈𝒚 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.012 
𝝈𝝅 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.006 
𝝈𝒒 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.012 
Loss 0.00019 0.00021 0.00018 0.00018 
The upper sign of * denotes a combination of policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rule and current growth of housing prices in LTV rule 
Mix B: Current data in interest rate rule and forecasted growth of housing prices in LTV rule 
Mix C: Forecasted data in interest rate rule and current growth of housing prices in LTV rule 
Mix D: Forecasted data in interest rate rule and forecasted growth of housing prices in LTV             
rule 
 
Now, we turn to the case in which current data for housing prices growth is not available and 
needs to be forecasted in the LTV rule. In a situation where a housing demand shock hits the 
economy, the LTV rule that reacts to forecasted growth of housing prices do not give any 
advantage compared to the case where the LTV rule is set at a fix ratio (illustrated in Table 
3.2, labelled by “Mix B” and “Mix D”). This finding is valid regardless the kind of data used 
in monetary policy by central bank. Intuitively, forecasted data creates another uncertainty for 
policy makers which potentially lead to higher volatility when they do some mistakes on 
forecasting. Under this condition, a combination of policy parameters that leads to the highest 
welfare is obtained when no response is given to forecasted growth of housing prices.  
What is the intuition behind this finding? As discussed by Iacoviello (2005), when a positive 
housing demand shock hits the economy, housing prices will increase. The rise in housing 
prices increases the borrowing capacity of debtors, allowing them to spend and consume 
more. In addition, when demand rises, consumer price increases that reduces the real value of 




have a higher propensity to spend than lenders, the net effect on demand is positive, and acts 
as a powerful amplification mechanism. As an accelerator mechanism of demand shock works 
well here, then the LTV rule that reacts inversely to housing prices growth may effectively 
dampen housing boom. However, as shown in Table 3.2, the effectiveness of this adjustment 
depends critically on the quality of housing prices data its self.  
 
3.5.2. A Technology Shock 
We have seen when central bank owns current data accurately, it becomes easier for them to 
lead the economy to a determinate and E-stable REE. We can also show that when a housing 
demand shock hits the economy, the benefit of responding to the growth of housing prices via 
the LTV rule depends on the quality of housing prices data itself; when current growth of 
housing prices is observed, then responding to it is beneficial, regardless the quality of data 
used in interest rate rule.  
Table 3.3 
Optimal constrained policy rule  
(a technological shock) 
 Mix A* Mix B Mix C Mix D 
 𝝉𝒚 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.01 
𝝉𝝅 4.96 1.81 2.86 2.41 
 𝝉𝒒 1.2 0 1.2 0 
𝝈𝒚 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 
𝝈𝝅 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
𝝈𝒒 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Loss 0.00013 0.00015 0.00015 0.00015 
The upper sign of * denotes a combination of policy rule that gives the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rule and current growth of housing prices in LTV rule 
Mix B: Current data in interest rate rule and forecasted growth of housing prices in LTV rule 
Mix C: Forecasted data in interest rate rule and current growth of housing prices in LTV rule 






When a technology shock becomes the source of uncertainty, a response to the growth of 
housing prices through the LTV rule is not necessary if forecasted data of housing prices 
growth is used. As shown in Table 3.3, labelled by “Mix B” and “Mix D”, when a technology 
shock is active, a combination of policy parameters that offers the highest welfare is obtained 
when the LTV rule reaction function parameter  𝜏𝑞 is set at zero with parameter 𝜏𝜋 = 1.81 
and 𝜏𝑦 = 0.01 (for “Mix B”) and 𝜏𝜋 = 2.41 and 𝜏𝑦 = 0.01 (for “Mix D”). Unfortunately, 
when current data for the growth of housing prices is used in the LTV rule, the result suggests 
that it is beneficial to give a response to the growth of housing prices. Having this, we become 
ambiguous about the requirement of responding housing prices when technology shock hits 
the economy. Note that, among all policy rule combinations, using current data in both 
interest rate and the LTV rule is the most advantageous policy combination as it offers the 
lowest loss with a combination of policy parameters  𝜏𝑦 = 0.26, 𝜎𝜋 = 4.96 and 𝜏𝑞 = 1.2, 
respectively (labelled by “Mix A” in Table 3.3). 
 
3.5.3. All Shocks 
When both a housing demand shock and a technology shock are active in the economy, a 
response to the growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is required to find the optimal 
constrained policy as long as current data of housing prices growth is used ( see “Mix A” and 
“Mix C” in Table 3.4). Again, we remark the importance of having current and valid data for 
the LTV rule in order to get the optimal policy. However, when forecasted data of housing 
prices growth is used in the LTV rule, then responding to it does not lead to the most stable 
economic condition. This can be confirmed from “Mix B” and “Mix D” of policy 




current data in both monetary and macroprudential policies is the most advantageous policy 
rules as it offers the lowest loss in terms of the variability of inflation, output and housing 
prices with a combination of policy parameters 𝜏𝜋 = 1.31, 𝜏𝑦 = 0.01 and 𝜏𝑞 = 1.2, 
respectively. 
Table 3.4 
Optimal constrained policy rule 
(all shocks) 
 Mix A* Mix B Mix C Mix D 
 𝝉𝒚 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
𝝉𝝅 1.31 1.31 1.66 1.66 
 𝝉𝒒 1.2 0 1.2 0 
𝝈𝒚 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
𝝈𝝅 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
𝝈𝒒 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.017 
Loss 0.00035 0.00038 0.00037 0.00039 
The upper sign of * denotes a combination of policy rules that give the lowest loss. 
Mix A: Current data in interest rule and current growth of housing prices in LTV rule 
Mix B: Current data in interest rate rule and forecasted growth of housing prices in LTV rule 
Mix C: Forecasted data in interest rate rule and current growth of housing prices in LTV rule 




This chapter tries to address three important issues in relation to the recent crisis: Firstly, the 
benefits for central bank to target asset prices (i.e. housing prices) or financial variables (i.e. 
credit). Secondly, the appropriate rules to be used in both monetary and macroprudential 
policies by assumption agents do RLS learning in forming their expectation. Thirdly, the 
optimal monetary and macroprudential policies to stabilise the economy. Unlike similar 
studies that use a welfare perspective only, we have addressed the last issue from the 




In general, responding to the growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is favourable than to 
the growth of credit. Yet, the benefit of responding to the growth of housing prices depends 
on the quality of this data itself. When central bank has accessed to current data of inflation 
and output and uses them in monetary policy, then responding to the growth of housing prices 
via the LTV rule becomes irrelevant. However, when they do not have recent data of inflation 
and output in monetary policy, then responding to current growth of housing prices via the 
LTV rule is beneficial. A stronger reaction of the LTV rule on current growth of housing 
prices increases the probability of leading the economy to a determinate and E-stable REE. 
But, when current data of housing prices is also not available, then using forecasted growth of 
housing prices in the LTV rule, in addition to forecasted data in monetary policy, is 
undesirable since it shrinks the region of determinate and E-stable policy rules. The same 
conclusion does not emerge for a case in which central bank responds to credit growth via the 
LTV rule. Under such condition, the equilibrium easily falls to indeterminacy and instability 
problem under learning.  
Finally, a decision to choose the optimal constrained policy rule depends on the type of 
shocks that hits the economy and the type of housing prices data observed in the LTV rule. 
When a housing demand shock hits the economy, responding to current growth of housing 
prices dampen the economy volatility, whilst responding to forecasted growth of housing 
prices is not necessary. This argument is valid for any types of a standard Taylor rule used in 
monetary policy. In contrast, when a technology shock hits the economy, a benefit of 
responding to the growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is ambiguous and should be 
taken with caution. Unlike similar studies that have used the assumption of rational 




added for adaptive learning analysis by adding one more criteria, i.e. E-stability, in addition to 
determinacy, when choosing the optimal policy rule.  
Although, the assumption of recursive least square (RLS) learning has made the framework of 
the model becomes more plausible. Still, there are some researchers who view it as a strong 
assumption. Under this type of learning algorithm, it is assumed that economic agents can 
observe the variance of the state variables and use them in forming their forecasts. Yet, in 
practise, it is hard to observe the variance of all state variables when agents do learning 
process. Therefore, in the next chapter we consider a situation in which economic agents may 
deviate from a standard RLS learning rule such that we are uncertain about the type of 




Appendix 3.1. Notation 
 
Parameter Description 
𝛽𝑠 The discount factor for patient households (savers) 
𝛽𝑏 The discount factor for impatient households (borrowers) 
J Steady-state weight of housing in utility function 
 The inverse of the elasticity of labour supply 
 The elasticity of substitution across final goods 
m Steady-state of the loan to value (LTV) ratio  
𝛼 Savers wage income/ Labour share for savers 
X Steady-state mark up 
 The fraction of firms that keep their price unchanged  
𝜏𝜋 Interest rate reaction function to inflation 
𝜏𝑦 Interest rate reaction function to output  
𝜏𝑞 LTV rule reaction function to house-price growth 
𝜏𝑏 LTV rule reaction function to credit growth 
𝜌𝑗 Coefficient of housing demand shock AR (1) model 
𝜌𝑎 Coefficient of productivity or technology AR (1) model 
𝜎𝑗 Standard deviation of housing demand shock 




𝐶𝑠  Saver Consumption 
𝐶𝑏 Borrower Consumption 
𝐻𝑠 Saver Housing Stock 
𝐻𝑏 Borrower Housing Stock 
𝑁𝑠 Saver Working Hour 
𝑁𝑏 Borrower Working Hour 
𝑗 Exogenous housing demand shock 
𝐷𝑠 Saver’s bank deposit 
𝐷𝑏 Borrower’s loan 
𝑞𝑡 Real housing prices 
𝜋 Inflation 
𝑤𝑠 Saver real wage 
𝑤𝑏 Borrower real wage 
𝐹 Real lump-sum profit 
𝑚 Loan to value (LTV) ratio 
𝐴 Exogenous technology shock 
𝑋 Mark up 




𝑅 Gross interest rate 
𝑢𝑗  Normally distributed shock to housing demand shock 






Appendix 3.2. Model Derivation 
 
Patient Households 
A representative of patient households (saver) maximises their utility by choosing 




𝑡=0 (𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝐻𝑠,𝑡 −
𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝜂
)   
S.t.  𝐶𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑠,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡(𝐻𝑠,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑠,𝑡−1) ≤
𝑅𝑡−1𝐷𝑠,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡










+ 𝑤𝑠,𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡  − 𝐶𝑠,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑠,𝑡 −
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) = 0  




)         3A.5  







)       3A.6 
Substituting (3A.2) into (3A.4) yields the standard labour-leisure trade-off, equating the 







𝐶𝑠,𝑡        3A.7 










)       3A.8 
This equation equates the purchase price of housing to the pay-off (the marginal rate of 
substitution between housing and non-durable consumption), plus the expected resale value. 
 
Impatient Households 
A representative of impatient households (borrowers) maximises their utility function by 




𝑡=0 (𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝐻𝑏,𝑡 −
𝑁𝑏,𝑡
𝜂
)   
S.t.  𝐶𝑏,𝑡 +
𝑅𝑡−1𝐷𝑏,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑞𝑡(𝐻𝑏,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑏,𝑡−1) ≤ 𝐷𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑤𝑏,𝑡𝑁𝑏,𝑡     3A.9 
        𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑏,𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝑡𝐸𝑡




𝑡=0 (𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝐻𝑏,𝑡 −
𝑁𝑏,𝑡
𝜂




𝑞𝑡(𝐻𝑏,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑏,𝑡−1)] + 𝜑𝑡[𝑚𝑡𝐸𝑡







− 𝑏,𝑡) = 0   
1
𝐶𝑏,𝑡







− 𝑏,𝑡𝑞𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡𝑚𝑡𝐸𝑡
∗[𝑞𝑡+1𝜋𝑡+1]) + 𝛽𝑏
𝑡+1𝐸𝑡




− 𝑏,𝑡𝑞𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡𝑚𝑡𝐸𝑡
∗[𝑞𝑡+1𝜋𝑡+1] + 𝛽𝑏𝐸𝑡




























)       3A.14  
From (3A.11) and (3A.14), we obtain a consumption Euler equation for impatient households 







) + 𝜑𝑡𝑅𝑡       3A.15 
Combining (3A.11) and (3A.13) yields the standard labour-leisure trade-off for borrower: 
𝑤𝑏,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑏,𝑡
−1
𝐶𝑏,𝑡         3A.16 











∗[𝑞𝑡+1𝜋𝑡+1]     3A.17 
This equation equates the marginal utility of non-durable consumption to shadow value of 
durable housing service.  
 
Wholesalers  
The wholesalers operate under perfect competition and flexible price to produce homogenous 
goods 𝑌𝑡. These intermediate goods are produced using the following production function: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑏,𝑡
1−𝛼, where 𝐴𝑡 is a temporary shock that follows:   
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑡) = 𝜌𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑎𝑡        
After intermediate goods are produced, retailers purchase them at the wholesale price 𝑃𝑡
𝑤, and 
transform them into final goods and sell them at the price 𝑃𝑡. We denote the mark-up of final 
over intermediate goods as 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡
𝑤⁄ .      
The wholesalers maximise her real profit subject to its production function as follows:  
𝑌𝑡 𝑋𝑡⁄ − 𝑤𝑠,𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑏,𝑡𝑁𝑏,𝑡            
𝑆.t      𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑏,𝑡
1−𝛼         3A.18 
Substituting the constraint into the profit function, we obtain unconstraint profit maximisation 
problem as:    
𝑉𝑤 ≡  𝑌𝑡 𝑋𝑡⁄ − 𝑤𝑠,𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑏,𝑡𝑁𝑏,𝑡    + 𝑤,𝑡(𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑏,𝑡
1−𝛼 − 𝑌𝑡)  







≡ −𝑤𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛼 𝑤,𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝛼−1𝑁𝑏,𝑡
1−𝛼 = 0   
 𝑤𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑤,𝑡 𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑠,𝑡⁄          3A.19 
𝜕𝑉𝑤
𝜕𝑁𝑏,𝑡
≡ −𝑤𝑏,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑤,𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑠,𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑏,𝑡
−𝛼 = 0   
 𝑤𝑏,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼) 𝑤,𝑡 𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑏,𝑡⁄         3A.20 
We solve 𝑤,𝑡 by substituting (3A.19) and (3A.20) back into profit maximisation function to 
get: 
𝑌𝑡 𝑋𝑡⁄ − 𝛼 𝑤,𝑡𝑌𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼) 𝑤,𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 0  
𝑤,𝑡 = 1 𝑋𝑡⁄ ≡ 𝑚𝑐𝑡        3A.21 
where, 𝑚𝑐𝑡 is the marginal cost or the inverse of the mark up 𝑋𝑡. 
 
Retailers 
There is a continuum of retailers indexed by 𝑧 who operates under monopolistically 
competitive market. Retailer 𝑧 buys intermediate goods in a competitive market, differentiates 
it at no cost into 𝑌𝑡(𝑧), and sells it at 𝑃𝑡(𝑧). Total final goods are aggregated from each type 𝑧 











           















    













)    
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑌𝑡(𝑧)










𝜀 ] = 0   







    ∀ 𝑧         3A.22 


























≡ 𝑃𝑡  
The price index is then given by: 






        3A.23 
The price-setting problem for the retailer is a standard Calvo setting. Each retailer sells its 
good at price 𝑃𝑡(𝑧), and (1 − ) ∈ [0,1], is the probability of being able to change the sale 
price in every period.  
























































































































































































































) 𝑌𝑡+𝑘(𝑧) = 0     3A.24 
where  𝑋 = ( − 1)⁄  is the steady-state mark-up and 𝑌𝑡 ≈ 𝑌𝑡
𝑓
.  
Given the fraction  of retailers do not change their price in period 𝑡, the aggregate price 
evolves according to:  
𝑃𝑡 = [ 𝑃𝑡−1
1− + (1 − )(𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤)1− ]1/(1− )     ` 3A.25 
 
Equilibrium and Market Clearing  
The equilibrium of the model is a sequence of prices {𝑞𝑡, 𝑅𝑡, 𝑃𝑡, 𝑋𝑡, 𝑤𝑠,𝑡, 𝑤𝑏,𝑡} and an 
allocation {𝑌𝑡, 𝐶𝑠,𝑡, 𝐶𝑏,𝑡, 𝐷𝑠,𝑡, 𝐷𝑏,𝑡, 𝐻𝑠,𝑡, 𝐻𝑏,𝑡} such that all first order conditions and constraint 
hold, and all markets are clear.  
The aggregate real profit from retailers is: 











𝑌𝑡(𝑧) 𝑑𝑧  




























































 𝑑𝑧  since 𝑌𝑡
𝑓
≈ 𝑌𝑡 






 from (3A.23).  





)𝑌𝑡, by assuming 𝑃𝑡 ≡ ∫ 𝑃𝑡(𝑧)
1
0
     3A.26 
This aggregate profit will be transferred to patient households (savers) since it is assumed that 
retailers are owned by them. 
Goods market is clear when: 




While housing and bond market should satisfy: 
𝐻𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐻𝑏,𝑡 = 𝐻 = 1        3A.28 
𝐷𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑏,𝑡 = 0         3A.29 
 
Steady State Level 





   
Given (3A.6) and (3A.10), 






    













 , where 𝛾𝑐 = 𝛽𝑏 +𝑚(𝛽𝑠 − 𝛽𝑏)  






















𝐻𝑠 + 𝐻𝑏 = 𝐻 = 1 
Given (3A.29), 




Log-Linearisation around Steady State 






∗?̃?𝑠,𝑡+1 − (?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1)      3A.30 
From (3A.7), 
?̃?𝑠,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑠,𝑡 + ( − 1)?̃?𝑠,𝑡       3A.31 
From (3A.8), 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗(?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑠,𝑡+1) − (1 − 𝛽𝑠)(ℎ̃𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑗?̃?)   3A.32 
 
Borrowers Consumption and Constraint   
From (3A.15), 
?̃?𝑏,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝑏𝑅(𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡








∗(?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1) −
𝑞
𝐶𝑏
(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑏,𝑡) + 𝜑𝑚𝑞𝜋𝐸𝑡
∗(?̃?𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑡+1 +
?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡)         3A.34 
Combining (3A.33) and (3A.34) yields 
?̃?𝑡 − (1 −𝑚𝛽𝑠)?̃?𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑐𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑏(1 − 𝑚)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑏,𝑡+1 −𝑚𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡+1) −
(1 − 𝛾𝑐)(ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 − 𝑗?̃?) + (𝛾𝑐 − 𝛽𝑏)?̃?𝑡      3A.35 

















(ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡−1) +
𝐷𝑏
𝛽𝑠𝑌






(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡)  
          3A.37 
From (3A.10), 
 ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑏,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡+?̃?𝑡+1 + ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1     3A.38 
 
Intermediate Goods Firm 
From (3A.18), 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝛼?̃?𝑠,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝑏,𝑡      3A.39 




(?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑠,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑠,𝑡)       3A.40 




(?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑏,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑏,𝑡)       3A.41 
 
Retailers 































𝑘=0 𝑌𝑡+𝑘(𝑧)𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘  








𝑘=0 (?̃?𝑡+𝑘 +𝑚?̃?𝑡+𝑘)  
𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽𝑠)𝐸0
∗∑ ( 𝛽𝑠)
𝑘∞
𝑘=0 (?̃?𝑡+𝑘 +𝑚?̃?𝑡+𝑘)  
The last equation can be cast in the recursive form: 
𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽𝑠)(?̃?𝑡 +𝑚?̃?𝑡) +  𝛽𝑠(1 − 𝛽𝑠)𝐸0
∗∑ ( 𝛽𝑠)
𝑘∞
𝑘=0 (?̃?𝑡+𝑘+1 +𝑚?̃?𝑡+𝑘+1)  
𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽𝑠)(?̃?𝑡 +𝑚?̃?𝑡) + 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗𝑝𝑡+1










) 𝑝𝑡 − (1− ) 𝑝𝑡−1      3A.43 
Substituting (3A.43) into (3A.42) for 𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 and 𝑝𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑤 yields:  
𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 = 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑠𝑝𝑡 + 𝑚?̃?𝑡       
Finally, the familiar Philip Curve equation is obtained: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡        3A.44 
where, =
(1− )((1− 𝛽𝑠))














ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡         3A.46 
From (3A.29),  
?̃?𝑠,𝑡 = −?̃?𝑏,𝑡          3A.47 
 
Reduced Forms 




(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑠,𝑡)       3A.48 




(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑏,𝑡)       3A.49 
























We use (3A.39) to replace ?̃?𝑠,𝑡 in (3A.50):  







































Plug it back the above result into (3A.39) yields: 

























   
Given (3A.48), (3A.49), (3A.51) and (3A.52), we can replace the variable of ?̃?𝑠,𝑡, ?̃?𝑏,𝑡  ?̃?𝑏,𝑡 
and ?̃?𝑠,𝑡 on some dynamic equations as follows:  
From (3A.30), 
             (1 − Ψ1)?̃?𝑡 − (1 − Ψ2)?̃?𝑡 = (1 − Ψ1)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − (1 − Ψ2)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡  
+𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + Ψ3(1 − 𝜌)?̃?𝑡         3A.53 
From (3A.32), 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − Ψ1)?̃?𝑡 − (1 − Ψ2)?̃?𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑠(1 − Ψ1)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑠(1 −
Ψ2)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛽𝑠)
𝐻𝑏
𝐻𝑠
ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 + Ψ3(𝛽𝑠𝜌 − 1)?̃?𝑡 + (1 − 𝛽𝑠)𝑗?̃?  3A.54  
From (3A.35), 
?̃?𝑡 − ([1 − 𝛽𝑠𝑚] [1 −
Ω1
Ω2
]) ?̃?𝑡 + [(1 − 𝛽𝑠𝑚)(1 +
1
Ω2
)] ?̃?𝑡 = 𝛾𝑐𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 −




∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑏(1 − 𝑚) (1 + Ω2
)𝐸𝑡





(1 − 𝛾𝑐)ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 + (𝛾𝑐 − 𝛽𝑏)?̃?𝑡 +
Ψ3
Ψ2
[(1 − 𝛽𝑠𝑚) − 𝛽𝑏(1 −𝑚)𝜌]?̃?𝑡 + (1 − 𝛾𝑐)𝑗?̃?      



































?̃?𝑡 = 0      3A.56 
The final reduce forms are characterised by equations (3A.53), (3A.54), (3A.55), (3A.38), 
(3A.56) and (3A.44), along with the Taylor-type interest rate rules and macroprudential policy 







Robust Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules  
under Learning Rule Uncertainty 
 
 
4.1. Background and Motivation 
So far, we have used two criteria to pin down the preferred policy rules used by central bank 
when conducting both monetary and macroprudential policies. These criteria are determinacy 
and expectational stability (E-stability). Determinacy is used to ensure the chosen policy rule 
leads to unique stationary rational expectation equilibrium (REE). A rule that takes the 
equilibrium into non-stationary condition needs to be ruled out as it takes to an explosive 
path. As well, a rule that leads to multiple stationary REE (indeterminacy) should be avoided 
as it delivers at least two consequences: Firstly, the mechanism under which fundamental 
shocks propagate through the system is not easy to observe. Secondly, the existence of 
sunspot shocks, in addition to fundamental shocks, affects the equilibrium allocations and 
business cycle fluctuations.28  
As discussed in the previous chapters, determinacy criterion is established under the 
assumption where economic agents, i.e. private agents and policy makers, endow with the 
assumption of rational expectation (RE). Under this framework, it is assumed that agents 
understand that they are rational and know what others know. As well, they have knowledge 
about the correct form of the model and all the parameters. This framework turns out to be too 
strong which encourages researchers to find an alternative of modelling boundedly rational 
agents. Among them is the application of adaptive learning in which agents follow recursive 
least square (RLS) learning in forming their expectation. Under this learning framework, it is 
                                                          




assumed that agents update their beliefs using an econometric algorithm to learn the REE (i.e. 
learn adaptively) as the sample size of the data set gets larger. Here, private agents nor policy 
makers do not know the true parameter values of the model and try to estimate them. The 
interest is whether this particular learning algorithm eventually takes the equilibrium path 
converges to unique stationary REE. The E-stability principle states that REE is 
asymptotically stable under RLS learning iff it is expectational stable (E-stable). Hence, in 
addition to determinacy, we consider another criterion for choosing the preferred policy rule 
that is E-stability.    
Unfortunately, the concept of E-stability does not in general imply learnability of REE, as 
argued by Giannitsarou (2005) and Christev & Slobodyan (2014), among others. This is 
particularly true when economic agents slightly deviate from a standard RLS learning rule and 
use the stochastic gradient (SG) learning rule for updating their belief. The SG learning rule is 
different from the RLS learning rule in which the former is less efficient from econometric 
approach but more realistic from the view of researchers as it helps to describe the behaviour 
of boundedly rational agents. Technically, under the SG learning rule, economic agents are 
unable to observe the second moment of state variables whereby this moment will be used in 
forming their forecasts. In contrast, under the RLS learning rule, the variance of state 
variables is assumed to be known by agent precisely. As the algorithm of these two learning 
processes is different, then it affects a condition for the convergence of each class of these 
learning rules to REE. In general, a condition for the convergence of SG learning to REE is 
distinct from but related to the well-known stability conditions for RLS learning (E-stability). 
There have been some previous studies that analyse the convergence condition of these two 
learning algorithms to REE and their relationships. It was started by Barruci & Landi (1997) 




learnability if economic agents use the SG learning algorithm. This result implies that the SG 
learning algorithm may converge to E-unstable REE. It is further shown by Giannitsarou 
(2005) that E-stability is also not sufficient condition for learnability. This means there may 
exist E-stable REE that are not learnable by a SG learning algorithm. Note that Giannitsarou 
(2005) establishes her argument using an economic model with lagged endogenous variables.  
Evans & Honkapohja (2001) have used a cobweb-type model to study similar issue. They 
conclude that SG learning converges to REE under precisely the same condition as RLS 
learning. Yet, they also put a concern on the lack of general results on stability and 
convergence of different learning algorithms. Further, Evans et al. (2010) discuss about 
additional conditions that ensure E-stable REE is learnable under generalized stochastic 
(GSG) gradient learning including SG learning. Recently, Christev & Slobodyan (2014) study 
learnability of E-stable REE in a standard two equations of NK model. They propose a 
refinement of learnability of REE that should not only E-stable but also SG-stable. In this 
way, the preferred policy rule is the one that is not only stable under RLS learning but also 
SG learning. Like E-stability principle, SG-stability principle states that REE is 
asymptotically stable under stochastic gradient (SG) learning iff it is SG-stable.  If economic 
policy leads to a system that is SG-unstable, then it should be avoided by policy makers even 
if the result offers a high welfare gain under rational expectation (RE).  
In summary, there are two possible relationships with regards to the convergence condition of 
the RLS and SG learning rule to REE: Firstly, these two conditions are identical. This implies, 
for a given economic policy, these learning algorithms take the system to unique stationary 
REE. Secondly, the convergence condition of SG learning rule is independent of the 




the system to a determinate and stable REE under the RLS (or SG) learning rule might be 
unstable under the SG (or the RLS) learning rule.     
In the same spirit, in this chapter we conduct a refinement of learnability of REE in the 
context of New Keynesian (NK) model with housing market and financial constraint in which 
monetary policy interacts with macroprudential policy. To be specific, we extend our work in 
Chapter 3 by incorporating other criteria in the design of policy rule, i.e. SG-stability, in 
addition to determinacy and E-stability. As shown, the convergence condition of SG and RLS 
learning to REE is likely sensitive to the structure and the specification of economic model. 
Two relevant issues are addressed: Firstly, how to find robust policy rules, for both monetary 
and macroprudential policies, that remain stable when there is uncertainty with regards to the 
type of learning algorithm used by agents when updating their beliefs (between the RLS and 
the SG learning algorithm). Secondly, we re-examine the advantage of having more recent 
data in both monetary and macroprudential policies when agents’ learning process is 
uncertain between RLS and the SG class. We remark that recent (or current) data has a better 
quality than forecasted data. For this purpose, we consider some variations of monetary and 
macroprudential policy rules as used in Chapter 3. To my knowledge, our work is the first one 
who studies about learnability of E-stable REE in the framework of NK model with housing 
market/sector. It is expected that this study enriches the existing literatures and gives a benefit 
for policy makers in the design of meaningful monetary and macroprudential policies.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 represents the model used in 
Chapter 3. Since we have derived the model comprehensively, we only provide the reduced 
forms of the model in this section. Section 4.3 describes the methodology and the calibration 




monetary and macroprudential policy rules under learning rule uncertainty. Section 4.5 
concludes this chapter.         
 
4.2. The Model 
As mentioned, we use the same model as used in Chapter 3 to find robust monetary and 
macroprudential policy rules. This model is based on a simple version of Iacoviello (2005) in 
which asset market fluctuations can have real effects to the economy through a credit channel. 
The model consists of patient and impatient households, wholesalers, retailers, and central 
bank that conducts both monetary and macroprudential policies. Households get utility from 
consumption goods and housing service and disutility from hourly work supplied to the 
wholesalers. The wholesaler firms convert this labour into intermediate goods while the 
retailers transform it further into final goods. The price of final goods is sticky that creates 
inefficiency and gives a real effect to the economy.  
Housing assets are the main vehicle for accumulating wealth in the economy. Patient and 
impatient households are savers and borrowers, respectively. Borrowers are credit constrained 
and need collateral to obtain loans from savers. Savers can lend to borrowers directly but its 
amount is controlled by central bank through the ratio of loan to value (LTV). This LTV ratio 
is assumed to be operational which means if there is a tendency for a bubble in housing 
prices, then this ratio will be set at a lower level to bring the economy back to its stable 
condition. Similarly, if there is a down turn in the economy, then this ratio will be set at a 
higher level to stimulate the economy. Finally, central bank is assumed to follow the Taylor-





4.2.1. Structure of the Economy 
We do not derive the model again here. Instead, we directly present the reduced form of the 
log-linearised model that characterises the structure of the economy as follows:29 
(1 − Ψ1)?̃?𝑡 − (1 − Ψ2)?̃?𝑡 = (1 − Ψ1)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − (1 − Ψ2)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1  
4.1 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − Ψ1)?̃?𝑡 − (1 − Ψ2)?̃?𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑠(1 − Ψ1)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑠(1 −
Ψ2)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛽𝑠)
𝐻𝑏
𝐻𝑠
ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛽𝑠)𝑗?̃?       4.2 
?̃?𝑡 − ([1 − 𝛽𝑠𝑚] [1 −
Ω1
Ω2
]) ?̃?𝑡 + [(1 − 𝛽𝑠𝑚)(1 +
1
Ω2
)] ?̃?𝑡 = 𝛾𝑐𝐸𝑡




∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑏(1 − 𝑚) (1 + Ω2
)𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑠𝑚(?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1) − (1 − 𝛾𝑐)ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 +
(𝛾𝑐 − 𝛽𝑏)?̃?𝑡 + (1 − 𝛾𝑐)𝑗?̃?              4.3 
?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑏,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡





























?̃?𝑏,𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝑡) −
𝐷𝑏
𝑌
?̃?𝑏,𝑡 = 0           4.5 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝑠𝐸𝑡





































 ;    Ψ2 =
1−𝛼
𝛼Ω2
 ;     
                                                          
29 The economic structure are characterised by equations: (3A.53) to (3A.56), (3A.38), and (3A.44) along with 










Recall that equation (4.1) corresponds to the extensive form of saver’s consumption Euler 
equation that determines the optimal consumption choice of saver over time. Equation (4.2) 
describes the marginal rate of substation (MRS) between housing service and consumption 
goods, also in the extensive form (this equation equates the purchase price of housing to the 
pay-off plus the expected resale value). Equation (4.3) combines borrower’s consumption 
Euler equation, adjusted to capture the borrowing constraint, and the marginal utility of 
consumption goods to shadow value of housing service. Meanwhile, equation (4.4) and (4.5) 
represent the borrower’s financial constraint and budget constraint, respectively. Finally, 
equation (4.6) expresses the standard equation of Philip Curve.  
In total, there are six dynamic systems of equation, excluding two equations that describe the 
way of how monetary and macroprudential policies are operated. This system of equations is 
attributed with seven endogenous state variables, i.e. output (?̃?𝑡), mark-up cost (?̃?𝑡), 
inflation (?̃?𝑡), housing prices (?̃?𝑡), credit/loan (?̃?𝑏,𝑡), housing stock (ℎ̃𝑡) and interest 
rate (?̃?𝑡), plus one exogenous state variable, i.e. housing preference shock 𝑗?̃?.  We only 
consider housing preference shock as the only fundamental shock in the economy since it 
delivers the acceleration’s impact to a bubble in housing prices and the financial markets as 
what we have shown in Chapter 3.  
After describing the structure of the model, then it is worth to spend a time to discuss about 
the notation of subjective expectation operator 𝐸𝑡
∗. This notation is important since it explains 
the way of how economic agents, both private agents and policy makers, update their belief 
about future outcome, conditional on information available at time 𝑡. Under rational 
expectations, 𝐸𝑡




distributions of the stochastic shocks which are assumed known by the rational households. In 
our model’s environment, this subjective expectation 𝐸𝑡
∗ is assumed to be equal among all 
economic agents that imply a structural homogeneity exhibits in the model.  
The assumption of a structural homogeneity is applied here just for convenient, although 
under the same model, this analysis can be extended by considering the assumption of a 
structural heterogeneity. Under a structural heterogeneity, different agents in the economy 
may respond to expectation with different ways which implies both the expectations and 
learning rules adopted by different agents can also differ. This latter topic is dicussed 
comprehensively in Mitra & Honkapohja (2002). They found that the stability condition for 
learning is also affected by the type of heterogeneity, including structural heterogenity, 
although it is not always the case. For some standard models, they found that the existence of 
heterogeneous expectations and learning rules does not change the convergence condition to 
REE under homogenous expectation and learning. This means the assumption of homogenous 
expectation and learning algorithm is not so restrictive. However, there are also models in 
which heterogeneous expectations and learning rules affect the conditions for convergence of 
adaptive learning to REE. This result is obtained for example in a standard forward looking 
NK model.  
Although the assumption of a structural heterogeneity is also applicable, we limit the analysis 
in this chapter only for a situation where the economy has structural homogeneity. This means 
different agents in the economy respond to the expectation in the same way and use the same 
learning algorithm. Nevertheless, we are uncertain about the kind of learning algorithm used 




robust policy rules that can anticipate this uncertainty. For that purpose, we use both E-
stability and SG-stability criteria when choosing preferred policy rules30.   
 
4.2.2. Monetary and Macroprudential Policies  
Housing market volatility can have real effect to the economy through credit constraint for 
borrowers. In order to stabilise that condition, central bank is required to give a response to 
housing prices either using macroprudential or monetary policy. As other studies, we argue 
that managing a bubble in housing prices using macroprudential policy is more effective and 
realistic than using monetary policy31. Given this, we assume that central bank uses 
macroprudential policy via the ratio of LTV to stabilise a bubble in housing prices in which 
this ratio is assumed to be operational and can be changed at any time as a result of an 
increase in housing prices. In addition to credit constraint, the feature of sticky price in final 
goods consumption also creates other inefficiency in the economy. In this way, inflation may 
arises which requires central bank to consider monetary policy to stabilise the price level. We 
assume that central bank uses a conventional Taylor-type interest rate rule that responds to 
inflation and output from their steady state values, but not to any asset/financial variables.  
In practice, central bank may face a constraint on data availability when conducting both 
monetary and macroprudential policies. Under such condition, there are two alternatives 
available: Firstly, when current data is available. Secondly, when current data is impossible to 
obtain such that it requires to being estimated or forecasted. For monetary policy, the 
alternatives of Taylor-type interest rate rules are as follows: 
                                                          
30 Some papers use the term “learnability of E-stable REE”. 




𝑟𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦?̃?𝑡         4.7 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑦𝐸𝑡
∗?̃?𝑡+1        4.8 
where equation (4.7) refers to a contemporaneous interest rate rule and equation (4.8) 
corresponds to forecasted policy rule. Parameter 𝜏𝜋 and 𝜏𝑦 are the reaction function parameter 
of interest rate to inflation and output, respectively. While the variables with a tilde are 
defined in the log-linearised form around the steady state. 
Central bank also conducts macroprudential policy through the LTV ratio that reacts inversely 
to economic condition. Since this ratio is operational, then we can view it as a rule that can be 
adjusted freely to counter a bubble in housing prices. In practice, when the LTV ratio is high, 
the collateral constraint is less tight. And since the constraint is binding, borrowers will 
borrow as much as they can. Lowering the LTV ratio tightens the constraint and therefore 
limits the loans that borrowers can obtain. Based on data availability, some alternatives of 
LTV rules are as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞∆?̃?𝑡          4.9 
?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞𝐸𝑡
∗∆?̃?𝑡+1         4.10 
where equation (4.9) corresponds to the LTV rule that responds to current growth of housing 
prices and equation (4.10) refers to the LTV rule that reacts inversely to forecasted growth of 
housing prices, assuming current data of housing prices is not available. Parameter 𝜏𝑞 is the 
LTV rule reaction function to the growth of housing prices. Again, all variables are presented 





4.3. Methodology and Calibration 
4.3.1. Methodology  
We begin by describing the concept of recursive least square (RLS) learning rule. This 
econometric concept is discussed intensively in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and other 
relevant literatures. We have also discussed this concept in earlier chapters. Yet, to contrast it 
with the concept of SG learning rule, we explain it again.  
Assume that we have some stochastic linear system of equations as follows: 
 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑑
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖         4.11 
where vector 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖 have a size 𝑛 𝑥 1 and correspond to the collection of dependent and 
independent variables, respectively. We fit this system of equations using time-series data 
within the period 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑇. 
Using the formula of least square, we can obtain the value of 𝑛 𝑥 1 coefficient vector 𝑑 that 
minimises the sum of residual square ∑ 𝑖
2𝑇
𝑖=1  as follows: 





𝑖=1 𝑌𝑖)        4.12 
The above term can be re-written in more familiar form as:  
𝑑 = (𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑌         4.13 
where 𝑌 is the 𝑇 𝑥 1 vector column with 𝑖-th component is 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑋 is the 𝑇 𝑥 𝑘 matrix given 
by 𝑋 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑇)
′.  
Motivated by Marcet & Sargent (1989b), Evans & Honkapohja (2001) have shown that vector 




𝑑𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑡
−1𝑅𝑡
−1𝑋𝑡(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡
′𝑑𝑡−1)      4.14 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑡
−1(𝑋𝑡𝑋𝑡
′ − 𝑅𝑡−1)       4.15 
where 𝑑𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡 denote the coeficient vector and the moment matrix of 𝑋𝑡 using data 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑡, respectively. Note that the term (𝑌𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡
′𝑑𝑡−1) refers to the most recent forecast error 
at time 𝑡. 
In order to generate the least square values that equivalent to equation (4.13), starting values 
for the above recursion needs to be chosen appropriately32. Entering these values into 
equation (4.14) and using data from 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑡, the usual least square coefficient vector 𝑑𝑡 
can be obtained. This result can be verified using induction process33.  
After describing the concept of RLS algorithm, we apply this concept to our learning problem 
in which the economy is assumed to be characterised by equations (4.1) to (4.6) and some 
combinations of monetary and macroprudential policy rules. Under this condition, there are 
seven expectational dynamic systems of equation where, for learning purposes, this system of 
equations can be written as: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵𝑜 + 𝐵1𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 + 𝐵3𝑧𝑡      4.16 
𝑆𝑡 = (?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑏,𝑡, ℎ̃𝑏,𝑡, ?̃?𝑡)
′
 is a vector of endogenous state variables while  𝑧𝑡 = 𝑗?̃? is a 
vector of observed exogenous state variable that follows an autoregressive (AR) process.  
𝑧𝑡 = ℱ𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡         4.17 
                                                          
32  For a comprehensive explanation, see the text book “Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics” by 
Evans and Honkapohja  








𝑖=1 𝑦𝑡 , this recursion process can be seen to lead to the 




As discussed previously, the notation 𝐸𝑡
∗ on 𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 corresponds to the mathematical operator 
𝐸𝑡 evaluated using the objective distributions of the stochastic shock which are assumed 
known by the rational households. This subjective expectation is assumed to be equal among 
agents in the economy, i.e. private agents and policy makers, which implies no heterogeneity 
in expectation. ℱ is assumed to be invertible with all roots lie inside the unit circle. While 𝑒𝑡 




′ = 𝑀𝑧 is positive definite and solves the Lyapunov equation 𝑀𝑧 = ℱ𝑀𝑧ℱ
′ +
𝛴𝑒.  
In order to evaluate the convergence condition of a particular learning algorithm to REE, we 
need to solve the RE model initially. As a standard solution of RE model, it has a unique RE 
solution of the form: 
 𝑆𝑡 = ?̅? + ?̅?𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑐̅𝑧𝑡         4.18 
which is often called the fundamentals or minimal state variable (MSV) solution. The 
existence of MSV solution ensures the uniqueness of the solution of RE model. Since the RE 
is established under the assumption that agents understand that they are rational, know what 
others know, and have knowledge about the correct form of the model and the true 
parameters, it turns out that this framework is too strong. Hence, we relax the assumption of 
RE and assume that all agents follow the recursive learning square (RLS) algorithm to 
estimate their future outcome. Under such condition, agents have a perceived law of motion 
(PLM) of the form 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑧𝑡 and estimate parameters 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 econometrically.  
At time 𝑡, the estimated PLM is given by: 
𝐸𝑡




One step ahead of this PLM gives the forecast function as: 
𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡𝑆𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡ℱ𝑧𝑡        4.20 
For simplicity, we have assumed that ℱ is known by agents although it can also be estimated. 
Any given PLM induces an actual law of motion (ALM) that gives a temporary equilibrium 
value of 𝑆𝑡. This is obtained by substituting the term 𝐸𝑡
∗𝑆𝑡+1 into equation (4.16).  
For PLM estimates 𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑡 and 𝑐𝑡, we obtain ALM as follows: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵𝑜 + 𝐵2(𝐼 + 𝑏) + (𝐵2𝑏
2 + 𝐵1)𝑆𝑡−1 + (𝐵2(𝑏𝑐 + 𝑐ℱ) + 𝐵3)𝑧𝑡  4.21 
At this stage, we need to slightly modify the representation of our system of equations. We 
introduce the notation 𝑤𝑡
′ = (1, 𝑆𝑡−1
′ , 𝑧𝑡
′) for all state variables including exogenous state 
variables and 𝜑𝑡
′ = (𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑡, 𝑐𝑡) for parameters.  
We can re-write the PLM at time 𝑡 as:  
 𝑆𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡
′𝑤𝑡           4.22 
and the ALM at 𝑡 as: 
 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑇(𝜑𝑡)
′𝑤𝑡         4.23 
where,  
𝑇(𝜑𝑡)
′ = {𝐵𝑜 + 𝐵2(𝐼 + 𝑏), (𝐵2𝑏
2 + 𝐵1), (𝐵2[𝑏𝑐 + 𝑐ℱ] + 𝐵3)}   4.24 
The MSV of RE solution is given by the fixed point of 𝑇, that is, ?̅?′ = (?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑐̅) where ?̅? =
0, ?̅? = (𝐼 − 𝐵2?̅?)
−1
𝐵1 and 𝑐̅ = (𝐼 − 𝐵2?̅?)
−1





Meanwhile, the RLS algorithm for estimating and updating 𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑡, 𝑐𝑡 is given by:  
𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝛾ℛ𝑡−1
−1𝑤𝑡−1(𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝜑𝑡−1
′ 𝑤𝑡−1)
′     4.25 
with 𝛾 > 0 is a small gain parameter and ℛ𝑡 is symmetric and positive definite matrix of 
second moments of the state variables. Notice that setting 𝛾 = 1/𝑡, we have decreasing gain 
sequence.  
Substituting in the ALM, we can write: 





 𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝛾ℛ𝑡−1
−1𝑤𝑡−1(𝑤𝑡−1
′ [𝑇(𝜑𝑡−1) − 𝜑𝑡−1]) 
where, 
ℛ𝑡 = ℛ𝑡−1 + 𝛾[𝑤𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1
′ − 𝑅𝑡−1]       4.26 
Marcet & Sargent (1989a) show that the associated ordinary differential equation (ODE) is 
the vectorised version of the following ODE: 
𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝜏
= ℛ−1𝑀𝑤[𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑]  
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑀𝑤 − ℛ  
We remark 𝑀𝑤 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(1,𝑀𝑠, 𝑀𝑧), that is a symmetric and positive definite matrix of second 
moments of the state variables used by agents in forming their forecasts. They further show 
that the local stability of REE is entirely determined by the local stability, at the same point, 
of the following small ODE34: 
                                                          






= 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)  




= 𝐿(𝜑) − 𝐼        4.27 
The local asymptotic stability of REE ?̅? under least squares learning is determined by the 
stability of the matrix 𝐽𝐿𝑆(?̅?): the least squares algorithm converges locally to the REE if and 
only if the real parts of the eigenvalues of 𝐽𝐿𝑆(?̅?) are strictly negative. These conditions are 
known as E-stability condition as we have applied so far in Chapter 2 and 3 previously. 
Unfortunately, the above RLS learning algorithm has assumed that economic agents’ 
perception takes the form of a forecasting model with fixed unknown parameters that they 
update overtime as new data become available. As a result, the above setting does not 
explicitly allow for parameter drift and regime switching or for model uncertainty and 
robustness. Therefore, Evans et al. (2013), among others, have proposed a refinement of 
learnability for REE by introducing more generic learning algorithm, i.e. the general 
stochastic gradient (GSG) learning algorithm, in which both the RLS and the SG learning 
algorithm are a subset of this learning algorithm. 
Using the GSG learning algorithm, the value of 𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑡, 𝑐𝑡 can be estimated and updated as: 
𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝛾Γ𝑤𝑡−1(𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝜑𝑡−1
′ 𝑤𝑡−1)
′      4.28 
where 𝛾 > 0 is a small scalar gain parameter. As discussed by Evans et al. (2013), the above 
equation can also be viewed as an approximation to Kalman filter in which this equation 




generating process and one wants to use an estimator that works well for different alternatives 
models.   
Substituting in the ALM, we can write: 




𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝛾Γ𝑤𝑡−1(𝑤𝑡−1
′ [𝑇(𝜑𝑡−1) − 𝜑𝑡−1])     4.29 
which is formally a constant gain stochastic approximation or stochastic recursive algorithm.  
Provided a suitable stability condition is satisfied, with sufficiently small 𝛾, the time path of 
equation (4.21) previously converges to a stochastic process near REE. We explicitly restrict 
the attention to weighting symmetric positive definite matrices Γ.  
In the current case of constant-gain learning, the trajectories of the differential equation give 
the mean dynamics of the stochastic process. Convergence of 𝜑𝑡 depends, in particular, on the 
properties of the mapping 𝑇(𝜑). For the system equation (4.21), the mean dynamics will 
converge locally to a fixed point ?̅? of 𝑇(𝜑) if ?̅? is a locally stable equilibrium of the 
associated differential equation.  
Following Barucci & Landi (1997), the associated ODE is: 
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐𝜑
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑣𝑒𝑐[Γ𝑀𝑤(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)]   
where the relevant Jacobian is given by35:  










− 𝐼  
                                                          




 𝐽𝐺𝑆𝐺(𝜑) = Γ[(𝑇(𝜑)′ − 𝜑′)⨂𝐼]
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑤
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐 𝜑
+ (Γ𝑀𝑤⨂𝐼).  𝐽
𝐿𝑆(𝜑) − 𝐼  
Further, the Jacobian evaluated at ?̅? will give us: 
𝐽𝐺𝑆𝐺(𝜑) = (Γ𝑀𝑤⨂𝐼).  𝐽
𝐿𝑆(𝜑) − 𝐼, since 𝑇(?̅?) = ?̅?     4.30 
Since both Γ and 𝑀𝑤 are positive definite, their product is non singular which implies that the 
only equilibrium of the differential equations is the REE. GSG-stability is obtained when 
matrix system in equation (4.30) is stable.  In other words, GSG-stability is attained if all 
eigenvalues of the following Jacobian matrix have negative real parts.  
(Γ𝑀𝑤⊗ 𝐼)(
𝐵2 + 𝐵2?̅? 0 0
0 ?̅?′⊗𝐵2 + 𝐼 ⊗ 𝐵2?̅? 0
0 0 ℱ𝐵2 + 𝐵2?̅?
) − 𝐼   4.31 
In a specicial case where Γ = (𝑀𝑤)
−1, the above GSG-stability condition is equal to E-
stability condition as shown in equation (4.27). Meanwhile, when Γ = 𝐼 the above GSG-
stability condition shrinks to SG-stability condition where agents are assumed to follow the 
SG learning rule. The SG learning rule is a good representation of how agents’ boundedly 
rationality performs. It is simpler than the RLS learning rule so that it is much easier to follow 
by agents. Technically, SG-stability condition differs from E-stability condition, which 
governs the convergence of RLS learning, in terms of its dependency to the second moment 
of 𝑀𝑤. The fact that SG-stability depends on 𝑀𝑤 suggests that the stability conditions depend 
on how the exogenous variables are measured. As point out by Evans et al. (2010)36, SG-
stability and E-stability conditions are not always the same, that is, in general neither implies 
the other.  
                                                          




After describing the concept of E-stability and GSG/SG-stability, we turn the attention to the 
concept of determinacy. Although this concept has been discussed in earlier chapters, we 
recall it again to build a comprehensive understanding about the topic that we discuss here. 
Given the model, the system of equation can be slightly modified and re-written as:  
𝐸𝑡𝐺𝑡+1 = Ω𝐺𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡         4.32 
where 𝐺𝑡 represents a vector of endogenous state variables of the model including its lag and 
𝑧𝑡 governs a vector of exogenous state variables. The REE is determinate if the number of 
stable eigenvalues of matrix Ω is equal to the number of predetermined variables of the 
system. If the number of stable eigenvalues is higher than predetermined variables, then we 
obtain multiple equilibria (indeterminacy problem). In contrast, if the number of stable 
eigenvalues is lower than predetermined variables, then non-existence of locally unique 
stationary equilibrium is attained. The existence of locally unique stationary equilibrium is 
equivalent to the existence of unique solution to the model e.g. in terms of minimum state 
variable (MSV) solution.  
 
4.3.2. Calibration 
Most of parameters are calibrated using the same values as used in Chapter 3 in order to 
ensure a comparable result.  These parameters and their calibrated values are as follows: the 
discount factor of savers 𝛽𝑠 is 0.99 and of borrowers 𝛽𝑏 is 0.98; the elasticity of substitution 
across final goods  is 4 while the inverse of the elasticity of labour supply  is 1.01; the 
Calvo parameter  is set equal to 0.75 while the saver’s wage income 𝛼 and the steady state of 
the loan to value (LTV) ratio 𝑚 are set equal to 0.5 and 0.9, respectively. For the purpose of 




general equilibrium (SG) learning rule, an exogenous shock is required to be introduced in the 
system. As mentioned, we consider a housing demand shock since this exogenous shock has 
an acceleration effect to the movement of housing prices. This shock is assumed to follow an 
autoregressive AR (1) process as  𝑗?̃? = 𝜌𝑗 𝑗?̃?−1 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡, where the coefficient of AR 
process 𝜌𝑗  is calibrated at 0.9 and a white noise shock 𝑒𝑗,𝑡 is assumed to have a mean zero and 
standard deviation  𝜎𝑗 at 0.05.  
 
4.4. Robust Monetary and Macroprudential Policies  
We have seen in Chapter 3 that different quality of data used in monetary and 
macroprudential policies may lead to different results for learnability of REE. These results 
are obtained by assuming agents follow the RLS learning rule in estimating their future 
outcome, instead of the RE. In summary, using current data in policy rule is better than using 
forecasted data since it may give higher probability of directing the economy to a determinate 
and E-stable REE. Note that, in our setting, current data are assumed to have better quality 
than forecasted data since they are the latest updated data available.   
In this chapter, we revisit this issue again, though using more restricted definition of 
learnability of REE. Unlike earlier chapters that assume agents never make an error when 
conducting the RLS learning rule, we consider a case in which the learning process is possibly 
mis-specified asymptotically relative to RLS learning. The example of this situation is a case 
in which agents follow SG algorithm instead of RLS algorithm in estimating future outcome. 
Since we are unsure about the type of learning algorithm used by agents, then a preferred 




SG class. In other words, the chosen policy rule should not be only E-stable under RLS 
learning but also SG-stable under SG learning.  
We start the analysis by briefly defining two policies that might be applied by central bank, 
i.e. macroprudential policy and monetary policy. Macroprudential policy operates through the 
LTV rule that reacts inversely to the movement of housing prices growth. Since there is a 
constraint on data availability, there are two alternatives of conducting LTV rules: (1) current 
data of housing prices growth are accurately available; (2) current data of housing prices 
growth are not available and need to be forecasted. Meanwhile, monetary policy operates 
through a simple Taylor-type rule that responds to inflation and output. As a case of the LTV 
rule, it is assumed that monetary policy is also constrained by data availability. Under such 
condition, there two are options available for conducting monetary policy: (1) current data of 
inflation and output are accurately available; (2) these data are not available and needs to be 
forecasted. In aggregate, there are four combinations between monetary and macroprudential 
policies. Notice that the LTV rule that responds to credit growth will not be considered in this 
analysis since we have seen earlier that this rule is inferior relatively to the LTV rule that 
responds to housing prices growth. 
 
4.4.1. Current Data in Interest Rate and LTV Rules 
We consider a case where interest rate and the LTV rule jointly interact as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦 ?̃?𝑡  and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞∆?̃?𝑡      4.33 
Under this setting, it is assumed that central bank has accessed to current data of inflation, 




system of equations in equation (4.1) to (4.6), we obtain the final reduced form of equations 
which is characterised by seven linearised system of equations with seven endogenous state 
variables, i.e. ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑏,𝑡, ℎ̃𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡 and one exogenous variable 𝑗?̃?. Among the 
endogenous state variables, there are four predetermined state variables, i.e. ?̃?𝑡−1, ?̃?𝑏,𝑡−1, ℎ̃𝑡−1 
and ?̃?𝑡−1. We put the final system of equations as equation (4.32) and follow the relevant steps 
for determinacy analysis. For learning analysis, we write the system as equation (4.16) and 
evaluate both E-stability, by checking the eigenvalues of  𝐽𝐿𝑆(𝜑) for a negative real part, and 
SG-stability, by checking the eigenvalues of  𝐽𝐺𝑆𝐺(𝜑) for a negative real part. We argue that a 
robust policy rule is the one that is not only determinate but also E-stable and SG-stable.  
For the numerical approach, we can explain the process as follows. For each combination of 
interest rate and the LTV rule, we begin by assuming the LTV ratio is fixed at certain value 
such that it does not respond to any economic condition. This assumption implies parameter 
𝜏𝑞 needs to be set at the value of zero since the system of equations is the form of log-
linearised variables around the steady state values. Meanwhile, parameter 𝜏𝜋 and 𝜏𝑦 in policy 
rate are allowed to vary within a plausible range of policy parameter from 0 to 4 for 𝜏𝑦 and 0 
to 5 for 𝜏𝜋, with an increment step size is 0.05. The final numerical results are provided using 
two dimensional figures which make the results are easier to compare between one to another.  
The same procedure is applied for different values of the LTV reaction function parameter 𝜏𝑞, 
i.e. 0.6 and 1.2. Under this setting, the LTV rule reacts inversely to economic condition, 
especially to the movement of housing prices growth. A positive value of 𝜏𝑞 implies a 
percentage growth on housing prices will be dampened by a percentage reduction of the LTV 
ratio from its steady state value. As illustration, setting parameter 𝜏𝑞 equal to 1.2 implies a 




reduction in the LTV ratio from its steady state value. Since the steady state value of the LTV 
ratio is calibrated at 0.9, a 12% reduction causes central bank to set the LTV ratio around 
0.79. This means more restrictions on the LTV ratio is imposed in order to stabilise the 
economic condition when housing prices bubble is observed.  
After explaining the general procedure for evaluating E-stability and SG-stability and 
describing how our numerical task works, we arrive to a discussion about the results. When 
policy rate responds to current inflation and output, setting the LTV ratio at a fix value 
(implies 𝜏𝑞 is set equal to 0) is sufficient to lead the economy into E-stable REE as long as the 
standard Taylor principle applies37. This is illustrated with a yellow/grey colour in Figure 4.1. 
Unfortunately, this result is established under the assumption that agents follow the RLS 
learning rule in estimating future outcomes so that the design of policy rule depends only on 
E-stability criterion.  
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The way of how agents conduct their learning process can also create another uncertainty in 
policy design. For example, agents may follow the stochastic gradient (SG) learning 
algorithm, instead of the RLS learning algorithm, since it is computationally much simpler. 
Under such condition, we advise that a robust policy rule should not be only E-stable but also 
SG-stable. A policy rule that satisfies both of these criteria is called ESG-stable policy rule, 
whilst relevant rational expectation equilibrium (REE) that corresponds to it is called ESG-
stable REE38. Note that we will use these terms extensively throughout this chapter.   
When both SG-stability and E-stability are jointly considered, it turns out that most of E-
stable policy rules become SG-unstable and only a small subset of them is SG-stable 
(represented by a blue/dark region in Figure 4.1). This result shows the standard Taylor 
principle is insufficient to ensure a robust policy rule when learning rule uncertainty arises. 
This finding has brought us to the conclusion that a refined criterion for learnability of REE 
has caused central bank is not easy to find the preferred policy rule. As the preferred rule is 
the one that is ESG-stable, a strong response of policy rate to inflation is required to ensure 
ESG-stable REE (i.e. 𝜏𝜋 > 2.6). If not, central bank may take the economy to unexpected 
condition, e.g. indeterminate or ESG-unstable REE.     
The above finding is similar to the results obtained by Christev & Slobodyan (2013). They 
argue that more active monetary policy is associated with SG-stability while SG-instability is 
concentrated in areas where 𝜏𝜋 is relatively low. Our work differs from them in two aspects: 
Firstly, in the way of how they frame the structure of the economy. Secondly, the kind of 
monetary policy rule is used by central bank. We frame the structure of the economy using an 
otherwise version of NK model with housing market and financial friction, as introduced by 
Iacoviello (2005). While, Christev & Slobodyan (2013) have framed it as a standard two-
                                                          




equation NK model that is absent from housing market and financial constraint. In addition, 
we consider different combinations of monetary and macroprudential policy rules since the 
purpose of our study is to find a robust policy rule under learning rule uncertainty. In contrast, 
Christev & Slobodyan (2013) consider only one version of monetary policy rule, i.e. the 
expectations-based interest rate rule under commitment. In this way, central bank responds to 
past output, in addition to future output and future inflation. 
Christev & Slobodyan (2013) found that ESG-stable policy rules associate with E-stable 
policy rule that delivers a high convergence speed to REE under RLS learning. In contrast, E-
stable policy rule that is SG-unstable associates with a low convergence speed to REE under 
the same learning algorithm. Following their claim, although we do not address this issue 
specifically, we argue that a blue/dark region in Figure 4.1 associates with a high convergence 
speed to REE under RLS learning, while a region with a yellow/grey colour associates with a 
low convergence speed to REE under the same learning. In the following sub-section, we 
extend the analysis in a case where the LTV rule responds to current growth of housing prices 
while interest rate responds to current data of inflation and output. This experiment is 
illustrated in panel 2 and 3 of Figure 4.1, respectively.  
In Chapter 3, we argue that it is redundant for central bank to give a response to current 
growth of housing prices via the LTV rule if they have used current data of inflation and 
output in monetary policy. However, that result holds under the assumption of the RLS 
learning rule in the formation of agents’ expectation. When we are uncertainty about the kind 
of learning rule adopted by economic agents, whether it is the RLS or the SG learning 
algorithm, then a response to current growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is favourable 
for learning stability even when central bank has used current data of inflation and output in 




slightly increased the region of ESG-stable policy rules within policy parameter range (the 
blue/dark region). It follows that a lower response to inflation is required (𝜏𝜋 > 2.3) to ensure 
a robust policy rule relative to a case where the LTV ratio is constant (𝜏𝜋 > 2.6). As parameter 
𝜏𝑞 gets higher, i.e. 1.2 (panel 3 of Figure 4.1), a lower response of policy rate to inflation is 
required (i.e. 𝜏𝜋 > 2.2) which implies a larger region of ESG-stability is attained within policy 
parameters.  
In summary, there are two findings from this exercise: Firstly, the uncertainty about learning 
specification makes the task of central bank becomes more challenging. It is not easy now for 
them to direct the economy to ESG-stable REE since most of the rules that are E-stable under 
RLS learning turn out to be SG-unstable under SG learning. Secondly, although it still 
requires a relatively high response of policy rate to inflation for obtaining the desired 
economic condition, we conclude that the LTV rule that responds to current growth of 
housing prices is useful even when current data of inflation and output are used in monetary 
policy. This last finding is contrast to earlier results found in Chapter 3 in which a response to 
current growth of housing prices via the LTV rule does not improve the probability of central 
bank leads the economy to a determinate and E-stable REE if current data of inflation and 
output have been used in monetary policy. In what follows, we do a robustness check for 
these two findings by considering another combination between monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy.     
 
4.4.2. Current Data in Interest Rate Rule and Forecasted Data in LTV Rule 
Under this setting, current growth of housing prices is not available and needs to be estimated 




is made, most of the current data are unavailable. Meanwhile, monetary policy works in a 
conventional way that responds to the deviation of current inflation and output from their 
steady state values. This combination of policy rules can be presented as follows:  
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝜏𝑦 ?̃?𝑡  and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞∆𝐸
∗?̃?𝑡+1       4.34 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that a response to forecasted growth of housing prices 
via the LTV rule is irrelevant if central bank has used current data of inflation and output in 
monetary policy. This result is established under the assumption that agents in the economy 
follow the RLS learning algorithm in estimating future outcomes. We re-visit the same issue 
here, but with different environments. To be specific, we assume that agents’ learning is mis-
specified asymptotically relative to RLS learning such that we are uncertain about the type of 
learning algorithm used by agents, whether it is RLS or SG learning.  
Substituting the above interest rate rule and the LTV rule into the dynamic system in equation 
(4.1) to (4.6), we get the reduced form of equations that is characterised by seven linearised 
systems of equation with seven endogenous state variables, i.e. ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑏,𝑡, ℎ̃𝑡 and ?̃?𝑡 and 
one exogenous state variable 𝑗?̃?. Notice that among these endogenous variables, three 
variables are predetermined, i.e.  ?̃?𝑏,𝑡−1, ℎ̃𝑡−1 and ?̃?𝑡−1. As demonstrated in the previous sub-
section, we present the final system of equations as equation (4.32) and follow the relevant 
steps for determinacy analysis. For the purpose of learning analysis, we construct the system 
as equation (4.16) and evaluate both E-stability and SG-stability condition. We argue that a 
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When SG-stability is considered as additional criteria in policy design, it becomes difficult for 
central bank to find a robust policy rule, i.e. a policy rule that is not only E-stable under RLS 
learning but also SG-stable under the classic SG learning. ESG-stable REE is obtained when a 
strong response of policy rate to inflation is imposed, as illustrated by a blue/dark region in 
Figure 4.2. A policy rule that is E-stable but SG-unstable should not be chosen as it takes the 
system to unique stationary REE with a zero probability (an area with yellow/grey colour). 
From this exercise, although the effect is minimal, it can be seen that a response to forecasted 
growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is beneficial, especially in an environment where 
there is uncertainty about the type of learning algorithms used by agents. This is a useful 
result in which forecasted data can also be used in the LTV rule when a bubble in housing 
prices is observed. As illustration, setting 𝜏𝑞 equal to 0.6 slightly enlarges the region of EGS-
stable policy rules. This can be clarify from a point where the slope of ESG-stable region (a 




axis of 𝜏𝜋. When the LTV ratio is constant, the minimum required value for 𝜏𝜋 is about 2.6 
for getting ESG-stable REE. Meanwhile, when the LTV rule responds actively to forecasted 
growth of housing prices, e.g. by setting 𝜏𝑞 at 0.6, the minimum required value for 𝜏𝜋 reduces 
to around 2.5 for obtaining ESG-stable REE. This implies a slightly larger region of ESG-
stable policy rules is attained when a stronger response of the LTV rule to forecasted growth 
of housing prices is imposed. The benefit of giving a response to forecasted growth of 
housing prices via the LTV rule becomes clearer when we set the LTV reaction function to 
housing prices growth 𝜏𝑞  equal to 1.2. Under this condition, the minimum required value for 
𝜏𝜋 reduces to around 2.4 for obtaining ESG-stable of REE while at the same time policy rate 
is more flexible in responding to output.  
Unlike a case where central bank responds to current growth of housing prices earlier, for a 
case where central bank responds to forecasted growth of housing prices through the LTV 
rule, the effect is small and hard to be seen. The reason is that there is another uncertainty that 
arises from using forecasted data of housing prices growth in the LTV rule. As an illustration, 
comparing panel 3 of Figure 4.1 and 4.2, using the same value of parameter 𝜏𝑞, i.e. 1.2, a 
stronger monetary policy reaction function to inflation is required when forecasted data of 
housing prices are used in the LTV rule relative to current data of housing price are used. In 
panel 3 of Figure 4.2, parameter 𝜏𝜋 is required to be set at 2.4 (for a minimum) to obtain 
ESG-stable REE while in panel 3 of Figure 4.1, setting  𝜏𝜋 equal to 2.2 (for a minimum) is 
sufficient to have ESG-stable REE. We argue this small difference is important in a situation 
in which uncertainty arises from agents’ learning algorithm. From Figure 4.1 and 4.2, we can 
also confirm that it is not necessary for central bank to respond to output in order to get ESG-
stable REE. Instead, a strong response to inflation is required to ensure a robust policy rule 




By summarising the above findings and the findings from earlier sub-sections, we argue that a 
response to the growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is beneficial regardless the quality 
of housing prices data as long as central bank has used current data in monetary policy. Yet, 
the benefit is very limited. This is a nice result since in practice having access to current data 
of housing prices is not so easy such that most decisions by policy makers are taken using 
forecasted or past data.  
 
4.4.3. Forecasted Data in Interest Rate Rule and Current Data in LTV Rule 
This is the third alternative of mixing monetary and macroprudential policies. As argued 
several times, having access to current data is a strong assumption. In most cases, current data 
is not ready when a decision is made as there is a lag until it is officially published by relevant 
institutions. This applies not only for the data of housing prices but also for the data of 
inflation and output. We consider another alternative of policy combination between 
monetary and macroprudential policies as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝐸
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑦𝐸
∗?̃?𝑡+1  and ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞∆?̃?𝑡     4.35 
Under this setting, interest rate responds to forecasted deviation of inflation and output from 
their steady state values and the LTV rule reacts inversely to current growth of housing prices. 
Substituting these rules into the dynamic system of equations in equations (4.1) to (4.6), a 
final reduced form is obtained, which is characterised by seven linearised system of equations 
with seven endogenous state variables and one exogenous variable. For the analysis of 
determinacy, we put this final system of equations as equation (4.32) and follow relevant 




analysis, we write the system as equation (4.16) and evaluate both E-stability and SG-stability 
condition.  
In Chapter 3, we have seen when central bank uses forecasted data of inflation and output in 
monetary policy, then a response given to current growth of housing prices via the LTV rule 
is favourable. When this response becomes more aggressive, then a larger region of E-stable 
policy rules is attained within plausible policy parameters. Notice that this result is established 
under the assumption that private agents and central banks follow the RLS learning rule in 
updating their belief. We relax the assumption of the RLS learning rule by assuming there is 
another type of learning algorithm that might be used by agents, i.e. SG learning. SG learning 
is different from RLS learning in which the first type of learning assumes that agents are 
unable to observe the variance of all state variables perfectly during learning process. 
Meanwhile, the second type of learning assumes that agents can observe the second moment 
of endogenous state variables precisely during learning process. Unfortunately, we are unsure 
about these two learning rules, which one among them is used by agents in the economy. To 
accommodate this uncertainty, we argue that a robust policy rule should be the one that is 
stable under both the RLS and the SG learning algorithm.    
Adding another criterion in policy design, i.e. SG stability has caused the option for choosing 
the preferred policy rule becomes more restrictive. When the ratio of LTV is constant, 
i.e. 𝜏𝑞 = 0, which implies no response is given to economic condition, then only a small 
subset of policy parameters that E-stable is also SG-stable (plotted with a blue/dark colour). 
This combination of policy parameters is obtained for relatively strong responses of policy 
rate to inflation (𝜏𝜋 > 2.9) and sufficiently low response of policy rate to output (as 
illustrated in panel 1 of Figure 4.3). Comparing this finding with a result produced by the first 




of inflation and output, we argue that a stronger reaction of policy rate on inflation is required 
when data used in interest rate rule is less credible. As can be seen in panel 1 of Figure 4.1, 
the reaction function parameter of interest rate to inflation 𝜏𝜋 only requires to be set at 2.6 (for 
the minimum) in order to have ESG-stable REE. While in panel 1 of Figure 4.3, this 
parameter needs to be set at higher value, i.e. 2.9, for a minimum. It can also be shown that 
most E-stable policy rules are unstable under SG-learning that causes central bank is not easy 
to find a robust policy rule that stable under both the SG and the RLS learning algorithm (a 
region with yellow/grey colour). Notice that indeterminate but E-stable policy rules turn out 
to be unstable under the SG learning algorithm (a region with a pink colour in Figure 4.3). 
While for policy parameters that are E-unstable, we do not carried out the analysis of SG-
stability any more. 
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Is a stronger response of the LTV rule to current growth of housing prices beneficial for the 
whole economy when agents’ learning is mis-specified asymptotically relative to RLS 
learning? We answer this question by repeating the numerical work for different values of 
parameter  𝜏𝑞 at 0.6 and 1.2, respectively. As shown in panel 2 and 3 of Figure 4.3, a higher 
response of LTV rule to current growth of housing prices, indeed, increases the region of 
ESG-stable policy rules. As an illustration, when the LTV reaction function to current growth 
of housing prices is set equal to 0.6, a more flexible response of monetary policy to output 𝜏𝑦 
is attained for leading the system to ESG-stable REE, compared to a case where no response 
of the LTV rule is given to housing prices growth. At the same time, monetary reaction 
function to inflation  𝜏𝜋 does not alter. This result implies a larger ESG-stable region is 
obtained when LTV reaction to current growth of housing prices gets stronger. As 
parameter 𝜏𝑞 increases from 0.6 to 1.2, ESG-stable region enlarge even further although the 
change is relatively small such that it is hard to be seen (illustrated in panel 3 of Figure 4.3). 
We summarise that a response to current growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is 
beneficial even when current data of inflation and output are not observed. 
It is also interesting to discuss about a possible ESG-stable policy rule that is attained when 
interest rate reaction function to inflation  𝜏𝜋 is set equal to 1 with no or low response of 
policy rate is given to output. We argue that these policy parameter combinations are 
important and should be considered in designing preferred policy rules that are robust to 
learning rule uncertainty. As shown in Figure 4.3, there are a few plots of ESG- stable policy 
rules that consistently appear around 𝜏𝜋 = 1 although parameter  𝜏𝑞 has been varied within 
the range 0 to 1.2. If this finding is valid, then it is unnecessary for central bank gives a strong 
response of policy rate to inflation in order to get a robust learnability of REE. A combination 




lead to the desired REE. This is an important finding since our argument is established under 
the assumption that there is uncertainty about learning algorithm used by agents and a 
difficulty in obtaining current data in monetary policy (in fact, this is a realistic assumption). 
We reconfirm this last finding by considering another combination of policy parameters 
between monetary and macroprudential policies in the following sub-section. To be specific, 
we assume now that all current data are not available and need to be forecasted in both 
monetary and macroprudential policies.           
 
4.4.4. Forecasted Data in Interest Rate and LTV Rule 
In this scenario, we assume that all relevant data, i.e. inflation, output and housing prices are 
not available in current period so that central bank needs to forecast them. This condition is 
the most realistic assumption as at the time a decision is made it is almost impossible to have 
access to current data. We consider a combination of policy rules as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝐸
∗?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑦𝐸
∗ ?̃?𝑡+1 and  ?̃?𝑡 = −𝜏𝑞∆𝐸
∗?̃?𝑡+1     4.36 
where interest rate responds to forecasted data of inflation and output while the LTV rule 
responds to forecasted growth of housing prices.  
In earlier chapter, we have shown that a response to forecasted growth of housing prices via 
the LTV rule is not useful since it reduces the probability of central bank leads the economy 
to E-stable REE. This argument is established under the assumption that forecasted data is 
unreliable and invalid to be used. To some extent, this argument is too strong since it gives no 
room for improvement if we know that the data used in policy rules are not the recent ones. 




growth of housing prices should be beneficial, relative to a case where no response is given by 
the LTV rule if a bubble in housing market exists.  
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We re-evaluate the consequence of using forecasted data in both monetary and 
macroprudential policies with a slightly different environment, that is the uncertainty of 
learning rule used by agents (between SG and RLS learning rule). Having this limitation, the 
preferred policy rule is the one that satisfies both E-stability and SG-stability principle. The 
result of this numerical simulation is reported in Figure 4.4. Similar to other scenatios, only a 
small subset of policy parameters that E-stable is also SG-stable (represented by a blue/dark 
region). Most of E-stable policy rules turn out to be not stable under the SG learning 
algorithm. In addition, all indeterminate but E-stable policy rule becomes SG-unstable under 
SG learning. Having this result, it becomes clear that the task of central bank gets more 
difficult when there is uncertainty with regards to the kind of learning algorithm used by 
agents, regardless the type of rules used in both monetary and macroprudential policies. 




As illustrated in panel 2 and 3 of Figure 4.4, the LTV rule that responds to forecasted growth 
of housing prices does increase ESG-stable region within plausible policy parmaters. This is 
an interesting result as we can show that the argument that says it is irrelevant to give a 
response to forecasted growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is not entirely true. An 
increase of the LTV reaction function parameter 𝜏𝑞 from 0 to 1.2 unarguably enlarges the 
ESG-stable region within policy parameters. As an illustration, when the LTV rule does not 
actively respond to economic condition, i.e. 𝜏𝑞 = 0, it is required a strong response of policy 
rate to inflation (𝜏𝜋 > 2.9) in order to get a robust learnability of REE. As parameter  𝜏𝑞 
increases from 0 to 1.2, a lower response of policy rate to inflation is required to obtain a 
robust learnability of REE (𝜏𝜋 > 2.75). This latter result implies a higher probability of 
leading the economy to ESG-stable REE.  
The above numerical result also shows that a benefit of using forecasted data in the LTV rule 
is less significant relative to the case where current data is used in the LTV rule. Yet, it 
confirms our intuition whereas a response of the LTV rule to housing prices growth should be 
beneficial even when the data used in the LTV rule is the forecasted one. This happens since a 
credit channel mechanism and a housing preference shock in the model have ensured the 
existence of housing prices growth such that a response to the growth of housing prices via 
the LTV rule is required, regardless the quality of housing data owned. As an illustration, the 
intersection of ESG-stable region that splits ESG-stable policy with E-stable but SG-unstable 
policy in panel 3 of Figure 4.4 is smaller than a similar region in panel 3 of Figure 4.3. 
Although the difference is very small, we argue that this difference matters in the context of 
learning uncertainty.      
The result from Figure 4.4 also confirms the existence of ESG-stable policy rules when 




low. Varying the value of parameter 𝜏𝑞 within 0 to 1.2 does not remove the existence of these 
blue/dark dots around 𝜏𝜋 = 1 (note that a blue/dark dot represents ESG-stable policy rule). 
This means a robust learnability of REE may be obtained when interest rate responds to 
forecasted inflation around 𝜏𝜋 = 1 and to forecasted output at sufficiently low values, whilst 
at the same time the LTV rule responds to forecasted growth of housing prices. But this 
decision should be taken with care since it may easily falls to indeterminate and E-stable 
equilibrium (an area with a white colour) or E-stable but SG-unstable equilibrium (an area 
with a yellow/grey colour).      
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter studies a refinement of learnability of REE in the framework of New Keynesian 
model with housing market and financial constraint. In addition to E-stability, we consider 
SG-stability criteria in the design of both monetary and macroprudential policies. Two 
relevant issues are addressed: Firstly, how to find robust monetary and macroprudential 
policy rules that remain stable  even when there is uncertainty concerning the type of learning 
algorithms used by agents (between RLS and SG learning). Secondly, is having access to 
current data in monetary and macroprudential policies beneficial when the learning process is 
uncertain between the RLS and the SG learning algorithm.  
With regards to the first issue, the results show that a refined criterion for learnability of REE 
has made central bank’s task becomes not easy. The standard Taylor principle is insufficient 
to ensure a robust learnability of REE when the uncertainty in learning rule arises between the 
RLS and the SG learning rule. In general, it is required a strong response of policy rate to 




unexpected equilibrium e.g. indeterminate, E-unstable or SG-unstable REE. Concerning the 
second issue, we argue that the quality of data remains matter in an environment where the 
uncertainty in learning rule arises. Yet, this claim does not mean that there is no room for 
improvement if current data is not available. It can be shown that using forecasted data of 
housing prices growth in the LTV rule is also beneficial when bubble in housing prices is 
observed. However, this benefit is smaller relative to a response given to current data of 
housing prices growth in the LTV rule. This is an interesting finding as in reality having 
access to current data is almost impossible such that forecasted data is more commonly used 
by policy makers. 
In the next chapter, we deviate from a calibrated model as we use so far (from Chapter 2 to 
Chapter 4) and consider an estimated model for the analysis of monetary policy. Although 
calibration approach helps researchers and policy makers in evaluating policy implications, 
under reasonable assumptions of parameters values, there are some limitations on this 
approach, especially when the model gets larger and complex. A calibrated model is also less 
powerful in characterising a specific country’s economic condition since no data series is 
employed and entered to the model. Given these limitations, in next chapter, we focus the 
analysis on the estimated model by employing a Bayesian technique. A Bayesian technique is 
very useful in solving the limitations of the calibration approach since it offers a formal way 
to estimate parameters by combining prior information about parameters with the data, 





Appendix 4.1. E-Stability Condition 
 
The recursive least squares algorithm is given by: 




Substituting into the ALM, we can write: 





 𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝛾ℛ𝑡−1
−1𝑤𝑡−1[𝑤𝑡−1
′ (𝑇(𝜑𝑡−1) − 𝜑𝑡−1)] 
where, 
ℛ𝑡 = ℛ𝑡−1 + 𝛾[𝑤𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1
′ − ℛ𝑡−1] 
Marcet & Sargent (1989) show that the associated ordinary differential equation (ODE) is the 
vectorised version of the following ODE: 
𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝜏
= ℛ−1𝑀(𝜑)[𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑]  
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑀(𝜑) − ℛ   
where 𝑀(𝜑) = lim𝑡→∞ 𝐸𝑤𝑡(𝜑)𝑤𝑡(𝜑)
′.  
They further show that the local stability of rational expectations equilibrium is entirely 
determined by the local stability, at the same point, of the following small ODE: 
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐𝜑
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)  
Let 𝐿(𝜑) = 𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑇(𝜑))/𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐𝜑   




= 𝐿(𝜑) − 𝐼   
The local asymptotic stability of REE under least squares learning is determined by the 




real parts of the eigenvalues of 𝐽𝐿𝑆(?̅?) are strictly negative. The conditions are also known as 





Appendix 4.2. GSG-Stability Condition 
 
The generalised stochastic gradient learning is given by: 
𝜑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝛾Γ𝑤𝑡−1[𝑤𝑡−1
′ (𝑇(𝜑𝑡−1) − 𝜑𝑡−1)] 
Following Barucci & Landi (1997), the associated ODE of the above system is: 
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐𝜑
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑣𝑒𝑐[Γ𝑀𝑤(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)], where 𝑀𝑤 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(1,𝑀𝑠, 𝑀𝑧) 




− 𝐼  
First note that: 
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐[Γ𝑀𝑤. (𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)]  =  𝑣𝑒𝑐 Γ𝑑[𝑀𝑤(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)] 
                                          = 𝑣𝑒𝑐 Γ[𝑑𝑀𝑤(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑) +𝑀𝑤𝑑(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)]  
                                          =  𝑣𝑒𝑐 Γ[𝐼. 𝑑𝑀𝑤(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)] + 𝑣𝑒𝑐[𝑀𝑤𝑑(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑). 𝐼] 
                                          = [Γ(𝑇(𝜑)′ − 𝜑′)⨂𝐼]. 𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑤 + (Γ𝑀𝑤⨂𝐼). 𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑇(𝜑) − 𝜑)  
Using the above result, we can re-write the Jacobian matrix as:  
𝐽𝐺𝑆𝐺(𝜑) =  
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐[Γ𝑀𝑤(𝑇(𝜑)−𝜑)]
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐 𝜑
− 𝐼  






− 𝐼   
                =  Γ[(𝑇(𝜑)′ − 𝜑′)⨂𝐼].
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑤
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐 𝜑
+ (Γ𝑀𝑤⨂𝐼).  𝐽
𝐿𝑆(𝜑) − 𝐼  
Further, the Jacobian evaluated at ?̅? is given by: 
(Γ𝑀𝑤⨂𝐼).  𝐽
𝐿𝑆(𝜑) − 𝐼, since 𝑇(?̅?) = ?̅?       
Both Γ and 𝑀𝑤 are positive definite. Given this property, their product is non-singular which 
implies the only equilibrium of the differential equation is the REE. We say matrix 𝐽𝐺𝑆𝐺(𝜑) is 




Appendix 4.3. Some Useful Matrix Operations 
 
𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝐴𝐵𝐶) = (𝐶′⊗𝐴). 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝐵)  
𝑑(𝐴𝑌𝐵) = 𝐴(𝑑𝑌)𝐵 
𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑐 𝑦 = 𝑣𝑒𝑐 𝑑𝑦 and 𝑑(𝑣𝑒𝑐 𝑋) = 𝑣𝑒𝑐 𝑑𝑋  
𝑑(𝐴𝑋 + 𝐵) = 𝐴(𝑑𝑋)  
𝑑(𝐴𝑋2) = 𝐴((𝑑𝑋)𝑋 + 𝑋𝑑𝑋) 
where 𝑑𝑋 and 𝑑𝑦 stand for the differential of matrix 𝑋 and of the vector 𝑦, respectively. The 













Monetary Policy, Lending Decision and Business Cycles in Indonesia 
 
 
5.1. Background and Motivation 
In earlier chapters, we have studied the issue of monetary and macroprudential policies in 
which economic agents deviate from the framework of a rational expectation (RE) and follow 
a particular learning algorithm in forming their expectation. Under this assumption, the 
preferred policy rule becomes more restrictive since the expected equilibrium must not only 
be unique (or determinate) but also stable under learning assumption. So far, we have studied 
the issue of learning stability in two different versions of New Keynesian (NK) model: 
Firstly, a standard NK model with the feature of consumption habit where agents in the 
economy follow the recursive least square (RLS) learning rule in making a forecast, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Secondly, an otherwise version of NK model featuring housing 
market and liquidity constraint in which agents endow with the RLS learning algorithm when 
estimating the structural parameters, as studied in Chapter 3. The latter model is also used in 
Chapter 4 in which it is assumed that there is uncertainty with regards to the type of learning 
rules adopted by economic agents, whether it is RLS or SG learning.  
The result from Chapter 2 shows that as the parameter of habit gets larger, determinate and E-
stable policy rules, under plausible policy parameters, become easily to obtain. This happens 
as the feature of habit in consumption makes output less volatile, although at the cost of a 
slightly higher inflation, such that it becomes easier for economic agents to learn the rational 
expectation equilibrium (REE). Meanwhile, the result from Chapter 3 suggests that monetary 




macroprudential policy) to ease their work in finding determinate and E-stable policy rules. 
This last work is then extended, by assuming there is uncertainty with regards to the type of 
learning rules used by agents, as discussed in Chapter 4. The result from this chapter shows 
that it becomes difficult for central bank to lead the economy to a determinate and stable REE 
when both criteria of E-stability and SG-stability are jointly considered to find the best policy 
rule.  
All the above analyses have been done under the assumption that the models are calibrated to 
those estimated in previous studies and/or those computed using long-run average data. 
Although the calibration approach helps researchers and policy makers in evaluating policy 
implications, under reasonable assumptions about parameters values, there are some 
limitations on this approach, especially when the model gets larger and complex e.g. for the 
purpose of addressing mis-specification issues and presenting more realistic features found in 
empirical data. Under such condition, it becomes less obvious how all deep parameters in the 
model are calibrated (see Beltran & Draper (2008)). A calibrated dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model is also less powerful in characterising a specific country’s 
economic condition since no data series is employed and entered to the model. As well, this 
type of model is not always robust to alternative calibrations such that a slightly different 
parameter value may change the result significantly. Motivated by these limitations, in this 
chapter, we focus the analysis on the estimated model, instead of the calibrated one, by 
employing a Bayesian technique. Base on the literature, a Bayesian technique is very useful in 
solving the limitations in the calibration approach as it offers a formal way to estimate the 
parameters by combining prior information about parameters with the data, conditional on the 




policy that is robust to the uncertainty around the parameters of interest (see for example: 
Levin et al. (2004) and Levin et al. (2005)). 
A Bayesian technique is used for estimating a DSGE model for Indonesia. According to the 
literature, there are not many studies that try to establish a specific DSGE model for this 
country. The most related one is Ramayandi (2009) who examines the suitability of a simple 
structural small open economy model in five ASEAN economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
approach. Motivated by this, we build and propose an alternative DSGE model for Indonesia 
by combining the version of a small open economy model of Gali & Monacelli (2005) with 
the version of housing market and financial constraint model of Iacoviello (2005). To make it 
more realistic, the model also incorporates the features of incomplete exchange rate pass-
through, following Monacelli (2005), and the Calvo (1983) staggered price setting in 
domestic and import price. Our work is different from Ramayandi (2009) in the sense that the 
latter does not bring the feature of housing market and borrowing constraint into the model 
and the feature of incomplete exchange rate pass-through as used in Monacelli (2005).  
On the study of DSGE model for Indonesia, there are at least four objectives that we want to 
achieve: Firstly, proposing an alternative DSGE model where its features and assumptions fit 
with the Indonesian economy characteristics. Secondly, estimating and analysing banks’ 
lending decisions in Indonesia. This objective is motivated by the fact that the ratio of loan to 
value (LTV) or down payment (DP) has not been explicitly regulated by Bank Indonesia (BI) 
until 2012. Having knowledge about this lending parameter, we are allowed to evaluate the 
current setting of macroprudential policy. Thirdly, analysing the main objective of monetary 
policy in Indonesia through the estimation of monetary reaction function parameter. The 




way of how BI conducts its monetary policy. We are interested whether BI puts higher 
concern on the variability of inflation, output or exchange rate. Lastly, analysing the 
determinant of business cycle fluctuations in Indonesia, including housing prices volatility. 
Recent development shows that housing prices in Indonesia has shown a significant increase, 
especially in some major cities in Indonesia.    
In regards to the issue of banks’ lending decisions, the estimation result suggests that banks in 
Indonesia are likely to set higher ratio of down payment (DP) for households who have only 
housing assets in collateral than the ones who can show both her income and housing assets 
when making a housing loan application. The result also shows that Bank Indonesia (BI) has 
consistently adopted the Taylor principle in their monetary policy which implies price 
stabilisation is among their main targets. As opposed to the behaviour of central bank in 
developed countries, BI policy rate is also occasionally used to promote economy growth but 
rarely used to stabilise the variability of exchange rate. Concerning the degree of economic 
dependency, the estimation result clarifies that the Indonesian economic dependency is not as 
high as predicted since the proportion of import goods in consumption goods bundle is less 
than 10%.  
In respect to the issue of business cycles, the result confirms that there are three main drivers 
of the Indonesian economy, i.e. non-stationary permanent technology shock, monetary policy 
shock and marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock. The important role of non-
stationary permanent technology shock is in line with Aguiar & Gopinath (2007), among 
others. Meanwhile, a significant contribution of monetary policy shock follows a similar 
result found by Aspachs-Bracons & Rabanal (2010) for the case of Spain and Euro area. As 
well, a large contribution of MEI shock to business cycles supports a claim argued by Justiano 




that housing preference shock is the main disturbance of housing prices variation. 
Surprisingly, the contribution of monetary policy shock and loan to value (LTV) shock on the 
variability of housing prices is minimal.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly discusses the recent 
development in the implementation of macroprudential policy and the ITF in Indonesia. 
Section 5.3 describes our proposed open-economy DSGE model, giving proper consideration 
to the Indonesian’s characteristics. Section 5.4 discusses the methodology and the data used in 
estimating the model. Section 5.5 presents the estimation results and evaluates the impacts of 
various structural innovations to the Indonesian economy. This section also discusses about a 
mechanism under which these innovations affect the Indonesian economy through the 
analysis of the impulse response function (IRF). Section 5.6 conducts a robustness check by 
evaluating the role of news shocks in the formation of the agents’ expectation. The conclusion 
of this chapter is summarised in Section 5.7.    
 
5.2. Macroprudential Policy and ITF in Indonesia  
Since January 1st, 2014, the role of banking supervision in Indonesia has been delegated from 
Bank Indonesia (BI) to a new institution called the Indonesian Financial Service Authority 
(OJK). This delegation is formalised through the 2011 OJK Act that integrates the supervision 
of banking sector, non-banking financial industry and capital market to minimise frauds in 
financial service industries. Under this new law, the role of BI has slightly changed in which 
they focus now more on the financial system stability, through macroprudential policies, in 




microprudential policies (i.e. the supervision of each individual bank), which were used to be 
under BI’s mandate, are delegated to the OJK.  
As part of their role in ensuring a financial stability, since March 2012, BI has released a 
macroprudential regulation that controls the maximum ratio of loan to value (LTV) or down 
payment (DP) for housing/property loan. Currently, the ratio of LTV for property loan in 
Indonesia is bounded above within the range 60-90% of asset values in which the exact value 
depends on the types of houses, banks and credit facilities that borrowers currently have39. 
Before March 2012, BI does not explicitly control this lending parameter and gives flexibility 
to commercial banks in deciding the amount of loan given to borrowers based on the 5Cs 
principle (i.e. character, capacity, capital, collateral and condition). As the result, there is a 
variation with regards to the LTV ratio among banks. For a bank that has high target of credit 
growth, they may be very loose such that the LTV ratio can be very high. This condition may 
get worst when the behaviour of moral hazard occurs among banks’ employees such that they 
try to offer a loan, as much as they can, but ignoring the quality of this loan simply to get high 
bonuses. Motivated by this, we are interested in estimating the ratio of LTV for housing loan 
among banks in Indonesian during the period 2000-2014. Although, BI has started to control 
the maximum ratio of this lending parameter since early 2012, we argue that there is still a 
room for banks to set this ratio below its maximum value. Therefore, our choice in regards to 
the period of observation remains valid in the estimation.      
BI has also adopted the Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF) since 2000, although it is 
officially acknowledged in July 2005. Under this framework, a policy rate is used as an 
instrument to guide market’s expectation. Before this period, one month BI certificate was 
                                                          
39 Effective from June 18th 2015, Bank Indonesia has released a new requirement concerning the LTV ratio of 





used as a policy rate, instead of BI policy rate. Fortunately, the behaviour of these two interest 
rates is very close so that we can define them together as a policy rate in the model. The 
implementation of the ITF brings a curiosity about the way of how BI responds to inflation, 
output and exchange rate through interest rate. To address this issue, we estimate the 
parameters of monetary reaction function in the interest rate rule using our data sample. 
 
5.3. Theoretical Model 
The model features a small open economy model of Gali & Monacelli (2005) and a housing 
market and borrowing constraint model of Iacoviello (2005). Following Monacelli (2005), the 
feature of imperfect exchange rate pass-through is also introduced. A number of nominal and 
real rigidities are incorporated, i.e. the Calvo-type staggered price settings in both domestic 
and import consumption goods and the adjustment cost of physical capital and of housing. All 
these features are relevant in characterising the Indonesian economy as a developing country.  
We start assuming the world economy is constituted by a continuum of small economies 
where each of them is populated by infinitely lived entrepreneurs, bundle firms, households 
and retailers, of measure one, plus a central bank. Based on its discount rate, there are two 
types of households in the economy, i.e. patient and impatient households. Patient households 
refer to a group of households that has lower discount rate than entrepreneurs, while impatient 
households correspond to a group of households that has higher discount rate than 
entrepreneurs. Households get utility from consuming a bundle of consumption goods and 
housing service, and disutility from supplying labour to entrepreneurs. Patient households 
have an option to save in domestic and foreign bonds and their role is as a lender in the 




access to foreign bond market. At the end of each period, both types of households decide 
how much to invest in housing, constrained by the adjustment cost of changing these assets.     
Unlike households, entrepreneurs only get utility from consuming a bundle of consumption 
goods. They produce a homogenous good using physical capital, labour from both types of 
households and housing stock. Similar to impatient households, entrepreneurs can only 
borrow domestically without having access to foreign bond market. We assume that there is 
no housing goods producer in the model which means the stock of housing is always constant. 
This assumption seems realistic as housing stock is a slow moving variable compared to other 
variables in the economy. Yet, we allow for the shifting of housing ownership among 
entrepreneurs and households via borrowing and lending activities. At the end of each period, 
entrepreneurs decide how much to invest in housing and physical capital, conditional on the 
adjustment cost of changing these assets.   
Motivated by the interest of studying banks’ lending decisions in Indonesia, we assume that 
there is a limit on the amount of loan for entrepreneurs and impatient households. Note that in 
the model, we do not explicitly describe the behaviour of bank. Instead, we artificially model 
bank as a purely financial intermediary agent that transfers loans from lenders (patient 
households) to borrowers (impatient households and entrepreneurs) without taking any profit 
for doing this. For entrepreneurs, the amount of loans that they can borrow is bounded above 
by the expectation of housing prices minus some proportion of their housing assets that 
cannot be used as collateral. This assumption follows the recent strand of literature introduced 
by Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). For impatient households, we slightly deviate from the original 
model of Iacoviello (2005) where it is assumed that banks do not only consider future price of 
housing when approving the amount of housing loan but also the applicant’s wage income. 




housing assets in collateral when banks make a decision about lending. Having different types 
of borrower, i.e. impatient households and entrepreneurs also has allowed us to learn the way 
of how banks treat different agents in the economy.  
The way of how we model a borrowing constraint for impatient households is similar to 
Gelain et al. (2013), with an exception concerning the agents who can control these lending 
parameters. In Gelain et al. (2013), it is assumed that central bank controls the ratio of LTV 
and loan to income (LTI) when the borrowers want to get a loan from the lenders (patient 
households)40. Unlike their work, in our model, it is assumed that these parameters are set by 
an individual bank without any intervention from monetary authority. This assumption seems 
more realistic in the context of Indonesia, since a policy that controls the ratio of LTV or DP 
has not become an attention of central bank until the beginning of 2012.      
Following Gali & Monacelli (2005), we assume that a bundle of goods consumed by 
households and entrepreneurs consists of domestic and foreign (import) goods. Considering a 
sufficient amount of foreign goods in aggregate consumption in Indonesia, the model allows 
foreign goods to enter a bundle of goods consumed. We also introduce price stickiness 
through retailers’ activity for domestic goods and, as Monacelli (2005), import firms’ activity 
for foreign goods. Finally, the model is closed by specifying a monetary reaction function 
adopted by central bank. It is assumed that the Taylor-type interest rule is employed to 
stabilise the Indonesian economy, given some contemporaneous exogenous shocks.  
 
 
                                                          
40 The LTV ratio is the ratio of a loan to the value of an asset purchased while the LTI ratio is the ratio of a loan 













′′)(1−𝜎)(1−𝜇−𝜈)    5.1 
where ∈ (0,1) and ∈ (0,1) are parameters that associate with the share of capital and 
housing in production, respectively. Meanwhile 𝜎 ∈ (0,1) corresponds to the share of patient 
households to the total labour. We can also think it as patient households wage share. In the 
above setting, we assume that there are two types of technology shock that affect the 
production of all goods, homogenously. These are a covariance stationary technology shock, 
denoted by 𝑒𝛬𝑡 , and a permanent technology shock, denoted by 𝐴𝑡. The level of permanent 
technology is non-stationary with the growth rate 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑡 𝐴𝑡−1⁄ ) and follows an AR (1) 
process: 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑧   𝜖𝑡
𝑧 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
𝑧)     5.2 
Meanwhile, the log-linearised form of stationary shock has the following representation: 
Λ𝑡 = 𝜌ΛΛ𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡
Λ     𝜖𝑡
Λ ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
Λ)    5.3 
Parameter 𝜌𝑧 ∈ (0,1) and 𝜌Λ ∈ (0,1) correspond to the persistence parameter of permanent 
and neutral technology, respectively. While 𝜖𝑡
𝑧 and 𝜖𝑡
Λ are a white noise shock with a mean 
zero and variance 𝜎𝜖
𝑧 and 𝜎𝜖
Λ, subsequently. As shown in equation (5.1), in addition to labour 
of patient households 𝐿𝑡
′  and impatient households 𝐿𝑡
′′, housing stock 𝐻𝑡 and physical 
capital 𝐾𝑡 are used as inputs in the production function. By our notation, it is assumed that 




For both housing and physical capital, we assume that there is a quadratic cost of adjusting 


















𝐾𝑡−1        5.5 
Variables 𝐼𝐻,𝑡 and 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 correspond to housing and capital investment, respectively. Meanwhile, 
the notation of 𝑃𝐻/𝐶 refers to the steady state of housing prices while 𝜓 is the slope of 
adjustment cost with subscript 𝐻 refers to housing and 𝐾 refers to capital. This adjustment 
cost can be viewed as the cost of transaction, i.e. the cost of converting housing or capital 
purposes, and is also used in Nishiyama et al. (2009), among others. Note that, overtime, 
housing and capital depreciate at the rate 𝛿𝐻 ∈ (0,1) and 𝛿𝐾 ∈ (0,1), respectively.  
The physical capital and housing evolve according to the following law of motion: 
𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾
𝐼𝐾,𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐾)𝐾𝑡−1        5.6 
𝐼𝐻,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐻𝑡−1         5.7 
where 𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾
 represents investment-specific technology shock, following Fisher (2006)41. This 
exogenous shock is also commonly known as marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock 
in the literature. As argued by Justiano et al. (2011), MEI shock is a good proxy for the 
effectiveness of financial intermediation in channelling savings’ activity into productive 
capital in the economy. Although, we do not explicitly link this exogenous shock to financial 
                                                          
41 Greenwood et al. (1998) was the first one who suggest investment specific-technology shock as an alternative 




sector, the way of how this shock introduced to the model is in line with the literatures since it 
creates randomness and interruptions in the capital formation process. 
The log-linearised form of investment-specific technology shock is assumed to follow an AR 





𝐼𝐾 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
𝐼𝐾)      5.8 
where 𝜌𝐼𝐾 ∈ (0,1)  is an auto-regressive coefficient that reflects the persistence of this shock. 
Entrepreneurs are allowed to borrow domestically to finance their expenditures. However, 
there is a limit of their borrowing activity. Since housing is one of their assets, the maximum 
amount of loan that entrepreneurs can obtain is bounded above by the expected price of their 
housing minus some proportions of this asset that cannot be used as collateral. This 
financial/borrowing constraint can be illustrated using the following relation:     
𝐵𝑡 = (1 − 𝜒)𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1𝐻𝑡πC,t+1)𝑒
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉
𝑅𝑡⁄       5.9 
The variable of 𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 is the relative price of housing to the price of consumption goods 
(CPI), in which for future reference we simply define it as housing prices. π𝐶,𝑡 denotes 
consumption price index (CPI) inflation, while 𝑅𝑡 is gross interest rate. Parameter 𝜒 ∈ (0,1) 
represents a fraction of housing assets that is used in collateral (or down payment ratio). 
Given this, (1 − 𝜒) is a proxy for the ratio of loan to value (LTV) where 𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉
 captures the 
variation of this ratio. Notarpietro & Siviero (2014) have used the term of a “financial shock” 
to characterise the variation in LTV ratio. This financial shock can be interpreted as the 
changes in financial regulation, following Ludvigson et al. (2013). The importance of this 




and propagate exogenous shocks only when a financial shock generates fluctuation in LTV 
ratio.  
In line with the above literature, we argue that the financial shock is also relevant when we 
model financial constraint in the context of the Indonesian economy. As mentioned earlier, 
the LTV ratio has not become an attention of BI until 2012 that causes this lending parameter 
was set independently by bank, based on their individual risk appetite. Although BI did not 
directly control this ratio, a decision on lending may still be influenced by other factors that 
relate to financial regulations, for instance: the regulation that controls the ratio of non-
performing loan (NPL), the ratio of loan to deposit (LDR), etc. Following the US financial 
crisis, on March 2012, BI had issued a new regulation that controls the ratio for LTV through 
BI regulation No. 15/40/DKMP. It was done to anticipate similar crisis happens in Indonesia.   
In log-linearised form, an exogenous shock to the ratio of LTV is assumed to follow an AR 





𝐿𝑇𝑉 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
𝐿𝑇𝑉)     5.10 
with 𝜌𝐿𝑇𝑉 ∈ (0,1) represents an autoregressive coefficient and 𝜖𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 is an independently and 
identically distributed process with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜖
𝐿𝑇𝑉. As we want to analyse the 
decision made by banks in lending process, then 𝜒 and the standard deviation of financial 
shock 𝜎𝜖
𝐿𝑇𝑉 are among the estimated parameters. Recall that it is assumed 𝜒 is set 
independently without any influence from monetary authority.  
A representative entrepreneur attains utility from a flow of consumption goods 𝐶𝑡 by 
maximising the following objective function:    


























′ + 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐻,𝑡  5.11 
Here, 𝛽𝑡 ∈ (0,1) stands for entrepreneur discount factor while 𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝛽
 represents a general 
preference shock that affects the discount rate of entrepreneurs (determines the intertemporal 
substitution decisions). This contemporaneous shock can be interpreted as the change of 
consumer tastes due to cultural norm or society-wide unexpected events that make a shift in 
demand curves.  












)     5.12 
with 𝜌𝛽 ∈ (0,1) is an autoregressive coefficient and 𝜖𝑡
𝛽
 is an independent and identically 
distributed shock with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜖
𝛽
. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the notation 𝐸0 corresponds to the mathematical expectation 
operator evaluated using the objective distributions of the stochastic shock, which is assumed 
known by the rational agents. Unlike the earlier chapters, in this chapter we focus the analysis 
on the framework of RE as incorporating the assumption of adaptive learning to the model, 
whilst at the same time estimating it, makes our work is computationally expensive (it 
increases dimensionally of the model significantly). Yet, for future work, we may extend this 
analysis by considering a case where agents are boundedly rational, instead of fully rational, 




In equation (5.11), 𝑊𝑡
′ and 𝑊𝑡
′′ are defined as nominal wage of patient and impatient 
households while 𝐿𝑡
′  and 𝐿′𝑡
′  represent labour supply of patient and of impatient households, 
respectively. Output cannot be transformed directly into consumption goods 𝐶𝑡. Hence, we 
model retailers who can convert intermediate goods into final goods, following Bernanke et 
al. (1999). Retailers purchase intermediate goods from entrepreneurs at its wholesale prices 
𝑃𝑡
𝑤 and transform into a composite of final goods whose price index is 𝑃𝑌,𝑡. By this 




𝑤 .  
By defining 𝑡 as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint, the 
entrepreneur’s optimal choice are characterised by consumption Euler equation, the demand 
















































) + Ω𝐾,𝑡+1Ω̌𝐾,𝑡+1])    
5.16  












+ 𝛿𝐾) + (1 − 𝛿𝐾) 
                                                          














+ (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + Ω𝐻,𝑡+1Ω̌𝐻,𝑡+1] +
(1 − 𝜒) 𝑡𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1π𝐶,𝑡+1]𝑒
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉
)       5.17 












+ 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻) 
As discussed in Iacoviello (2005), the above Euler equation and housing demand equations 
differ from a standard formulation due to the presence of 𝑡. From the equation (5.13) and 
(5.17), 𝑡 can be interpreted as the increase in lifetime utility that is obtained by borrowing 𝑅𝑡 
dollars, consuming (equation [5.13]) or investing (equation [5.17]) the gains, and reducing 
consumption by sufficient amount in next period. Equation (5.14) and (5.15) equate the 
marginal product of labour with real wage for patient households and impatient households, 
respectively. Finally, equation (5.16) equates marginal product of capital with cost of capital.  
Since we focus on the equilibrium dynamics around the steady state, the above nonlinear 
optimality conditions are stationerised and log-linearised around the steady state to get the 
following equations: 
𝛽′?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − (𝛽
′ − 𝛽) ̃𝑡 − 𝛽
′?̃?𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 − (𝛽𝜌𝛽 − 𝛽
′)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
+ 𝛽𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡 5.18 
?̃?𝑡
′ − 𝑝𝐶 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡         5.19 
?̃?𝑡
′′ − 𝑝𝐶,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡       5.20 
𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝛽(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡) +
1−𝛽(1−𝛿𝐾)
𝜓𝐾
(𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) +
1
𝜓𝐾








[1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾)𝜌𝐼𝐾]ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾 − (𝜌𝑧 [
𝛽(1−𝛿𝐾)
𝜓𝐾





𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑒𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛾𝑒)(𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + 𝑚𝑒( ̃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 +
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + (
𝜓𝐻
𝛿𝐻
) [𝛽(𝐸𝑡ℎ̃𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡) − (ℎ̃𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1)] + [(1 − 𝑚𝑒)𝜌𝛽 −
1]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− ([𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝛽𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 + 𝜓𝐻)𝑧𝑡        5.22 
with  𝑚𝑒 = (1 − 𝜒)(𝛽
′ − 𝛽)  and 𝛾𝑒 = 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + 𝑚𝑒 
The term ?̃?𝑡 in equation (5.19) and (5.20) corresponds to the effective term trade where its 
relation to domestic/producer price index and CPI, in log-linearised forms, is given by 
equation (5.71). We discuss this term in details when we derive the assumption of an open 
economy latter.  
In addition to equations that are derived from the optimality conditions, the equilibrium 
dynamic is also characterised by stationerised and log-linearised form of the physical capital 
law of motion, borrowing constraint, production function and entrepreneurs’ budget constraint 




(?̃?𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐾)(?̃?𝑡−1 − 𝑧𝑡)) − ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾     5.23 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝜒)(𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ℎ̃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉) − ?̃?𝑡    5.24 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛬𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡−1 + ℎ̃𝑡−1 + 𝜎(1 − − )𝑙𝑡
′ + (1 − 𝜎)(1 − − )𝑙𝑡
















(?̃?𝑡−1 + ?̃?𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝐶,𝑡) − (1 − 𝑆
′ −
𝑆′′)(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) +
𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻
𝑌






] 𝑧𝑡    5.26 
with  𝑆′ =
𝜎(1−𝜇−𝜈)+𝑋−1
𝑋








Both types of households of mass 1 derive utility from a flow of consumption 𝐶𝑡
𝑗
 and service 
from housing 𝐻𝑡
𝑗
 and disutility from labour 𝐿𝑡
𝑗
. To distinguish between patient and impatient 
households, we use the superscripted notation 𝑗 in each relevant variable in which this 𝑗 is 
replaced by the index of " ′ " for patient households and of " ′′ " for impatient households.  
















)       
Here, 𝛽𝑗 ∈ (0,1) corresponds the relevant households’ type discount factor. Parameter 𝜘 ∈
(0,1) is the weight of housing services in utility and 1/( − 1) is the labour supply elasticity 
where the value of   is larger than zero. We label the movement in 𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝐻
 as a housing 
preference shock that is an exogenous shock to marginal utility of housing. According to 
Iacoviello & Neri (2010), there are at least two interpretations of this contemporaneous shock: 
Firstly, a shock that captures a shift in housing preference due to social, institutional changes 
and the variation of resources needed to buy a house relative to other goods. Secondly, a 
shock that accommodates the random changes in the factor mix required to produce home 
service a given housing stock. 





𝐻 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
𝐻)     5.27 
with 𝜌𝐻 ∈ (0,1) is the persistence parameter and 𝜖𝑡






5.3.2.1. Patient Households 
Patient households choose how much to consume, work, invest in housing and lend, both 
domestically and internationally. They also receive the profit 𝐹𝑡 since it is assumed retailers’ 
firm is owned by them.  








′ + 𝐹𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡











′   5.28 
where 𝐵𝑡
′ and 𝐵𝑡
∗ are real bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currency, respectively. 
𝔼𝑡 corresponds to the nominal bilateral exchange and  𝑅𝑡
∗ represents the gross foreign interest 
rate. 𝐼𝐻,𝑡
′  and 𝐴𝐻,𝑡
′  denote housing investment and the adjustment cost of changing housing 




′ − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐻𝑡−1












′        5.30 
Patient household’s optimality condition is characterised by the choices that determine labour 


































′ [𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 +ΩH,t












′ [(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ΩH,t+1
′ Ω̌H,t+1
′ ])   

















′ + 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻)  
Equation (5.32) and (5.33) are consumption Euler equation for patient households. These two 
equations equate the marginal utility from consuming one unit of income in period 𝑡 with 
discounted marginal utility from consuming the gross income obtained, 𝑅𝑡 or 𝑅𝑡
∗ (after 
accounting for exchange rate), by saving the income. As well, equation (5.31) is a marginal 
rate of substitution between consumption and supplying labour for patient households. Whilst 
the last equation, i.e. equation (5.34) illustrates patient households’ optimal choice for 
housing.  
The above optimality conditions are then stationerised and log-linearised around their steady 
state values. Combining the relevant optimality conditions from entrepreneurs, we to obtain 
the following equations: 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡
′ + ?̃?𝑡
′ + 𝛼?̃?𝑡        5.35  
?̃?𝑡
′ = 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
′ − (?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1) + (1 − 𝜌𝛽)ℰ𝑡
𝛽




∗ − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1) + (1 − 𝜌𝛽)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− Δ𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡   5.37 
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛽










′ ) − 𝛽′(𝐸𝑡ℎ̃𝑡+1
′ − ℎ̃𝑡
′)} + 𝛽′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(𝜌𝛽 − 1)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− (𝛽′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 +





5.3.2.2. Impatient Households  
Impatient households discount the future more heavily than the patient households. 
Technically, they have higher discount rate than patient households that generate an incentive 
for them to borrow (𝛽′ > 𝛽 >𝛽′′). They choose how much to consume, to work, to invest in 
housing and to borrow domestically. Yet, their borrowing capacity is constrained by the 
expected value of their housing assets (less the proportion of housing assets that cannot be 
used as collateral) and their wage income.  In details, the constraints faced by impatient 














′′      5.39 
𝐼𝐻,𝑡
′′ = 𝐻𝑡
′′ − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐻𝑡−1












′′        5.41 










′′  5.42 
Parameter 𝜒′′ ∈ (0,1)  represents a proportion of housing assets owned by impatient 
households that cannot be used as collateral (down payment ratio). Under this definition, 
(1 − 𝜒′′) stands for the ratio of LTV where 𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉
refers to financial shocks that capture the 
variability in the setting of LTV ratio (this exogenous shock is assumed to be the same as the 
case of entrepreneurs). Parameter 𝑏 ∈ (0,1)  is the weight of lending decision puts on wage 
income. It is assumed that these lending parameters (i.e. 𝜒′′ and 𝑏) are set independently by 
each individual bank without control from monetary authority. Having this assumption, we 




Impatient household’s optimal choice is characterised by labour supply, consumption Euler 





















′′ )𝑅𝑡 + 𝑡




′′ (𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + ΩH,t












′′ [(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ΩH,t+1
′′ Ω̌H,t+1
′′ ]) +





















′′ + 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻) 
In general, the interpretation of equation (5.43) to (5.45) is analogues to the one discussed in 
the case of patient households with 𝑡
′′ corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
the financial constraint faced by impatient households. Similar to entrepreneurs and patient 
households, the above optimality conditions are then stationerised and log-linearised around 
the steady state. Substituting the relevant optimality conditions from entrepreneurs, we obtain 
the following equations: 
(1 + 𝑚𝑏)(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) + 𝑚𝑏 ̃𝑡
′′ − ?̃?𝑡
′′ = (1 +𝑚𝑏)( − 1)𝑙𝑡
′′ +𝑚𝑏ℰ𝑡
𝛽
  5.46  
with  𝑚𝑏 =
𝑏(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′)  
𝛽′?̃?𝑡
′′ = 𝛽′′𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
′′ − (𝛽′ − 𝛽′′) ̃𝑡










𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛾ℎ𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛾ℎ)(ℰ𝑡
𝐻 − ℎ̃𝑡
′′) + 𝑚ℎ( ̃𝑡











′′ )} − [𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(1 − 𝜌𝛽) +
𝑚ℎ]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− (𝛽′′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 + 𝜓𝐻)𝑧𝑡       5.48 
with 𝑚ℎ = [1 −
𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′) and  𝛾ℎ = 𝛽
′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + 𝑚ℎ  
In addition to the above equations, we also stationerise and log-linearise impatient 
households’ financial constraint and their budget constraint that yield the following equations: 




(𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶,𝑡+1⁄ + ℎ̃𝑡
′′ + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡






) (?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡






















𝛿𝐻𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 − 𝑆




] 𝑧𝑡     5.50 
 
5.3.3. Retailers  
A continuum of retailers of mass 1, indexed by 𝑧, purchase intermediate goods 𝑌𝑡 from 
entrepreneurs at the wholesale price 𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑤  in competitive market. These intermediate goods are 
then differentiated into 𝑌𝑡(𝑧) and sell at the price 𝑃𝑌,𝑡(𝑧). There are no cost and labour 
required for this process.  
It is assumed that retailers have a monopolistic power and, when allowed to, will set their 




Bernanke et al. (1999). The final goods 𝑌𝑡
𝑓
 consist of a collection of differentiated goods 











         5.51 
with 𝑡
𝑟 > 1 captures the time-varying mark-up in domestic economy.  
The bundlers try to minimise their inputs in terms of differentiated goods 𝑌𝑡(𝑧) . In order to 




           
Subject to the technology in equation (5.51). 














      ∀𝑧       5.52  









corresponds to aggregate price index of final goods or 
producer price index (PPI).   
Each retailer 𝑧 chooses a sale price 𝑃𝑌,𝑡(𝑧) taking 𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑤  and demand curve as given. The 
retailer follows the Calvo (1983) staggered price setting. A randomly selected fraction of 
firms 1 −  adjusts prices, while the remaining fraction of firms  does not adjust. When a 







𝑠=0 , subject to the demand for its own goods and the constraint 
that all demand be satisfied at the chosen price. 
Retailers maximise profit which is discounted by 𝑠 - step ahead stochastic discount factor 








) 𝑌𝑡+𝑠(𝑧)     
subject to the demand of its own goods, i.e. equation (5.52). 
Note that 𝐸𝑡𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1𝒬𝑡+1,𝑡+2… 𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 and  𝐸𝑡𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡+𝑠−1𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠. It 
is also assumed that 𝑌𝑡
𝑓
= 𝑌𝑡, following Iacoviello (2005). 












]) 𝑌𝑡+𝑠(𝑧)     5.53 
As a fraction ∈ (0,1) of prices stays unchanged, the aggregate price level evolves according 
to: 
















     5.54 
Combining equation (5.53) and (5.54) and log-linearising it around the steady state we obtain 
a standard version of New Keynesian Philip Curve (NKPC) equation as follows: 
?̃?𝑌,𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑌,𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 + ̃𝑡








𝑟 is an exogenous mark-up/cost push shock that captures the time varying mark-up 
of final goods over intermediate goods. This unanticipated shock is assumed to follow an AR 
(1) process as: 
̃𝑡





∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝜖
𝜇𝑟
)     5.56 
where 𝜌𝜇𝑟 ∈ (0,1)  corresponds to the persistent parameter of an AR (1) process and 𝜖𝑡
𝜇𝑟
is a 
zero mean white noise process. 
 
5.3.4. Intertemporal Allocations 
Consumers consume a composite of final consumption goods in the form of a Dixit-Stiglitz 
aggregator over domestic and import (foreign) goods. These different types of goods, initially, 
are bundled by bundler firms before it is ready to be consumed by consumers (both 
entrepreneurs and households). A technology that bundler firms used to combine the domestic 
and import goods is defined as follows: 











     5.57 
where parameter 𝛼 ∈ (0,1)  is the share of import goods consumption in total goods 
consumption. This parameter is commonly viewed as an index of openness. Meanwhile, 
parameter 𝜛 refers to the elasticity substitution between domestic goods and import goods. It 
is assumed there is no cost and factors of production for this bundling process (e.g. labour and 
capital).  
In addition to final consumption good bundlers, that combine domestic and import goods, 




in domestic country (or a specific foreign country 𝑖) and to combine import goods from 
different foreign countries 𝑖. Again, these bundlers operate without any cost and factors of 
production required (e.g. labour). The technology that these bundlers used is defined as 
follows: 










       5.58 








        5.59 










        5.60 
The goods consumed ranges from 𝑗 = 0…1. Parameter 𝑡
𝑟 denotes the time-varying mark-up 
in the domestic country or foreign country 𝑖 while  is the elasticity of substitution between 
import goods from different foreign countries. 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑧, 𝑗) and 𝐶𝑖,𝑡(𝑧, 𝑗) are domestic demand 
for a specific domestic goods and for a specific goods in foreign country 𝑖, respectively. 
Meanwhile, 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗) and 𝐶𝑖,𝑡(𝑗) are a consumption composite index, summarising the demand 
for each type of goods in domestic country and a specific foreign country 𝑖. 𝐶𝐹,𝑡(𝑗) is a 
consumption composite index, summarising the demand for import goods from all foreign 
countries.  
Domestic goods bundlers help consumers, i.e. households and entrepreneurs to find the best 
allocation of specific domestic goods. For that purpose, they minimise the expenditure for 
obtaining each type of domestic goods subject to its technology as follows:   
ℒ ≡ 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∫ 𝑃𝑌,𝑡(𝑧)
1
0














The above minimisation problem yields a demand curve for each type of domestic goods as 
the following:  










𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗)       5.61 
Recall that 𝑃𝑌,𝑡 is defined as a producer price index (PPI) in domestic country in which, for 
simplicity, it is assumed to be equal to aggregate price index of domestic consumption goods.    
Similarly, we can obtain a demand curve for each type of domestic goods in country 𝑖 and 
demand curve for each foreign country goods as the followings: 
















𝐶𝐹,𝑡(𝑗)        5.63 



















  are defined as 
producer/domestic price index (PPI) in country 𝑖 and aggregate price index for import goods, 
respectively. 
In similar fashion, final consumption good bundlers help consumers to find the best allocation 
of domestic and import goods. These firms purchase domestic and foreign goods, combine 
them and sell to households and entrepreneurs to get profit.  
They maximise their profit in perfectly competitive market as follows: 















     
From profit maximisation problem, we obtain a demand curve for domestic goods and import 
goods along with the equation for consumer price index (CPI) as follows:  





𝐶𝑡(𝑗)       5.64 





𝐶𝑡(𝑗)        5.65 




1−𝜛       5.66 
Log-linearised CPI equation in (5.66) yields: 
𝑝𝐶,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝑌,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝𝐹,𝑡 ⇔ ?̃?𝐶,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝑌,𝑡 + 𝛼?̃?𝐹,𝑡    5.67 
In the model with the feature of open economy, there is a distinction between CPI inflation 
?̃?𝐶,𝑡 and producer inflation (PPI inflation) ?̃?𝑌,𝑡 as the result of import goods inflation ?̃?𝐹,𝑡 on 
the domestic economy. This is clearly illustrated in equation (5.67). In addition, as the 
economy of foreign country is large and behaves as a closed economy, then the foreign price 





all 𝑡. Given this, domestic inflation is similar to CPI inflation in the world economy. 
 
5.3.5. Definitions and Identities 
In this section, we define some definitions and identities to link the inflation, exchange rate, 




country and country 𝑖 that represents the price of country 𝑖’s goods in terms of domestic 
goods.  
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝑌,𝑡⁄           5.68 
Aggregating for all country 𝑖, we obtain the effective term terms of trade (the price of imports 












       5.69 




Log-linearised it around the steady state yields: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝑝𝐹,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡         5.70 
Substituting equation (5.70) into (5.67) for  𝑝𝐹,𝑡, we can find the relation among CPI inflation, 
producer inflation and the change of term trade as follows:  
?̃?𝐶,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑌,𝑡 + 𝛼∆?̃?𝑡         5.71 
It is worth to note that the above relation holds independently regardless the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through.   
 
Complete Exchange Rate Pass-Through  
Under the above assumption, the Law of One Price (LOOP) holds on a brand level, following 
Gali & Monacelli (2005).  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡(𝑧) = 𝔼𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡





𝑖 (𝑧) represents the price of good 𝑧 from country 𝑖 measured in terms of country 𝑖’s 
currency and 𝔼𝑖,𝑡 is the bilateral nominal exchange rate.  
By integrating over all products 𝑧 and all foreign countries yields: 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = 𝔼𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗          5.73 
Log-linearisation the last equation around its steady state value gives: 
𝑝𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡
∗ + ?̃?𝑡          5.74 
where ?̃?𝑡 is defined as the nominal effective exchange rate and 𝑝𝑡
∗ is the log of world 
consumption goods price in foreign currency.  
Substituting equation (5.74) into (5.70) for  𝑝𝐹,𝑡, we can re-write the term of trade equation as: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡
∗ + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡         5.75 





          5.76 
Integrating over all foreign countries and log-linearising it around the steady state yield the 
real effective exchange rate: 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝐶,𝑡         5.77  
To link the term of trade and the real exchange rate, we combine (5.75) and (5.77) to get: 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝑌,𝑡 − 𝑝𝐶,𝑡         5.78 
Further, substituting equation (5.71) into the last equation for 𝑝𝐶,𝑡, we obtain the relation 




?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝑡         5.79 
 
Incomplete Exchange Rate Pass-Through  
As mentioned in the section of introduction, this feature is incorporated into the model since 
we believe it makes our model fits with the characteristics of the Indonesian economy. Under 
incomplete pass-through the law of one price does not hold. Yet, our definition about the real 
effective exchange rate in equation (5.77) still holds. To link the term trade and the real 
exchange rate, we can combine (5.77) and (5.67) to get: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛹𝐹,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝑡        5.80 
where ∆𝛹𝐹,𝑡 = ∆?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡
∗ − ?̃?𝐹,𝑡   
𝛹𝐹,𝑡 denotes the deviation of the world price from the domestic currency price of imports, a 
measure of the deviations from the law of one price (LOOP gap)43. In line with this, we define 
?̃?𝐹,𝑡 as domestic currency import goods inflation while ?̃?𝑡
∗ as the world goods inflation. The 
world goods inflation is assumed to be exogenous for domestic economy and follows an AR 





𝜋∗ ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
𝜋∗)     5.81 
where 𝜌𝜋∗ ∈ (0,1)  is the persistent parameter of an AR (1) process. A similar way of 
introducing exogenous world goods inflation is also seen in Matheson (2009), among others.  
                                                          




We now turn to describe the characteristic of import goods inflation ?̃?𝐹,𝑡. It is assumed there 
are importing firms 𝑖 behaves as in the Calvo’s model and can set prices optimally in a 








) 𝐶𝐹,𝑡+𝑠(𝑖)       






𝐶𝐹,𝑡+𝑠, which is equivalent to equation (5.63) and 𝐸𝑡𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 =
𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1𝒬𝑡+1,𝑡+2… 𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 and  𝐸𝑡𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡+𝑠−1𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 are employed. 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
∗ (𝑖) is the foreign currency price of the imported goods (from country 𝑖), 𝐹
𝑠 is the 
probability that the price 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤(𝑖) sets for good from country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 still holds 𝑠 periods 
ahead and 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 is the relevant stochastic discount factor. Notice that, in general 
𝑠 ≠ 𝐹
𝑠. 
The above profit maximisation problem yields the equation for optimal price set by importing 
firms as the followings: 












)𝐶𝐹,𝑡+𝑠    5.82 
As a fraction 𝐹 ∈ (0,1) of prices stays unchanged, the aggregate price level evolution 
follows: 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = [ 𝐹𝑃𝐹,𝑡−1
1−





     5.83 
Combining equation (5.82) and (5.83) and log-linearised it around the steady state; one can 
obtain an aggregate supply curve for import goods inflation as follows: 
?̃?𝐹,𝑡 = 𝛽










From the last equation, it can be seen that import goods inflation depends on the expected 
import goods inflation and LOOP gap. Import goods inflation increase if the world price of 
goods is higher than domestic currency import goods price. Using this relationship, the world 
price of goods acts as the real marginal cost of imported goods that enhance import goods 
inflation. Note that parameter 𝐹  determines the degree of pass-through: 𝐹 = 0 implies that 
the LOOP holds and 𝐹 > 0 implies that pass-through is incomplete.  
After describing the relationship between inflation, exchange rate and term trade, now we turn 
to the relationship between the terms of trade and real interest rate differential. Their 
relationship is obtained by equating patient households first order conditions for domestic and 













∗        5.85 
After log-linearisation, one can obtain the following uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition 
as:  
?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡
∗ = 𝐸𝑡(Δ?̃?𝑡+1)         5.86 
As discussed previously, it is assumed that there is no access for both entrepreneurs and 
impatient households to get a loan from international market, except from domestic economy. 
In contrast, patient households are able to share country specific risks internationally via the 
trading of bonds on complete security markets. This means only patient households can do 
lending and borrowing activity internationally. This assumption seems realistic especially in 
the context of Indonesia where only a small proportion of the Indonesian people has accessed 
to the international financial markets. In fact, only a half of the Indonesian people have 




number has accessed to the international financial markets44. The same assumption is also 
used in Funke & Paetz (2013) who studied about housing wealth effect for Hongkong using 
the framework of a two-agent, two-sector, open economy DSGE model with a housing-
market sector and a borrowing constraint.   







𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1. Similarly, by accounting for the exchange rate, the characteristic of each country 𝑖 in 











) = 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1.  




















𝑖       5.87 




























𝑖 = Υ = Υ𝑖  5.88  
The last part is the initial consumption ratio, which is assumed to be identical for each country 










𝑖 = 1         5.89 
Thus, the condition of international risk sharing leads us to the following equation:  
𝐶𝑡
′ = 𝐶𝑡
′𝑖𝔈𝑖,𝑡  ∀𝑡            5.90 
                                                          




Log-linearising the above equation around the steady state and integrate it over 𝑖, we obtain  
?̃?𝑡
′ = ?̃?𝑡
∗ + ?̃?𝑡          5.91 
As the foreign economy is exogenous to domestic economy, then there is flexibility in 
specifying the behaviour of foreign variables, including the world consumption  ?̃?𝑡
∗. Following 








∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝜖
𝑦∗
)      5.92 
where 𝜌𝑦∗∈(0,1)  is the persistent parameter of this exogenous shock and 𝜎𝜖
𝑦∗
is the variance of 




5.3.6. Aggregation  
As the model is absent from housing production, then the supply of housing stock is constant 
in every period. However, we allow households and entrepreneurs for the exchange of 
housing ownership. The total of housing stock in each period is given by: 
?̆?𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡 + 𝐻𝑡
′ + 𝐻𝑡
′′ ≡ 1        5.93 
In log-linearised form, we can re-write the above equation as: 
0 = 𝐻ℎ̃𝑡 + 𝐻
′ℎ̃𝑡
′ + 𝐻′′ℎ̃𝑡





 , 𝐻′ =
𝜙3𝜙7
𝜙2+𝜙3𝜙7+𝜙4𝜙6
 and 𝐻′′ =
𝜙4𝜙6
𝜙2+𝜙3𝜙7+𝜙4𝜙6




where: 𝜙2, 𝜙3, 𝜙4, 𝜙6, and 𝜙7 are deep parameters derived from steady state relation
45.  
The total consumption goods is the sum of consumption goods consumed by both 
entrepreneurs and households (either domestic goods or importing goods). Using this 
definition, the total consumption goods is given by: 
?̆?𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝑡
′′         5.95 







′′)      5.96 
where 𝜙5, 𝜙6 and 𝜙7 are deep parameters which are again derived from steady state relation. 
 
5.3.7. Market Clearing and Equilibrium Condition  
The aggregate goods market clearing for each good 𝑧 requires 




+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡(𝑧)    5.97 
where ?̆?𝐷,𝑡(𝑧) = 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐶𝐷,𝑡
′ (𝑧) + 𝐶𝐷,𝑡
′′ (𝑧)  
The above equation tells that, in equilibrium, the total output produced by domestic firms is 
equal to the summation of domestic goods, foreign consumption goods (or export goods), 
physical capital investment and the cost of changing the physical capital and housing.  
 
We follow Gali (2003) in which it is assumed government purchases a time-varying fraction 
of 𝑡 of output of each good 𝑧, financed by lump sum taxation. Consequently, aggregate goods 
market clearing for each good 𝑧 requires:  




+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡(𝑧)    5.98 
                                                          




Substituting the relevant demand equations for each goods, i.e. equation (5.62) to (5.66) into 
the above equation and assuming a symmetric preference across countries, we can re-write 
equation (5.98) as follows: 





















+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡   
           5.99 
where:  𝑆𝑡 =
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑃𝑌,𝑡






;       𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑌,𝑡











Recall that 𝑆𝑡 is the effective term of trade of home country. 𝑆𝑡
𝑖 is the effective terms of trade 
of country 𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is bilateral terms of trade between home economy and country 𝑖. 






1−𝜛 (where it can be approached as 𝑃𝐶,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑌,𝑡
1−𝛼𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝛼), we obtain the relation 











         5.100 
Using equation (5.100), we replace the term 
𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑃𝐶,𝑡
 in equation (5.99) to get: 











+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡  
           5.101 
Defining a government expenditure shock 𝑔𝑡 by 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝑡) = −𝑔𝑡, we approximate the 




































𝑔𝑡           5.102 
Similar to other exogenous shocks in the model, it is assumed that 𝑔𝑡 follows an AR (1) 
process as follows: 






)     5.103 
with 𝜌𝑔 ∈ (0,1) is the persistent parameter and  𝜖𝑡
𝑔




From equation (5.102), we can see that domestic output depends on domestic and foreign 
consumption, term trade, real exchange rate, physical capital investment and government 
expenditure.    
 
5.3.8. Monetary Policy 
We close the model by specifying the Taylor-type interest rate rule in the log-linearised form 
around the steady state as follows:     
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜙𝑟?̃?𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜙𝑟)(𝜙𝑦?̃?𝑡 + 𝜙𝜋?̃?𝐶,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑒?̃?𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡
𝑟 𝜖𝑡
𝑟 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
𝑟)  5.104 
where 𝜖𝑡
𝑟  is distributed normally with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜖
𝑟.  
Under the above specification, it is assumed central bank responds to the deviation of output 
(?̃?𝑡), CPI inflation (?̃?𝐶,𝑡) and exchange rate (?̃?𝑡) from its steady state value
46. The Bayesian 
                                                          
46 Lubik & Schorfheide (2007) assume that monetary reaction function responds to exchange rate depreciation 




methodology allows us to estimate the level of aggressiveness of policy function on output, 
inflation and exchange rate that is reflected from the estimated parameter 𝜙𝑦 , 𝜙𝜋, and 𝜙𝑒, 
respectively.   
As previously mentioned when discussing about the recent development of monetary and 
macroprudential policies in Indonesia, the implementation of Inflation Targeting Framework 
(ITF) has attracted our attention about the way of how Bank Indonesia (BI) conducts its 
monetary policy. Ideally, we would like to see how the stance of BI alters by comparing the 
result before and after the implementation of ITF. Unfortunately, due to data availability, we 
focus the analysis on post period of the ITF and evaluate whether BI has put higher emphasis 
on price stabilisation than on output or on exchange rate stabilisation. For this purpose, we 
have considered the variable of output and exchange rate, in addition to inflation, in 
specifying the Taylor-type interest rate rule. 
 
5.3.9. Shocks  
In this sub section, we summarise all exogenous shocks introduced to the model and see how 
some of them are different to the others. In total, there are eleven exogenous shocks that 
influence the variables in the economy: nine domestic shocks and two foreign shocks. The 
domestic shocks are a monetary policy shocks 𝜖𝑡
𝑟 , a housing preference shocks 𝜖𝑡
𝐻, a cost 
push/mark up shocks 𝜖𝑡
𝜇𝑟
, a covariance stationary technology shocks 𝜖𝑡
Λ, a non-stationary 
permanent technology shocks 𝜖𝑡
𝑧, a government expenditure shocks 𝜖𝑡
𝑔
, a general preference 
shocks 𝜖𝑡
𝛽
, a marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shocks 𝜖𝑡
𝐼𝐾, and a LTV/financial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
reaction function responds to exchange rate deviation from steady states ?̃?𝑡. Here, we follow Matheson (2010) 





𝐿𝑇𝑉. Meanwhile, the foreign disturbances include a world consumption shock 𝜖𝑡
𝑦∗
and 
a world inflation shock 𝜖𝑡
𝜋∗. Given all these shocks, we assess the contribution of different 
shocks to the Indonesian business cycle fluctuation. For this purpose, we will display their 
asymptotic variance decomposition of the main macroeconomic variables implied by the 
estimated model.  
 
5.4. Methodology and Data   
5.4.1. Methodology  
The procedure required to estimate a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model 
using Bayesian econometric methods involves two steps:  
Firstly, linearising the system of stochastic equations and solving the model by writing it into 
state-space representation. The model is linearised since it is built by a number of non-linear 
systems of equations which is derived from economic agent’s optimisation behaviour in the 
economy. Non-linearity causes a closed analytical solution is not easy to obtain. As an 
alternative, the solution is approximated in the neighbourhood of a given point, i.e. the non-
stochastic steady state. The solution of model is obtained when the linear stochastic different 
equations can be written in state-space form; that is when each endogenous variable is written 
in terms of its lagged (pre-determined variable) and the exogenous shock.  
Secondly, estimating the model using a Bayesian method. This method is chosen since it 
delivers an advantage of using prior information and the data to estimate the structural 
parameters47. We argue the practicality of this method increases when the sample of data is 
                                                          




limited48. As a common knowledge, data availability and consistency is a classic problem 
faced by most developing countries, including in Indonesia. This happens as people in this 
country are still less aware about the advantage of having a long and credible time series data 
for policy analysis and decision making. This situation becomes more problematic when a 
long term time series data usually contains a structural break due to a major change in policy 
or a significant structural reformation. Therefore, the choice of using a Bayesian method 
seems very relevant since this technique gives flexibility in terms of the number of data used 
in the estimation. Notice that, the estimation procedure can only be executed when the 
solution of our RE model is unique, given the structural parameters of the model.  
 
 Solving the Model 
In refer to the existing literature; there are two general approaches of solving a DSGE model, 
i.e. global approaches and local approximation approaches. The former approach evaluates 
the model far away from the steady state and, sometimes, involves a switching in steady state. 
Yet, these global approaches are not applicable to solve the proposed model here as it is too 
large such that it becomes computationally expensive, given today’s computer capabilities. 
Meanwhile, the latter approach, which is more convenient relatively to the first one, 
approximates the model locally around a non-stochastic steady state. This local approximation 
approach includes a method of (log)-linearisation, perturbation of higher order and linear-
quadratic approximation.  
In this chapter, we decide to analyse the model around the non-stochastic steady state by 
choosing the log-linearised method as the approximation methods. For this purpose, we apply 
                                                          




the first order terms in the Taylor series approximation (around a steady state) for each 
stochastic non-linear equation in the model. This method is considered since we dealt with a 
relatively large DSGE model that covers different economic agents’ behaviour. By 
linearising, we simplify the problem significantly such that a solution to the model is easily to 
obtain. The result is not different when we linearise the model in level, instead of in logarithm 
form, except when interpreting the unit of measurement in the model. 
After the model is log-linearised, the next step is finding a procedure to solve the rational 
expectation (RE) model. Based on the literature, there are different methods of solving the RE 
model, for example: a method of undermined coefficient, as used by Christiano (2002) among 
others, a method of exploiting the properties of RE errors as used by Sims (2002), and a 
method of splitting the variables into state and jump variables as in Blanchard & Kahn (1980). 
Among these three methods, the most common one is a method of splitting the variables into 
state and jump variables by Blanchard & Kahn (1980). Using this method, all endogenous 
variables are defined either as state (or pre-determined) variables or jump (or non-
predetermined) variables. The existence and uniqueness of the solution is determined by 
comparing the number of non-explosive roots to the number of state variables. Unlike using a 
method of Blanchard & Khan (1980), the variables solved using a method of undetermined 
coefficient as used by Christiano (2002) and of expectational error as used by Sims (2002) are 
not necessary to be labelled as predetermined or non-predetermined variables. The difference 
between the last two methods is that the first one explicitly exploits the properties of the 
expectational errors under rational expectations while the second is not. A detail procedure for 
solving a rational expectation (RE) model using a method of Blanchard & Khan can be seen 





 Bayesian Estimation 
This estimation combines the observed data with the log-linearised version of the model and 
the initial prior of the data to generate a set of posterior parameters. To link the observed data 
and the variables in the model, a measurement equation is constructed. The result of this 
Bayesian estimation is in the form of a distribution of each parameter in which their means 
are used as the estimators of each parameter in the model.     
In the state-space representation, the relationship between the observed data, the solution of 















] ϵt       5.105 




𝑗] + 𝐷 𝑡        5.106 
Equation (5.105) is the state/transition equation which describes the evolution of the 
endogenous variables. It is based on the linear version of the solution of RE model as we 
discuss earlier. Meanwhile, Equation (5.106) is the observation equation that links the 












We run the Bayesian estimation using DYNARE program of a version 4.4.349. It is begun by 
evaluating the likelihood function of the model using the Kalman filter to obtain the log 
likelihood function. The log likelihood function describes the density of the observed data 
                                                          




given the parameters and the models. Combined with the data priors, this log-likelihood 
function generates the log-likelihood of the posterior as follows:   
𝑙𝑛𝒦( 𝒜|𝑀𝑇 , 𝒜) = 𝑙𝑛ℒ( |𝑀𝑇 , 𝒜) + 𝑙𝑛 𝑝( 𝒜|𝒜)  
The term of the left hand side refers to the log-likelihood of the posterior conditional on the 
observed data until period  𝑇 for model 𝒜. Meanwhile, the first term of the right hand side, 
i.e. 𝑙𝑛ℒ( |𝑀𝑡, 𝒜) corresponds to the likelihood function generated by Kalman filter and the 
second one, i.e. ln 𝑝( |𝒜) denotes a priori beliefs given information from the data, with 𝒜 as 
the model and 𝒜 as the model’s parameters. In summary, there are three frameworks in 
Bayesian inference: Firstly, prior distribution, where we quantifies prior knowledge of 
parameter values. Secondly, likelihood, that is a probability of observing a data if we have a 
certain set of parameters values. Thirdly, posterior distribution, that is a conditional 
probability distribution of unknown parameters given observed data.  
Unfortunately, the distribution of the posterior is composed by a complicated function of the 
deep parameters and is non-linear that causes it is often infeasible to derive moments of the 
posterior distribution analytically. To handle this problem, DYNARE has used a Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling method, in particular the Random Walk Metropolis 
Hasting, that enables us to generates draws from posterior distribution and with those 
calculate numerical approximations to the distributions.  
The steps of this algorithm can be described as follows: 
1. Choose the initial value of 0 with 𝑃( |𝑦𝑇) > 0 from a starting distribution 𝑃( 0|𝑦𝑇) >
0. This initial value is often taken from the estimate at the posterior peak or from the 




2. Draw a candidate parameter vector ∗ from the jumping distribution: 𝐽( ∗| 𝑡−1) =
𝑁( 𝑡−1, 𝑐
2𝐼) where 𝑐 is a scale tuning parameter and 𝐼 is the identity matrix. Without loss 
of generality, let assume that the candidate parameter vector  ∗ is 𝑖+1 in which the 
probability of this parameter being accepted as parameter ∗ is  𝑞( ∗| 𝑖+1) and being 
rejected is 1 − 𝑞( ∗| 𝑖+1). 
3. Compute the acceptance ratio: 𝑞( 𝑖+1| 𝑖) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1,
𝑃( ∗|𝑦𝑇)
𝑃( 𝑖|𝑦𝑇)
). This ratio compares the 
posterior given the candidate parameters ∗ to the posterior with the current parameters. 
If 𝑞( 𝑖+1| 𝑖) = 1  or 𝑃(
∗|𝑦𝑇) > 𝑃( 𝑖|𝑦𝑇), then the chosen candidate is stored. If not, 
then move to the new candidate parameter using a random walk specification: ∗ = 𝑖 +  
with 𝐸[ ] = 0. 
4. Return to step 2 and repeat the procedure once again until the average acceptance ratio 
gets close to 25%. In practice, this standard acceptance ratio can be obtained by setting a 
scale factor 𝑐 in the covariance matrix in such away. In addition, to minimise the effect of 
the initial choice of values 0, some proportion of the initial draw should be discarded. 
DYNARE is also equipped with a tool to check the convergence of this MCMC process, 
following Brooks & Gelman (1998). This tool compares the variance between sequence or 
blocks (?̂?), and those within the replication (?̂?) in the MCMC process. When the variance 
between blocks (?̂?) is closed to zero while at the same time the variance within replication is 







5.4.2. Data and Its Transformation  
As discussed earlier, the model features eleven exogenous shocks. The estimation is 
conducted with eight observable variables such that there exist as many shocks (or more) as 
observable variables to avoid a stochastic singularity problem50. The observable variables are 
derived from a quarterly macroeconomic data of Indonesia in which these data are initially 
transformed before entering to the model. Data transformation is required to ensure the 
observable variables align with the model-based definition. All data are transformed 
following Smets & Wouters (2007). 
The observation period is from Q1: 2000 to Q4: 2014. We start the estimation from Q1: 2000 
for two reasons: Firstly, we avoid structural break due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997-
1998. Secondly, we capture the episode when Bank Indonesia began to implement an inflation 
targeting framework (ITF) regime. In this way, we can exclude the periods where regime 
changes and structural breaks were observed to avoid spurious inferences.  
With regards to the data and its frequency, we use a quarterly data that covers the real gross 
domestic product (GDP), real consumption, real capital investment, consumption price index 
(CPI), relative price of housing prices index (HPI), nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), 
real effective exchange rate (REER), domestic interest rate and labour force51. Unfortunately, 
not all these data are reported in quarterly frequency. For example the data of labour force is 
published annually. As well, there are a quarterly data where its unit is recorded in annual unit 
instead of quarterly unit, e.g. nominal interest rate. There are also some series where its base 
year changes several times during a period of observation. Given all these facts and to be in 
line with the model-based variable definition, then all data series is required to be transformed 
                                                          
50 Stochastic singularity problem happens when the number of shocks is less than that of the observables.  




before being used in the estimation.  The way of how these data series are transformed can be 
explained as follows:       
 The series for real output (real gross domestic product), real consumption and real capital 
investment are supplied by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistic in quarterly basis52. 
To be aligned with the model-based definition, the data for capital investment is ideally 
obtained by subtracting gross investment with housing investment. Yet, the data for 
housing investment is difficult to obtain. As an alternative, we assume a fix proportion of 
gross investment, that is classified as physical capital investment, in each period53. In 
addition to data availability problem, we also observe that the series for output, 
consumption and investment data that have experienced two times change in their base 
year, i.e. in 2000 and 2010. For consistency, we select a 2010 as the base year and convert 
all old series based on a 2000 base year to new series with a 2010 base year.  
After having a consistent data series of real output, real consumption and real capital 
investment in a 2010 base, we follow the data transformation process as Smets & Wouters 
(2007). Initially, these data series are required to be seasonally adjusted. Then, they are 
divided by a quarterly data of labour force to obtain a new data series in per capita term, 
i.e. real output per capita, real consumption per capita and real capital investment per 
capita54. Note that the original series of labour force is in annually frequency. Using a 
linear interpolation, we can transform this series into a quarterly frequency55.  
In order to obtain a stationer series, the data series are then put in the logarithm form and 
transformed it into a new series using a first difference method.  Having this, the series are 
                                                          
52 These data series are not officially published. 
53 A fix proportion of capital investment (over gross investment) is approximated by one minus the average ratio 
of construction sector over gross investment.  
54 The number of labour force is derived from the number of population within the age of 15 and over. 




now in the form of Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎),  Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) and Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎), respectively. Finally, 
these data series are demeaned by subtracting their sample means before ready to be used 
in the estimation.  
 The data series for consumer price index (CPI) is published by the Indonesian Central 
Bureau of Statistic in monthly frequency. Thus, it is straight forward to collect these data 
in a quarterly frequency by using the last month index in each quarter. Unfortunately, 
during observation period, the data series for CPI has experienced four times change in 
base year, i.e. 1996, 2002, 2007 and 2012. To have a consistent CPI data and a 
comparable index with housing prices index (HPI), we select a 2002 base year as a 
reference and convert CPI data, using a 1996, 2007 and 2012 base, into CPI data with a 
2002 base. The way of how we translate CPI from one base year to another is explained as 
follows: 
We define 𝑀𝑡 as the total spending required for buying a basket of consumption goods in 
year 𝑡. A price index is simply the spending required to purchase a basket of consumption 
goods in year 𝑡 relative to some base year as follows: 
𝐼{𝑓}𝑡 = 100 (
𝑀𝑡
𝑀𝑓
)  where 𝑓 denotes a base year 𝑓    5.107 
Using a different base year ℎ, the above price index can be re-written as: 
𝐼{ℎ}𝑡 = 100 (
𝑀𝑡
𝑀ℎ
)         5.108 
Here, we assume there is no change in the type of goods in our consumption basket. In 
order to change a price index from one base to another base, we need to express them both 




base year 𝑓 into base year ℎ. We can convert the old price index by using the following 
formula: 
𝐼{ℎ}𝑡 = 100 (
𝑀𝑡
𝑀ℎ












   5.109 
As can be seen, the new price index with a ℎ year base can be obtained by simply dividing 
the original index by its own value in year ℎ divided by 100. To make it clear, we provide 
an example of this conversion process using our own data. Suppose we want to change a 
price index from a 1996 base to 2002 base. According to our data, the CPI for 2002 using 
the 1996 base is 262.38. Given this, we can convert all price index with a 1996 base into a 
price index with a 2002 base by simply dividing the former by 2.6238. If the price index 
on October 2003 using a 1996 is 282.4, then the price index for this period using a 2002 
base is 282.4/2.6238 = 107.66. After converting all CPI data into a 2002 base year, the 




𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎), before subtracting it 
with their long-run sample mean. 
 The data series for nominal interest rate is taken from monthly Bank Indonesia coupon 
rate (SBI) which is published in the web of Bank Indonesia. Since the series is recorded in 
annual percentage, then we need to divide it by 400 and adding it with 1 to get a quarterly 
gross interest rate series as: (𝑅𝑡





) before deviating it with steady state value of interest rate in the model. 
 Based on model-based definition, real housing prices is defined as the relative price of 
housing prices index (HPI) over consumption price index (CPI). As mentioned earlier, we 
choose a 2002 base year for CPI since HPI is also recorded with a 2002 base year. HPI is 




housing prices (SHPR). This survey is conducted as housing prices is not among the 742 
commodities of CPI survey conducted by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistic. 
Since these 2 (two) surveys offer 2 (two) different data independently, then a bias in the 
estimation is at minimum. With regards to data transformation, the stationery series of real 





subtract it with its long-run mean. The resulting series is then interpreted as percentage 
deviation of real housing prices from the steady state. 
 The data series for nominal effective exchange rate indexes (NEER) and real effective 
exchange rate index (REER) are provided in monthly averages56. It is published by Bank 
for International Settlement (BIS) using a 2010 base year (series name: broad1510). By 
definition, a nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is an index of some weighted 
average of bilateral exchange rates. Meanwhile, a real effective exchange rate (REER) is 
the NEER adjusted by some measures of relative price or cost; changes in the REER thus 
take into account both nominal exchange rate developments and the inflation differential 
vis-a-vis trading partners. The stationary series are obtained by setting these data into log 
form as 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) and 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎), respectively. The final resulting series can be 
interpreted as percentage deviation of nominal and real effective real exchange rate from 
their steady state.  
 
5.4.3. Measurement Equations 
For estimation, we need to define the observable variables to be linked with economic model 
variables using measurement equations. Our observable variables are taken from the result of 
                                                          
56 An effective exchange rate provides a better indicator of the macroeconomic effects of exchange rates than 




data transformation as discussed in the earlier section. In details, the measurement equations 
are given as follows:  
Real output growth: 
Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) − Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑦𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = ?̃?𝑡 
Real consumption growth: 
Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) − Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = ?̃?𝑡
𝑇 
Real capital physical investment growth: 
Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) − Δ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝑖𝐾,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡 
where  Δ denotes the first-difference operator and the notation with bar corresponds to sample 
means. Observable variables 𝑦𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑖𝐾,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 represent the demeaned real growth of output, 
consumption, and capita investment, respectively.  










̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
= 𝜋𝐶,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = ?̃?𝐶,𝑡     










̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
= 𝑝𝐻/𝐶,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 𝑝𝐻/𝐶,𝑡    
Observable variables 𝜋𝐶,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 and 𝑝𝐻/𝐶,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠  are the demeaned CPI inflation and the demeaned real 
housing prices, respectively.  





𝑜𝑏𝑠 = ?̃?𝑡 
Nominal effective exchange rate: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) = 𝑒𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = ?̃?𝑡 





) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = ?̃?𝑡 
where 𝑟𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 is the detrended logged quarterly gross interest rate.  
Using the above definition of our measurement equations, then the vector of observables that 









𝑜𝑏𝑠]      5.110 
 
5.5. Estimation  
5.5.1. Calibrated Parameters 
There are not many existing studies that have used a DSGE framework to estimate the 
Indonesian economy. Given this, some values of the calibrated parameters are taken from the 
existing literatures while the remaining are chosen in such way they match with the steady 
state of empirical data.  
We start calibrating patient households’ discount factor 𝛽′. We set this parameter equal to 
0.9776 which implies 9.2% annual nominal interest rate (matched with a sample mean of the 




production  equal to 0.4 which implies 60% steady state share of labour income in total 
output. Although this value is slightly high, our choice is still within the standard values used 
in the literatures e.g. Aliyev (2012), Khramov (2012), and Gadatsch (2015), among others. 
Capital deprecation rate 𝛿𝐾 is calibrated at 0.035 which implies 14% annual depreciation. We 
pick this value following a study by Schundeln (2012) who estimates depreciation rates of 
physical capital invested in manufacturing enterprises in Indonesia during the period 1985-
1995 (based on firm-level data set). Based on his study, depreciation rate of physical capital in 
Indonesia lies within the range 8% to 14% annually. Obviously, we choose the upper bound 
of his estimation result.  
Entrepreneurs’ discount factor 𝛽 is calibrated at 0.9693. This parameter is set in such a way so 
that a steady state ratio of physical capital over output is 0.2 (matched with the sample mean 
of physical capital investment over output ratio in the data). For impatient households, we 
choose their discount factor 𝛽′′ at 0.9493. It is difficult to find a reference for this parameter 
using the steady state relationship, as an alternative we follow Iacoviello (2005) where we set 
this value below entrepreneurs and patient households discount factor to initiate borrowing 
activity. Following Iacoviello (2005), we also set  𝜘 that controls the residential housing stock 
over annual output at 0.1 while labour supply aversion  at 1.01. As well, we pick the value 
for housing share in production function 𝑣 at 0.03. The parameter of housing adjustment cost 
𝜓𝐻 is assume to be 0 while the steady state mark up of final goods over intermediate goods 𝑋 
is chosen at 1.05 which implies 5% steady state mark-up of domestic goods. The reason for 
fixing the value of 𝜓𝐻 at 0 is due to indeterminacy problem found when we set this parameter 
at a positive value. We decide to calibrate 𝜛, the elasticity of type 𝑧 domestic country goods, 




(2005). Meanwhile, housing depreciation rate 𝛿𝐻 is fixed at 0.01 which means 4% of annual 
rate, following Monacelli (2009).  
Table 5.1. 
Calibrated parameters57 
Parameter Description Value Targeted Variable/ 
Steady State 
Preferences : Discount Factor 
𝛽 Entrepreneurs 0.9693 Sample mean ratio of capital 
investment over output is 0.2.  
𝛽′ Patient households 0.9776 
 
Sample mean of nominal BI rate  
(9.2% annual nominal interest rate)   
𝛽′′ Impatient households 0.9493 Own Assumption 
Other preferences parameters 
 𝜘 Weight on housing service  0.1 Iacoviello (2005) 
 Labour supply aversion 1.01 Iacoviello (2005) 
Technology : Factors productivity 
 Capital share in production 0.4 A standard value used in the 
literatures e.g. Aliyev (2012), 
Khramov (2012), and Gadatsch 
(2015), among others.  
𝑣 Housing Share in production  0.03 Iacoviello (2005) 
Other technology parameters 
𝜓𝐻 Variable housing adjustment cost 0 Iacoviello (2005) 
𝛿𝐾 Capital depreciation rate 0.035 14% annual depreciation  
Schundeln (2012) 
𝛿𝐻 Housing depreciation rate 0.01 
4% annual depreciation 
Monacelli (2009) 
Mark-up and Elasticity 
𝑋 Steady state gross mark-up 1.05 Iacoviello (2005) 
 Probability domestic fixed price 0.75 Iacoviello (2005) 
𝐹  Probability import fixed price 0.50 T. Matheson (2005) 
𝜛 Elasticity : domestic/foreign 
good’s bundle 
1.0 
Gali & Monacelli (2005) 
 Elasticity : among imported goods 
from country 𝑖 
1.0 
Gali & Monacelli (2005) 
 
 
We also decide to calibrate the parameters of price of stickiness for domestic and import 
goods price as they were not well identified during estimation process. For domestic price, we 
set the Calvo parameter  equal to 0.75 which implies an average duration of optimal price 
changes of four quarters. This value is fairly standard choice in DSGE literature. For the 
probability of import goods fixed price 𝐹 , we pick the value at lower probability, i.e. 0.5. 
This implies importing price is assumed to be more flexible than domestic price such that an 
                                                          




average length of import price contracts is two quarters. The choice of our calibrated 
parameters is summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
5.5.2. Priors Distribution  
In order to be consistent with the existing literatures, the priors of structural parameters are set 
as close as possible to the relevant studies that estimate DSGE model featuring housing 
market and/or open economies using Bayesian technique. 
We begin by setting a prior for the stochastic process. The standard deviations of the 
innovations to structural shocks are assumed to follow an inverse-gamma distribution with 
prior mean of 0.01 and slightly loose degrees of freedom 2, with an exception for MEI shock, 
financial shock, and government spending shock which are assumed to have prior mean of 
0.02. This choice is fairly standard in the literatures, especially in the context of log-linearised 
model. For persistence parameters of shocks, we choose a beta-distribution with prior mean of 
0.7 and standard deviation of 0.1. A decision to choose a beta-distribution comes from the fact 
that the value of these persistence parameters is bounded within zero and one.  The same 
choice of priors, for persistence parameters of shocks, is used in Rabanal & Bracons (2010), 
among others. 
Concerning the share of import goods in consumption goods bundles 𝛼, we set prior mean and 
standard deviation of this parameter equal to 0.4 and 0.1, respectively, where this prior is 
assumed to follow a beta-distribution. This mean value comes from the average ratio of 
import values over the Indonesian GDP (in constant price) during the period of observation. 
Notice that using the average ratio of import values over GDP to calibrate 𝛼 is not entirely 




that includes not only consumption goods but also durable and investment goods. Hence, 
instead of calibrating this parameter with the average ratio of import values over the 
Indonesian GDP, we let the data speaks by estimating this particular parameter using 
Bayesian technique.  
We assume a prior mean for a wage income share of patient households 𝜎 to follow a beta-
distribution with prior mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1. This mean value is within 
the range of comparable estimates in the literature: for example, Iacoviello (2005), using a 
limited information approach, estimates a wage income share of unconstrained agents of 64 
percent in the US. With regards to monetary policy, we assume the standard Taylor-type 
policy rule that responds to the deviation of inflation, output and nominal exchange rate with 
inertia in policy rate. We set prior mean for monetary reaction function to inflation 𝜙𝜋, output 
gap 𝜙𝑦 and nominal exchange rate 𝜙𝑒 at 1.25, 0.25 and 0.1, respectively with the same 
standard deviation of 0.1 for these parameters. Prior distribution of these parameters is 
assumed to follow an inverse gamma distribution which is quite standard in estimating policy 
parameters. Matheson (2009) uses the same prior means as ours when assessing the fit of 
small open economy DSGEs for Australia, Canada and New Zealand. For an interest rate 
smoothing parameter 𝜙𝑟, we set its prior means at 0.5 with standard deviation 0.1. Since this 
smoothing parameter is bounded between zero and one, then we assume that the distribution 






Prior and posterior distribution of structural parameters 
Parameter Prior   Posterior 
Dist. Supp. Mean St. Dev  Mean 5% 95% 
𝛼 Share of import con. goods Beta [0,1) 0.4 0.1  0.073 0.042 0.102 
𝜎 Patient wage income share Beta [0,1) 0.5 0.1  0.505 0.357 0.652 
𝑏 Proportion of wage income 
in collateral for impatient 
HH 
Beta [0,1) 0.5 0.1  0.533 0.370 0.687 
𝜒 DP ratio for entrepreneurs Beta [0,1) 0.3 0.1  0.418 0.250 0.586 
𝜒′′ DP ratio for impatient HH Beta [0,1) 0.3 0.1  0.342 0.171 0.513 
          
𝜓𝐾  Variable capital adj. cost Gamma ℝ
+ 2 0.1  2.003 1.848 2.166 
𝜙𝑟 Taylor : interest smoothing Gamma ℝ
+ 0.5 0.1  0.784 0.731 0.838 
𝜙𝜋 Taylor : inflation Gamma ℝ
+ 1.25 0.1  1.213 1.055 1.365 
𝜙𝑦 Taylor : output Gamma ℝ
+ 0.25 0.1  0.851 0.585 1.141 
𝜙𝑒 Taylor : exchange rate Gamma ℝ
+ 0.1 0.05  0.035 0.018 0.051 
          
𝜌𝐻 Housing Preference Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.749 0.630 0.887 
𝜌𝜇𝑟 Mark up Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.304 0.205 0.409 
𝜌𝑧 Permanent Technology Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.395 0.271 0.511 
𝜌Λ Temporary Technology Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.630 0.474 0.785 
𝜌𝑦∗ World Consumption Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.793 0.704 0.877 
𝜌𝜋𝐶
∗  World Inflation Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.430 0.307 0.550 
𝜌𝑔 Gov. Expenditure Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.497 0.373 0.632 
𝜌𝛽 General Preference Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.763 0.626 0.918 
𝜌𝐼𝐾 MEI Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.426 0.312 0.543 
𝜌𝐿𝑇𝑉 LTV Beta [0,1) 0.7 0.1  0.694 0.530 0.860 
          
𝜖𝐻 Housing preference Gamma ℝ+ 0.01 2  0.107 0.065 0.150 
𝜖
𝑟
 Mark up/Cost Push Gamma ℝ
+ 0.01 2  0.053 0.043 0.064 
𝜖𝑧 Permanent Technology Gamma ℝ+ 0.01 2  0.002 0.002 0.003 
𝜖Λ Temporary Technology Gamma ℝ+ 0.01 2  0.005 0.002 0.007 
𝜖𝑦
∗
 World Consumption Gamma ℝ
+ 0.01 2  0.025 0.021 0.029 
𝜖𝜋𝐶
∗
 World Inflation Gamma ℝ
+ 0.01 2  0.014 0.012 0.017 
𝜖𝑔 Gov. Expenditure Gamma ℝ+ 0.02 2  0.378 0.315 0.437 
𝜖𝛽 General Preference Gamma ℝ+ 0.01 2  0.003 0.002 0.004 
𝜖𝐼𝐾 MEI Gamma ℝ+ 0.02 2  0.033 0.027 0.038 
𝜖𝐿𝑇𝑉 LTV Gamma ℝ+ 0.02 2  0.013 0.005 0.021 
𝜖𝑟 Monetary Policy  Gamma ℝ+ 0.01 2  0.002 0.002 0.003 
 
Unlike similar studies that assume a fix value of lending parameters, in our work, we try to 
estimate these parameters in the context of Indonesia. This is motivated by the fact that some 




had not been controlled by Bank Indonesia until March 201258. For that purpose, we choose 
prior mean of down payment (DP) ratio for both entrepreneurs 𝜒 and impatient households 𝜒′′ 
at 0.3 with the standard deviation of 0.1. This mean value follows a beta-distribution and is in 
the range of comparable estimates in the literature. As illustration, Iacovielo (2005) estimates 
the ratio of DP in the U.S. at 0.2 for entrepreneurs and 0.4 for impatient households. As well, 
Notarpietro & Siviero (2015) has calibrated this parameter equal to 0.2, in line with the 
average for the U.S and the euro area59. Our choice for the prior is in the ball park of these 
values. 
In practice, lending decision does not only depend on the amount of collateral. Banks may 
also consider wage income in addition to the assets owned by private agents. Since only 
impatient households who receive wage income the model, then we assume that these agents 
are constrained by not only housing assets but also wage income when applying for a housing 
loan. However, a question that remains: how significant banks’ lending decisions is 
influenced by applicant’s wage income. We address this issue by estimating the weight of 
wage income 𝑏 in the model. We assume priors of  𝑏 to follow a beta-distribution with a 
mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1. This choice follows Gelain et al. (2013) who 
calibrate this parameter equal to 0.5. Yet, under their model, it is assumed central bank has 
control over these lending parameters while in our works it does not. Table 5.2 summarises all 
priors used in the model that include prior distribution, mean and standard deviation or degree 
of freedom of the structural parameters. 
 
                                                          
58 Before 2012, both micro and macroprudential policy are part of Bank Indonesia’s authority. After 2012, 
microprudential policy is delegated to the Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK) while macroprudential 
policy remains part of Bank Indonesia’s authority. 





5.5.3. Posteriors Distribution  
We summarise the estimation results in Table 5.2. It reports the posterior means together with 
90% confidence interval obtained through draws from the posterior distribution using the 
Metropolis-Hasting sample algorithm. The results are based on a total of 100.000 draws and 
two independent chains where the Brook & Gelman (1998) convergence criteria are 
employed. To ensure all the estimated parameters are well identified and to see how useful the 
data in the estimation, we also plot the priors and the posteriors distribution for each of the 
estimated parameter in appendix 5.3. In general, all parameters are identified as suggested by 
DYNARE60. The parameters that are not identified have been calibrated.  
Overall, our estimation results are plausible: the shapes of posterior distributions are broadly 
normal and the mode of posterior distribution is not excessively different from the mode 
calculated from the numerical optimisation of the posterior kernel. Yet, there are some 
parameters in which their priors are very close to their posteriors although there are still 
identified after checking it using a test of identification.  
We start reporting the estimation results for the parameter of import goods share in 
consumption bundle (𝛼), which is commonly interpreted as the degree of openness. 
Surprisingly, the share of import goods in consumption bundle is relatively small with 
posterior mean is 7.3%. The fact that the posterior distribution is different from the prior 
distribution implies that our data is very informative for estimating this parameter. A small 
proportion of import goods in consumption bundle suggests that the dependency of the 
Indonesian economy to foreign consumption goods is not very high. This might happen since 
this country is very well known for its natural resources, including agriculture products, such 
that most of consumption goods are supplied domestically. This result is in line with the data 
                                                          




reported by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistic in 2014, in which not more than 10% 
of the total value of import goods is classified as consumption goods. Given this fact, the 
model performs well in estimating this particular parameter. Notice that, this result is obtained 
by assuming no international trade for physical capital or investment goods. Allowing 
physical capital to be traded internationally may change the result. 
The way of how Bank Indonesia (BI) conducts its monetary policy also attracts our attention. 
The implementation of Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF) since 2000 has brought the 
curiosity about the targets of BI. The estimation result suggests that BI consistently adopts the 
Taylor principle in their policy rate by raising the nominal interest at higher rate than 
domestic inflation. This is confirmed by looking the posterior mean of monetary reaction 
function to inflation 𝜙𝜋 that is estimated at the value of 1.21 (higher than 1). The result also 
suggests a relatively high response of monetary policy to output deviation from its steady 
state value. This is confirmed by looking the posterior mean of monetary reaction function to 
output 𝜙𝑦 which is estimated at 0.85. Having this result, we argue that the focus of BI is not 
only about price stabilisation but also economic growth, especially when domestic economy 
experiences a down turn. This result is interesting as most similar studies for developed 
countries report a small systematic response of policy rate to output deviation. Our finding 
confirms about a distinction between central bank in developed countries and developing 
countries, especially in the way of conducting monetary policy.  
Previously, we have shown that BI does not only concern about price stabilisation but also 
economic condition. Yet, we are unsure whether policy rate is also used to stabilise the 
volatility in exchange rate. Motivated by this, we include the variable of exchange rate in the 
standard Taylor-type-interest rate rule. In this way, it is assumed that BI also responds to the 




that the responsiveness of policy rates to the exchange rate deviation 𝜙𝑒  takes on a lower 
value of 0.03. Therefore, for the case of Indonesia, it seems policy rate is rarely used as an 
instrument to stabilise the exchange rate. A possible explanation is that policy rate has been 
tied to other targets, e.g. price stabilisation. Theoretically, a country that adopts Inflation 
Targeting Framework (ITF) should let its exchange rate in floating. In this way, no response 
is necessarily given by policy rate to the exchange rate’s volatility. Our estimation result is in 
line with this theory.  
We turn our attention now to the estimation result for some lending parameters. As mentioned 
in earlier section, one objective of this chapter is to study the way of how banks or financial 
institutions carry out their lending decision. Since there are two different agents who can 
borrow in the economy, i.e. entrepreneurs and impatient households, we evaluate the relevant 
lending parameters for each of these borrowers. The estimation result suggests that banks in 
Indonesia are likely to set higher down payment (DP) ratio for agent who only has housing 
assets in collateral, but no wage income, when they decide a housing loan application. While 
for agent who can show both her wage income and housing assets, banks may set lower DP 
ratio since her wage income serves as additional guarantee. As illustrated in Table 5.2, 
parameter 𝜒 is estimated around 0.42 while parameter 𝜒′′ is estimated around 0.34. Recall 
that, these two parameters represent the ratio of DP for both entrepreneurs and impatient 
households, respectively. In the view of loan to value (LTV) ratio, which is an inverse of DP 
ratio, a higher LTV ratio is allowed to be given for impatient households, compared to 
entrepreneurs, since they can provide the proof of wage income in addition to the asset of 
























House > 70 m2 70 70 60 50 80 70 60 
House 22-70 m2 n/a n/a 70 60 n/a 80 70 
Apartment > 70 m2 70 70 60 50 80 70 60 
Apartment 22-70 m2 n/a 80 70 60 90 80 70 
Apartment < 21 m2 n/a n/a 70 60 n/a 80 70 
Shophouse n/a n/a 70 60 n/a 80 70 
          Source: Bank Indonesia 
How the above result relates with the current LTV ratio set by Bank Indonesia (BI). As 
mentioned earlier, BI has controlled the LTV ratio for property loans (housing loans and 
apartment ownership loan) since March 2012. Currently, the LTV ratio for property loans is 
set within the range 60%-90%, depending on the types of property and the numbers of 
property owned by borrowers at the time they make a loan application. In details, the 
maximum loan to property sector in Indonesia is illustrated in Table 5.3. 
Comparing our estimation result with the current setting of LTV ratio in Indonesia, we can 
show that our estimation for LTV ratio falls not far from the range 60% to 90%, i.e. 57% for 
entrepreneurs and 66% for impatient households. Recall that in our model set up, we assume 
this LTV ratio is not controlled by BI, instead we assume that banks have controlled over this 
ratio independently and we try to estimate it using relevant data.   
The previous results have not specifically evaluated the role of wage income in lending 
decision. As a standard procedure, it is common nowadays banks requests for the proof of 
wage income in addition to housing assets in collateral. We try to address this issue by 
estimating the weight of wage income in banks’ lending decisions relative to housing assets in 
collateral. The estimation results suggest that banks put roughly higher attention on wage 




parameter of wage income has posterior means around 0.53 which implies more than 50% of 
lending decision is based on wage income. This finding confirms the importance of wage 
income in lending decision. Concerning the incentive received by households for supplying a 
labour, the estimation result suggest that there is no significant difference between wage 
income received by patient and impatient households in Indonesia. This is reflected from 
posterior mean of parameter 𝜎 that falls around 0.5. 
After describing the estimation results for some structural parameters, we now focus on the 
shock process. Overall, the estimated persistence parameters of exogenous shocks are 
heterogeneous, lie within the range 0.3 for a cost push shock and 0.79 for the world 
consumption shock. For a foreign inflation shock, the posterior mean of its persistence 
parameters is estimated at 0.43. Meanwhile, for a general preference shock and a housing 
preference shock, the estimated AR (1) coefficient are reported at 0.76 and 0.74, respectively. 
As well, posterior mean of the persistence parameter in the unit-root technology process and 
the stationary technology shock are estimated at 0.39 and 0.62, subsequently.  
For the shock of government expenditure and he marginal efficiency of investment (MEI), 
their autoregressive coefficients are estimated at 0.49 and 0.42, respectively. As for the 
standard deviation of the shocks, we find that all the estimated values are to be significantly 
different from zero, where the less volatile one is a monetary policy white noise shock and the 
most volatile one is the shock of government expenditure.  
 
5.5.4. Variance Decomposition  
In this section, we assess the contribution of different contemporaneous shocks on the 




the main aggregate variables implied by the model, as shown on Table 5.4. There are at least 
three important findings that can be summarised from this exercise: Firstly, a permanent 
technology shock and a monetary policy shock are unarguably important shocks since they 
dominantly explain the volatility of business cycle fluctuation in Indonesia. Secondly, a 
marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock is the main driver of the variability of capital 
investment which also matters in explaining output and consumption variation. Thirdly, a 
housing preference shock accounts for a massive contribution in the volatility of housing 
prices in Indonesia.  
We start discussing the role of a permanent technology shock. As shown in Table 5.4, this 
exogenous contemporaneous shock accounts for more than 24% and 18% of output and 
consumption variation. As well, this innovation largely explains about the variability of other 
macro variables e.g. investment (11.34%), housing prices (10.86%), CPI inflation (19.07%), 
PPI inflation (18.66) and policy rate (31.93%). On the basis of this outcome, one can 
conclude that a permanent technology shock serves as the leading sources of the Indonesian 
business cycles. This finding is in line with the study by Aguiar & Gopinath (2007) who 
argue that emerging markets are usually characterised by fluctuation in trend growth rates that 
causes an innovation to trend growth rate as a source of business cycle fluctuation in 
emerging markets. A significant role of permanent technology shock is contrast with the role 
of a temporary technology shock in which the latter only contributes a small proportion of 
business cycle fluctuations in Indonesia, e.g. 0.35% and 0.26% of the variability of output and 
consumption, respectively.   
Following a permanent technology shock, a monetary policy shock appears to be an important 
shock that drives the Indonesian business cycles. It contributes more than 17% and 19% of 




monetary policy shock to the variability of consumption is line with the study by Aspachs-
Bracons & Rabanal (2010) who found around 14% of consumption volatility in Spain and 
more than 20% in the rest of European Monetary Union (EMU) are explained by this type of 
innovation. This shock also well captures the variability of investment and policy rate with a 
contribution 7.54% and 6.02%, subsequently.  
A MEI shock serves as another important shock for the Indonesian economy. It explains 
roughly 41% of the volatility of capital investment. Other than capital investment, a MEI 
shock also sufficiently matters in explaining the volatility of other aggregate variables, for 
instance: output (11.15%), consumption (13.34%), CPI inflation (8.97%), PPI inflation 
(8.75%) and interest rate (12.55%).  
A significant contribution of a MEI shock is in line with the literatures, for instance: Justiano 
et al. (2011) and Fisher (2006), among others.  In is worth to mention that the data for capital 
investment series in this work do not include durable consumption and change inventories, 
following Smets & Wouters (2003). This treatment is different from the work of Justiano et 
al. (2011) who combine durable consumption and change inventories in investment data 
series. The reason for not differentiating consumption data series into durable and non-durable 
consumption is due to unavailability of the Indonesian Central Bureau Agency to provide 
such series.  
We pursue a discussion by evaluating the source of housing prices volatility in Indonesia. As 
mentioned earlier, the main driver of the variability of housing prices is a housing preference 
shock that contributes almost 70% of housing prices variation. A sufficiently large 
contribution of this shock in explaining the volatility of housing prices is in line with the 
study of Iacoviello & Neri (2010) for the US economy and of Darracq-Parries & Notarpietro 




by using data for Spain and euro area in their analysis. Other than a housing preference shock, 
a permanent technology shock and a MEI shock explain roughly 10% and 5%, subsequently, 
of the variability of housing prices.  
Table 5.4 
Variance decomposition of model without news shocks – baseline model 
 𝜖𝐻 𝜖𝜇
𝑟




 𝜖𝑔 𝜖𝛽 𝜖𝐼𝐾 𝜖𝐿𝑇𝑉 𝜖𝑟 
Output  11.08   13.38   0.35   24.26   2.49   9.83   8.79   1.14   11.15   0.19   17.34  
Consumption  5.15   13.88   0.26   18.76   10.96   9.64   5.88   2.35   13.34   0.16   19.63  
Capital Inv.  23.21   4.26   2.77   11.34   2.63   6.20   0.08   0.09   41.71   0.18   7.54  
Housing prices  69.35   1.80   2.64   10.86   1.43   0.87   2.92   3.11   5.38   0.02   1.62  
CPI inf.  1.28   48.45   3.25   19.07   0.48   16.30   0.22   0.21   8.97   0.01   1.76  
PPI Inf.  1.20   49.58   3.69   18.66   0.36   15.60   0.16   0.20   8.75   0.01   1.80  
Import Inf.  0.67   6.21   0.33   4.96   78.46   5.47   1.11   0.12   2.41   0.00     0.27  
Interest Rate  5.75   6.77   2.99   31.93   0.33   28.98   2.70   1.90   12.55   0.06   6.02  
The innovation of a housing preference is denoted by 𝜖𝐻, a mark-up/cost push (𝜖𝜇
𝑟
), a stationary technology (𝜖Λ), 
a non-stationary technology (𝜖𝑧), a world consumption (𝜖𝑦
∗
), a world inflation (𝜖𝜋
∗
), a government expenditure 
(𝜖𝑔), a general preference (𝜖𝛽), a marginal efficiency of investment-MEI (𝜖𝐼𝐾), a loan to value/borrowing 
constraint (𝜖𝐿𝑇𝑉) and a monetary policy (𝜖𝑟). All values are presented in percentage. 
 
Meanwhile, the role of monetary policy and LTV shocks in explaining the variability of 
housing prices is minimal. Together, they only contribute 1.64% of housing prices volatility. 
This finding shows a challenge faced by Bank Indonesia in stabilising housing prices 
volatility in Indonesia. The minimal role of a monetary policy shock in explaining housing 
prices volatility is similar to what found in Aspachs-Bracons & Rabanal (2010) for a case of 
Spain. With regards to CPI inflation, it is shown that mark-up/cost push shock contributes 
around 48% of the variability of this variable. This result is plausible as being an archipelago 
with more than 13.000 islands; the supply of goods in Indonesia depends heavily on 
infrastructures e.g. logistics and transportations. As an illustration, during rainy season, where 
usually characterised by unfriendly weather, there is a tendency for firms to raise their mark-




CPI inflation is explained by a permanent technology shock (19.07%) and a world (foreign) 
inflation shock (16.30%). The latter is transmitted through the channel of import consumption 
goods.   
The world inflation shock also explains the variability of import good inflation, but it is not 
the main driver. Most of the volatility of import goods inflation is explained by a world 
consumption demand shock with a contribution 78.46%. This shock is transmitted from the 
exchange rate channel which affects import goods inflation. Recall that import goods inflation 
occurs as a fraction of import firms do not adjust their import prices in every point in time but 
set it as a staggered fashion ala the Calvo. As the result, changes in the exchange rate are not 
entirely transmitted into domestic price of import due to nominal price rigidity, which implies 
a deviation from the law of one price assumption. In the literature, this condition is known as 
incomplete exchange rate pass through.   
 
5.5.5. Historical Decomposition  
Another way of evaluating the contribution of each exogenous shock to the Indonesian 
business cycles is by analysing the historical decomposition result. By this way, we are 
allowed to observe a period where the Indonesian economy experiences a recession or a boom 
along with the various structural shocks that may contribute to those events. We focus on the 
movement of output, consumption, capital investment and housing prices over the sample 
period, i.e. Q1-2000 to Q4-2014.  As the role of a stationary technology shock is minimal, as 
shown from the result of variance decomposition earlier, we group this shock with a non-
stationary technology shock to become one category, i.e. a technology shock. We do the same 




where we combine all these shocks into a group called the rest of the shocks. In this way, the 
category of shocks has reduced from eleven into eight, as reported in Figure 5.1 through 
Figure 5.4 bellow.  
In line with the results from the variance decomposition, the shock of technology, mark-up 
cost, housing preference and monetary policy are the main contributors to the movement of 
the Indonesian economy during the period of observation. A positive effect of technology 
shock to the economy mainly takes place between Q3-2009 and Q4-2014, as reflected from a 
bar with an “orange colour” in Figure 5.1. In contrast, the effect of a technology shock to the 
economy before Q3-2009 is unclear as it changes from a positive to a negative effect (or vice 
versa) overtime. Based on its contribution, the role of a technology shock has increased since 
Q3-2009, compared to its role before Q3-2009.  
The result from Figure 5.1 also shows that there are moments where the Indonesian economy 
has experienced a down turn, for instance: Q1 to Q2-2000, Q1-2001 to Q4-2002, Q2 to Q4-
2003, and Q1 to Q2-2006. Notice that during period 2000-2003, the Indonesian economy has 
experienced a period of severe political instability, while during 2005-2006 the Indonesian 
economy has been underperforming due to the increase of world oil price that causes the 
Indonesian government to increase oil retail price domestically by reducing their subsidy on 
this commodity. One similarity found, during these downturn periods, is that a negative effect 
of monetary policy seems matter. In addition to technology and monetary policy innovations, 
a mark-up cost and a housing preference shock have their impacts on output volatility. A 
positive and large effect of a mark-up shock to the variability of output appears during Q2-
2002 to Q3-2004. While a smaller effect of this shock is observed in the rest of sample 




Another finding is that the role of a world consumption demand shock, in explaining output 
volatility in Indonesia, is minimal over the sample periods.  By this finding, an increase or a 
decrease on export does not give a significant effect to the performance of the Indonesian 
economy. In contrast, the effect of world inflation shock does matter to output, although it is 
not dominant. Note that a channel by which world inflation shock affects domestic economy 
is through CPI inflation.  
Figure 5.1 
Historical decomposition of output in Indonesian (Q-o-Q growth rate) 
 
 
Figure 5.2 advises that the main drivers of consumption volatility are a technology shock, a 
monetary policy shock, a mark-up cost and a world consumption demand shock. As there is a 
similarity with regards to the main drivers of consumption and output, we may expect that 
these two variables move in the same way in the economy. Our hypothesis is confirmed by 
evaluating the correlation between consumption and output during sample periods that falls at 
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Historical decomposition of consumption in Indonesia (Q-o-Q growth rate) 
 
 
The historical decomposition simulation shows that a marginal efficiency of investment 
(MEI) shock is the main driver of physical capital investment during the whole sample period, 
either with a positive effect or a negative effect (see Figure 5.3). In particular, a severe 
downturn on physical capital investment during Q3-2001, Q1-2003 and Q1-2006 is mostly 
accounted by a large negative MEI shock. Another finding is a tendency for physical capital 
investment to experience a downturn in the beginning of each year before increases in the 
next quarters.   
Figure 5.3 
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A result from historical decomposition simulation also advises that a housing preference 
shock is the main driver of housing prices volatility in Indonesia (see Figure 5.4). In 
particular, the severe downturn in housing prices during Q4-2005 and within Q3-2007 to Q3-
2008 is mostly accounted for by large negative housing prices shocks. Notice that Q4-2005 is 
the period where oil retail price has increased almost 100 percent from 2,400 rupiah (12 cent) 
in March 2005 into 4,500 rupiah (22.5 cent) in October 2005. Meanwhile, the horizon of Q3-
2007 to Q3-2008 is the period where a financial crisis arises in the US that causes a slowdown 
in housing demand, including in Indonesia. Note that this global financial crisis is considered 
by many economists to have been the worst financial crisis since the great depreciation of the 
1930s.  
Another important disturbance that explains the volatility of housing prices in Indonesia is a 
technology shock. This shock mostly gives a positive impact to the variability of housing 
prices starting from Q2-2003. From the historical decomposition simulation, we can also 
confirm that the role of a monetary policy shock is minimal in explaining the volatility in 
housing prices over the sample periods. This is in line with the results found when analysing 
the variance decomposition previsouly. 
Figure 5.4 
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5.5.6. The Impulse Response Function 
 A Non-Stationary Permanent Technology Shock 
By the standard mechanism, a positive non-stationary permanent technology shock 𝜖𝑡
𝑧 
improves productivity. Under this condition, consumption, investment, labour and output 
increase with the exception concerning the housing prices (see Figure 5.5). Since output, 
consumption, investment and labour move to the same direction, then this contemporaneous 
shock successfully generates co-movement among these variables as shown in empirical data.  
Figure 5.5.  
Responses to a one std. deviation non-stationary technology shock 
 
A positive permanent technology shock also triggers an increase on inflation at the early 
periods. This happens as people becomes optimistic about current and future economic 
condition. As the anticipation, BI starts to increase their policy rate slightly that makes the 




to generate co-movement between consumption and housing prices as reflected from the 
empirical data (see Appendix 5.5). After several quarters, the effect of this exogenous shock 
diminishes and all variables return to their steady state level. 
 
 A Monetary Policy Shock 
A positive shock to interest rate 𝜖𝑡
𝑟 indicates a monetary tightening policy. This unanticipated 
shock causes an immediate decline in consumption, followed by a drop in labour and output 
as the expected interest rate increases (as illustrated in Figure 5.6). Yet, the effect of this 
structural shock on consumption is not homogenous among agents. As an illustration, for 
patient households (savers), an increase in policy rate raises their consumption slightly above 
its steady state level since they get higher return from their lending activity. In contrast, 
borrowers (i.e. entrepreneurs and impatient households) need to reduce their consumption 
level since the cost of borrowing gets higher. As a reduction in borrowers’ consumption is 
greater than an increase in lenders’ consumption, in aggregate, consumption falls that leads to 
a decline in CPI inflation and a decrease in output latter on.  
A positive monetary policy shock also causes nominal exchange rate to appreciate while 
investment and housing prices reduce as a decline in aggregate demand including a demand 
for housing.  Notice that the immediate drop of consumption, investment and output 
reconciles a positive co-movement of these quantities in response to monetary policy shock 










Figure 5.6.  
Responses to a one std. deviation monetary policy shock 
 
 A Marginal Efficiency of Investment (MEI) Shock 
A positive MEI shock 𝜖𝑡
𝐼𝐾 increases capital investment that leads to an increase in output 
slightly (see Figure 5.7). This innovation also causes an increase in labour for both patient and 
impatient households. Unfortunately, an increase on capital investment has crowded out 
consumption that causes this variable to decline. As the result, these two variables move in 
opposite direction. In summary, under a positive MEI shock, investment, output and labour 
move to the same direction but not consumption and housing prices. Since there is a positive 
correlation between output and consumption in the Indonesian business cycles (see Appendix 





Figure 5.7.  
Responses to a one std. deviation marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock 
 
 
 A Housing Preference Shock 
A housing-preference shock generates a disturbance that shifts housing demand. This shock 
can resemble effect such as temporary tax advantages to housing investment and a sudden 
increase in demand fuelled by optimistic consumer expectations, following Iacoviello (2005). 
In a simulation, a positive housing preference shock surges housing prices as a result of an 
increase in housing demand. A rise in housing prices gives a benefit to borrowers as the value 
of their housing assets in collateral increases such that more loans can be obtained. As 
borrowers have a higher propensity to spend than lenders, then aggregate demand increases 
that triggers an increase in CPI inflation. Under such condition, the real value of outstanding 
loan decreases that accelerates borrowing capacity of borrowers that leads to an increase in 




demand shock works very well here. Interestingly, under housing preference shock, the model 
works well in capturing co-movement behaviour between housing prices, consumption, 
investment and output as standard empirical data. 
Figure 5.8.  




5.6. The Feature of News Shocks 
So far, we have estimated a specific dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
for Indonesia by incorporating some features that are relevant to the Indonesian economy 
characteristics. As well, we have evaluated the source of business cycles fluctuation in 
Indonesia in which some exogenous shocks are assumed to be present in the economy. 




subject to a criticism. One possibility is in the way of how the exogenous shocks are 
modelled.   
In earlier setting, we assume that all structural shocks are to be unanticipated. Under such 
condition, economic agents are always be surprised by any deviation from the historical 
practice. Although this assumption is plausible, in reality it is unlikely to happen all the time. 
Agent may use and update any early information or news that they have got to anticipate 
future outcome. Motivated by this, we relax the assumption of unanticipated shocks by 
combining these shocks with the anticipated ones and evaluate their contribution to the 
Indonesian business cycles. According to news literature, the anticipated shocks are known as 
news shocks that consist of information that are useful for predicting future fundamentals but 
do not affect current fundamentals.  




𝑖   𝜖𝑡,0
𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
𝜖𝑖
2 )  and 𝑖 ∈ {𝑧, 𝑟, 𝐼𝐾}   5.118  
The superscript 𝑖 is used to differentiate types of exogenous shock, for example: 𝑧 associates 
to a non-stationary permanent technology shock, 𝑟 associates to a monetary policy shock and 
𝐼𝐾 associates to a marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock. The first component 𝜖𝑡,0
𝑖  
represents unanticipated i.i.d., zero mean, finite-variance, fundamental innovations. This 
shock is also known as a surprised or contemporaneous shock. Meanwhile, the second 
component 𝜖𝑡,𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠
𝑖  represents news shocks component. This shock is assumed to be known to 
economic agents in period 𝑡 − ℎ, but will only materialize ℎ quarters ahead. Given its 
characteristic, a “news” shock about future event can be written explicitly as:  
𝜖𝑡,𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠
𝑖 ≡ ∑ 𝜖𝑡−ℎ
𝑖,ℎ𝐻




where 𝐻 is the maximum horizon where agents can memorize and anticipate advance news 
about future policies. In the absent of news shocks component, it turns out that 𝜖𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜖𝑡,0
𝑖  and 
we label the model under such condition as the baseline model.     
Following Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2012) and others related studies e.g. Christiano et al. 
(2014) and Khan & Tsoukalas (2012), we assume that news shock are driven by innovation 
announced four or eight quarters in advance (ℎ = 4 𝑜𝑟 ℎ = 8). This implies a disturbance to 
the exogenous fundamentals of the economy at time 𝑡 is a summation of three signals: Firstly, 
a signal received eight quarters in advance. Secondly, a signal received four quarters in 
advance. Thirdly, a surprised shock at time 𝑡 itself. A signal received in four quarters in 
advance associates to a revised version of a signal received eight quarters in advance. 
Meanwhile, a signal received at time 𝑡 is a revision of the sum of the signals received in eight 
and four quarters in advance.  
We also assume that all shocks are uncorrelated and set the sum of the variance of news 
shocks component is, evaluated at prior means, at most one half of the variance of the 
corresponding unanticipated component.  Note that we focus the study of news shocks only 
on three exogenous shocks, i.e. non-stationary permanent technology shock, monetary policy 
shock, and marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock, as these three shocks are found to 
be quantitatively important for the Indonesian business cycles, as shown in earlier sub 
sections.  
According to the literatures, the study on news shocks in business cycles is not new. There 
have been some previous studies that analyse the role of news shocks in the economy. Among 
others is a seminal paper by Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2012) who claim the importance of 




(RBC) model augmented with four real rigidities: internal habit formation in consumption, 
investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization, and imperfect competition in labour 
markets, with a specific preference that governs the wealth elasticity of labour supply, 
following Jaimovich & Rebelo (2009). They found that anticipated shocks account for about 
half of predicted aggregate fluctuation in output, consumption, investment and employment. 
Other studies are Cochrane (1998), Hoover & Jorda (2001) and Milani & Treadwell (2012) 
who evaluate the role of a specific news shocks, i.e. monetary policy news shocks. As well, 
Mertens & Ravn (2011) and Leeper et al. (2013), who examine the role of unanticipated 
fiscal/tax policy shocks.  
Table 5.5 
Log marginal data densities of different models  
Model Version Log Marginal 
Likelihood 
Baseline :  Model without any news component 1,590.05 
4 and 8 quarters ahead marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock 1.588.57 
4 and 8 quarters ahead monetary policy shock 1,577.18 
4 and 8 quarters ahead permanent technology shock  1,581.12 
The marginal data density is computed using the modified harmonic mean method proposed by Gweke 
(1999), based on 100,000 draws for each model after discarding the first 50,000 draws. 
 
Before evaluating the role of news shocks in the context of the Indonesian economy, one 
important criteria that ensures the alternative model (with news components) is better than the 
baseline model is the ability of the news shocks components to improve the empirical fit of 
the alternative model with the data. If incorporating the component of news shocks does not 
improve the empirical fit of the model in capturing the behaviour of empirical data, then there 
is no reason to evaluate the role of news shocks. For the purpose of evaluating the empirical 
fit of the model with the data, we need to compare the value of log marginal data densities 




Overall, the performance of the baseline model (i.e. model without news component) is 
superior to alternative models. For example, comparing the value of log marginal likelihood 
between the baseline model and a version of model with four and eight quarters ahead of MEI 
shock gives a log MDD difference of 1.37. This implies “slightly evidence” in favour of 
baseline model over the alternative model, i.e. a model with news component in MEI shocks. 
Our argument here follows Jeffries (1996) who advise that a log MDD difference in the range 
of [1.10, 2.30] means “slightly evidence” in favour of model 𝑖 over 𝑗. In terms of a Bayes 
Factor (BF), the range of log MDD difference within 1.10 to 2.30 is equivalent to a BF of 3 to 
10, i.e. [ln 3, ln10]. If a BF falls within 10 to 100 or a log MDD difference of [2.30, 4.61], 
then there is “strong to very strong evidence” that model 𝑖 is superior to model 𝑗. While if a 
BF is over 100 (a log MDD difference is over 4.61), then we can say that there is “decisive 
evidence” that model 𝑖 is better than model 𝑗. 
Comparing the value of marginal log likelihood between baseline model and a version of 
model with four and eight quarters ahead of monetary policy news shocks, we come to the 
conclusion that the baseline model is better than its alternative with a log MDD difference is 
equal to 12.75. This result implies that there is “decisive evidence” that baseline model is 
more powerful than its alternative in explaining the behaviour of empirical data. Finally, 
comparing the value of marginal log likelihood between baseline model and a version of 
model with four and eight quarters ahead of non-stationary technology news shocks, we can 
show there is “decisive evidence” that the baseline model is preferred with a log MDD 
difference of 8.82.  
In summary, the above result shows that a model without news shocks component is superior 
to a model with news shocks component under the proposed model’s specification. Why this 




First, the baseline model has sufficiently accommodated all relevant features that may be 
important for the empirical fit of the model to data. These include nominal and real rigidities, 
financial constraints, and monopolistic competition in domestic markets. As the result, the 
baseline model has performed quite well in capturing the behaviour of empirical data, for 
example: co-movement behaviour among aggregate variables, as discussed in the section of 
the impulse response function (IRF) earlier. Incorporating news shock component into the 
baseline model, to improve this co-movement behaviour, seems irrelevant. In fact, introducing 
news shocks component to baseline model has increased model’s complexity that reduces the 
value of log MDD.  
Secondly, the baseline model may have missed a specific feature that matters for the empirical 
fit of the model to data, as discussed in Gortz & Tsoukalas (2011) and Gortz & Tsoukalas 
(2013), among others. They can show that co-movement among aggregate variables can be 
improved and the role of technology news shock becomes matter if the feature of nominal 
price and wage rigidities are introduced to the model along with the feature of financial 
friction that links the financial markets and real activities. Their result is obtained under the 
framework of two sector NK model where financial intermediaries use deposit from 
households and their own equity to finance the acquisitions of physical capital by capital 
service producers, following Gertler & Karadi (2011) and Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010).  
Unfortunately, we are uncertain about the most valid argument between the above two. It 
might be useful to incorporate wage rigidness and other alternatives of modelling financial 
frictions. However, that is beyond the scope of this chapter as there are many different ways 
one could introduce financial frictions and it is not clear which mechanism would be the most 
appropriate. In order to keep the analysis simple and clear in terms of the focus on the effects 




we end the study of news shocks here and conclude that all results, under the model without 
news components, remains valid since incorporating news shocks component does not 
improve the empirical fit of the model to the Indonesian data. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to develop an otherwise version of DSGE model for Indonesia. The 
proposed model is established by combining some features used in a model with housing 
market and borrowing constraint of Iacovielo (2005), a small open economy model of Gali & 
Monacelli (2005), and a model with incomplete exchange rate pass-through as Monacelli 
(2005). We argue that all these features are important and relevant to the Indonesian economy 
characteristics.  
The proposed model is then estimated using a Bayesian technique. Our focus is on some deep 
parameters that explain about banks’ lending decisions, monetary policy’s objective, and the 
degree of economic dependency. With regards to banks’ lending decisions, the estimation 
result suggests that banks in Indonesia are likely to set higher ratio of down payment for 
households who have only housing assets in collateral than the ones who can show both her 
income and housing assets when applying for a housing loan. This happens as the wage 
income serves as an additional guarantor for banks. The estimation result also shows that 
banks put roughly higher attention on the wage income than housing assets in collateral. All 
these results are obtained by assuming each bank independently set their lending ratio without 
control from Bank Indonesia.     
Concerning the objective of monetary policy, the estimation result suggests that Bank 




implies price stabilisation is among their main targets. The estimation result also advises that 
BI policy rate is not only used for the purpose of price stabilisation but occasionally used to 
promote economy growth, especially when the economy experiences a down turn. This 
finding is interesting as most similar studies in developed countries suggest about unnecessary 
response of interest rate to output/economic growth. In regards to the issue of exchange rate 
stabilisation, it shows that policy rate is rarely used to stabilise the variability of exchange 
rate. This is in line with a theory that says a country that adopts Inflation Targeting 
Framework (ITF) should let its exchange rate in floating.     
As for the degree of economic dependency, the estimation result shows that the Indonesian 
economic dependency is not as high as predicted. This conclusion is obtained by evaluating 
the proportion of import goods in consumption goods bundle in which its share is less than 
10%. Although, not perfectly comparable, this result is line with the data reported by the 
Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistic in 2014 where the share of consumption goods in total 
import values is not more than 10% in Indonesia. 
The analysis is then extended by evaluating the source of business cycles fluctuation in 
Indonesia. Roughly, there are three main drivers of the Indonesian economy, i.e. non-
stationary permanent technology shock, monetary policy shock and marginal efficiency of 
investment (MEI) shock. The important role of non-stationary permanent technology shocks 
is in line with the study by Aguiar & Gopinath (2007) who argue that emerging market are 
usually characterised by fluctuation in trend growth rates that causes an innovation to trend 
growth rate as a source of business cycles fluctuation in emerging market. Meanwhile, a 
significant contribution of monetary policy shock to business cycle fluctuations follows a 
similar result found by Aspachs-Bracons & Rabanal (2010) for the case of Spain and Euro 




finding supports a claim of Justiano et al. (2010) who conclude that this particular shock is the 
most important driver of U.S business cycle fluctuations in the post-war period.  
The feature of housing market and financial constraint in the proposed model also allow us to 
identify the determinant of housing prices volatility. It can be shown that housing preference 
shock is the main disturbance of housing prices variation. This finding is in line with other 
similar studies in different countries, for example: the study of housing prices volatility in the 
US (see Iacoviello & Neri, 2008) and euro area (see Darracq-Parries & Notarpietro, 2008). 
Surprisingly, the contribution of monetary policy shock and loan to value (LTV) shock on the 
variability of housing prices is minimal that suggests a limitation of monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy in handling housing prices bubble in Indonesia. The estimation result 
also advices that CPI inflation variation is dominantly contributed by cost push shock, 
followed by non-stationary permanent technology shock and the world inflation shock. Note 
that the effect of world inflation disturbance is transmitted through the channel of import 
goods price that affects CPI inflation.  
Up to here, the model provides estimations that access the structural parameters of the 
economy. In addition, the model serves well in identifying the sources of business cycle 
fluctuation in Indonesia. Although, the assumption of the model seems realistic, still, it is 
subject to criticism. One of them is the feature of the exogenous shocks that is assumed to be 
unanticipated by agents. Motivated by this, we consider additional features that have been 
found to be important in earlier work, i.e. news shocks. We limit the analysis of news shock 
only on the disturbance of MEI, monetary policy and non-stationary permanent technology as 
they dominantly influence business cycles in Indonesia.  
The estimation result shows that introducing the feature of news shocks, regardless the way of 




non-stationary permanent technology does not improve the empirical fit of the model in 
capturing the behaviour of the data. This can be seen by comparing the value of log likelihood 
or log marginal data density (MDD) of different models. We can show that a model with news 
shocks component has lower value of MDD compared to the baseline model (a model where 
news shocks is absent). One possible explanation is the feature of news shock does not 
improve co-movement behaviour among aggregate variables, as argued by Jaimovich & 
Rebelo (2009).       
Our model describes the Indonesian economy well and results appear in line with the 
literature and economic intuition. However for a more detailed analysis of the indonesian 
economy the relevance of additional features may be considered. These features includes, but 
are not limited to, habit in consumption, wage stickiness and price indexation. Constructing a 
capital goods sector which is different than consumption goods sector also may improve the 
model’s environment. As well, allowing the capital goods to be traded internationally may 
improve the estimation result as under the current setting only consumption goods can be 
traded internationally. The assumption of a fix housing stock is also too strong, given a 
significant development of housing sector in Indonesia. Again, modelling a separate housing 
sector in the model may take the model closer with the reality. Describing the behaviour of 
commercial banks explicitly, as shown in Gerali et al. (2010), is also another potential 
extension to the current setting. In this way, we have flexibility in introducing other 
macroprudential instruments than the ratio of loan to value (LTV) or down payment (DP), for 
instance: monetary reserve requirement, minimum capital requirement, etc. However, this 






Appendix 5.1. Data and Sources 
 
 
Data Source Explanation 
Real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
The Indonesian Central Bureau of 
Statistic 
Based on 2010 = 100 
Real Consumption  The Indonesian Central Bureau of 
Statistic 
Based on 2010 = 100 
 
Real Investment  The Indonesian Central Bureau of 
Statistic 
Based on 2010 = 100 
Labour Force The Indonesian Central Bureau of 
Statistic 
 
Interest Rate  Bank Indonesia (BI)  
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate (NEER) 
Index  
Bank for International Settlements BIS effective exchange 
rate 
Monthly average :  
2010 = 100 
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate (REER) Index  
Bank for International Settlements BIS effective exchange 
rate 
Monthly average :  
2010 = 100 
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) 
Bank Indonesia (BI)  
(Statistics Indonesia) 
Based on 2002 = 100 
Housing prices Index 
(HPI) 
Bank Indonesia (BI)  
(Survey of Property Residential 
Price) 
Based on 2002 = 100 
Note : 
 
The item of housing prices is not included among 742 items of goods and services 
surveyed by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistic to measure consumer price index 
(CPI). So far, only the item of housing contract price is included in CPI basket in 
Indonesia.   
 
Survey of property residential price (SHPR) is a quarterly survey conducted by Bank 
Indonesia (BI) where its respondents are housing developers in some large cities in 
Indonesia. Currently, this survey covers 50 main housing developers in the city area of 
Jakarta, Bogor, Depok and Bekasi (Jabodebek) - Banten and 441 cities in the rest of 
Indonesia. The collected data includes price of housing in current quarter and the 
expectation of housing prices in the next quarter for three types of house, i.e. small (the 
size is less than 36 m2), medium (36-72 m2) and large (the size is larger than 70 m2). For 
aggregation, a weighted average method is used based on the weight of each city and the 





Appendix 5.2. Model Derivation 
 
A. Optimality Conditions 
 






























′ + 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐻,𝑡 
 with 𝑋𝑡 =
𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑤           5A.2 
(1 − 𝜒)𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1𝐻𝑡π𝐶,𝑡+1)𝑒
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉
= 𝑅𝑡𝐵𝑡      5A.3 
𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾
𝐼𝐾,𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐾)𝐾𝑡−1       5A.4 


















𝐻𝑡−1       5A.7 
 









































































= Ω𝐶,𝑡          5A.8 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐵𝑡




) = 0  
 Ω𝐶,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (
Ω𝐶,𝑡+1
Π𝐶,𝑡+1








































































− 𝛿𝑘)) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (Ω𝐶,𝑡+1 [
𝜇𝑌𝑡+1𝑃𝑌,𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝐶,𝑡+1

























+ Ω𝐾,𝑡) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (Ω𝐶,𝑡+1 [
𝜇𝑌𝑡+1𝑃𝑌,𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝐶,𝑡+1





) + Ω𝐾,𝑡+1Ω̌𝐾,𝑡+1]) 
           
          5A.12 






















− 𝛿𝐻)) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (Ω𝐶,𝑡+1 [
𝑣𝑌𝑡+1𝑃𝑌,𝑡+1
𝐻𝑡𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝐶,𝑡+1















− 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻))]) + (1 −
𝜒) 𝑡𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1π𝐶,𝑡+1]𝑒
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉




Ω𝐶,𝑡(𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + Ω𝐻,𝑡) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (Ω𝐶,𝑡+1 [
𝑣𝑌𝑡+1𝑃𝑌,𝑡+1
𝐻𝑡𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝐶,𝑡+1
+ (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 +
Ω𝐻,𝑡+1Ω̌𝐻,𝑡+1]) + (1 − 𝜒) 𝑡𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1π𝐶,𝑡+1)𝑒
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉



































′ + 𝐹𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡











′   
           5A.14 
 𝐼𝐻,𝑡
′ = 𝐻𝑡
′ − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐻𝑡−1












′       5A.16 
 





















′ + 𝐹𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
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′ − 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻))])   
ΩC,t
′ (𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + ΩH,t









′ [(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 +
ΩH,t+1
′ Ω̌H,t+1













































′′     5A.22 
 𝐼𝐻,𝑡
′′ = 𝐻𝑡
′′ − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐻𝑡−1












′′       5A.24 
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ΩC,t
′′ (𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + ΩH,t









′′ [(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 +
ΩH,t+1
′′ Ω̌H,t+1





















′′ + 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻) 
 
Retailers 
An implicit cost of adjusting nominal price is assumed. As well, a monopolistic competition 
at retail price is introduced, following Bernanke et al. (1999). Given these features, a 
continuum of retailers of mass 1, indexed by 𝑧, buy intermediate goods 𝑌𝑡 from entrepreneurs 
at 𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑤  in a competitive market, differentiate the goods at no cost into 𝑌𝑡(𝑧) and sell 𝑌𝑡(𝑧) at 
















𝑟 > 1 denotes the time-varying mark up over 
marginal cost in domestic economy. 
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  ∀𝑧       5A.32 
Each retailer chooses a sale price 𝑃𝑌,𝑡(𝑧), taking 𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑤  curve as given. The sale price can be 
changed in every period only with probability 1 − . When a price is allowed to change, 





















 and the constraints that all demand 
be satisfied at the chosen price. 
Profits are discounted by 𝑠 - step ahead stochastic discount factor 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 and by the probability 








) 𝑌𝑡+𝑠(𝑧)  











𝑌𝑡+𝑠       5A.33 
where 𝐸𝑡𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1𝒬𝑡+1,𝑡+2… 𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 and 𝐸𝑡𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡+𝑠−1𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 are 
employed. It is assumed that 𝑌𝑡
𝑓
= 𝑌𝑡, following Iacoviello (2005).  
 
Unconstrained maximisation problem can be written as:  














































)] 𝑌𝑡+𝑠  
The chosen price 𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤(𝑧) is allowed to be written as 𝑃𝑌,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 because retailers share the same 
production technology and price takers.  



























































































































   5A.35 
 
Intertemporal Allocation 
It is assumed a bundle of goods consumed by retailers and households consist of domestic and 
import (foreign) goods. The way of how these two goods are bundled, by the bundlers, 
follows a Dixit-Stieglitz aggregator as shown below: 











    5A.36 
where 
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       5A.39 
The goods consumed range from 𝑗 = 0…1 in which 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗) represents domestic consumption 
goods and 𝐶𝐹,𝑡(𝑗) corresponds to import consumption goods. The composite of import 
consumption goods consists of consumption goods from all foreign country 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] while 
the composite of domestic consumption goods consist of differentiated goods 𝑧 ∈ [0,1]  that 
produced domestically. The definition of 𝐶𝑖,𝑡(𝑗) is analogues to 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗) but it corresponds to a 
specific country 𝑖. As mentioned earlier, parameter 𝑡
𝑟 corresponds to time-varying markup 
over marginal cost in the domestic country and foreign country 𝑖 (assumed to be the same), 
while  is the elasticity of substitution between import goods from different foreign 
countries 𝑖. 
Domestic consumption goods bundlers help consumers (i.e. households and entrepreneurs) to 
find the best allocation of specific domestic goods. For that purpose, they minimise the 




ℒ ≡ 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∫ 𝑃𝑌,𝑡(𝑧)
1
0











where for simplicity, it is assumed that the price of domestic consumption goods 𝑧 is equal to 
producer price of goods 𝑧. From optimality condition, we obtain  
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑧,𝑗)












] = 0  










𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗)      5A.40 
Solving for 𝜑𝑡, 



































≡ 𝑃𝑌,𝑡  










𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗)      5A.41 
where 𝑃𝑌,𝑡 is defined as the price index of domestic consumption goods which is assumed to 
be equal to producer price index (PPI) in domestic country, for simplicity.   
Similarly, we can obtain 
















𝐶𝐹,𝑡(𝑗)       5A.43 



















  define as producer price 
index (PPI) in foreign country 𝑖 and aggregate price index for import consumption goods, 
respectively. 
In similar fashion, final consumption good bundlers help consumers to find the best allocation 
of domestic and import goods. These firms purchase domestic and import goods, combine 





They maximise their profit in perfectly competitive market as follows:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 Π ≡𝑃𝐶,𝑡𝐶𝑡 − 𝑃𝑌,𝑡𝐶𝐷,𝑡 − 𝑃𝐹,𝑡𝐶𝐹,𝑡   ∀ cohort 𝑗 











     












𝐶𝑡(𝑗))    
First order condition with respect to domestic and import goods consumption gives: 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗)































𝐶𝑡(𝑗)      5A.44 
Similarly, we can obtain  





𝐶𝑡(𝑗)       5A.45 
Solving for 𝜙𝑡, 
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] 𝐶𝑡(𝑗)  





1−𝜛 ≡ 𝑃𝐶,𝑡     5A.46 
 
We can re-write equation (5A.44) and (5A.45) as: 














𝐶𝑡(𝑗)       5A.48 
where 𝑃𝐶,𝑡 is defined as consumer price index (CPI) in domestic country (or country 𝑖 from 
the view of foreign country). 
 
Definitions and Identities 
Term of Trade 
The bilateral terms of trade between the domestic country and foreign country 𝑖 represents the 
price of country 𝑖’s goods in terms of domestic goods. This relation is defined by  
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝑌,𝑡⁄          5A.49 
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Incomplete Pass-Through and Import Goods Inflation 





         5A.51 
Yet, in the model’s environment, it is assumed that the Law of One Price (LOOP) fails to 
hold, following Monacelli (2005). This is a realistic assumption as the price of goods in 
domestic country and in country 𝑖 are not necessarily the same although the component of 
exchange rate has been taken into consideration. A possible argument for this condition is the 
existence of nominal rigidities in the price of import goods. Thus, similar to retailers, we 
allow importing firms to change their price only when they receive a random price change 
signal (the Calvo staggered contract in price setting).  
With probability 1 − 𝐹 , importing firms can choose its prices optimally by maximising the 








) 𝐶𝐹,𝑡+𝑠(𝑖)     5A.52 










where 𝐸𝑡𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1𝒬𝑡+1,𝑡+2… 𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 and 𝐸𝑡𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡+𝑠−1𝒬𝑡+𝑠−1,𝑡+𝑠 are 
employed. 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
∗ (𝑖) is the foreign currency price of the imported goods (from country 𝑖), 𝐹
𝑠 is the 
probability that the price 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤(𝑖) set for goods from country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 still holds 𝑠 periods 
ahead and 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 is the relevant stochastic discount factor. Notice that, in general 
𝑠 ≠ 𝐹
𝑠. 
The unconstrained optimisation problem is given by: 
































)] 𝐶𝐹,𝑡+𝑠  
We are allowed to write 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 instead of 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤(𝑖) because all importing firms share the same 
production technology and price takers.  
The optimal price decision is, 
𝜕𝑉
𝑃𝐹,𝑡











































)] 𝐶𝐹,𝑡+𝑠 = 0  
where the last equation can be obtained by multiplying it with 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 in both terms inside the 
bracket. 
Therefore, the optimal re-set price 𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 solves: 












)𝐶𝐹,𝑡+𝑠   5A.53  
As a fraction 𝐹  of prices stays unchanged, the aggregate index of import price evolves 
according to:  
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = [ 𝐹𝑃𝐹,𝑡−1
1−





    5A.54 
 
International Risk Sharing  
For simplicity, it is assumed that only savers (i.e. patient households) have accessed to foreign 










′ ) = 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1. 
This characteristic also applies for each foreign country 𝑖. Taking into account the exchange 












) = 𝒬𝑡,𝑡+1.      5A.55 






































𝑖      5A.56 




























𝑖 = Υ = Υ𝑖 = 1 5A.57 
The last part is the initial consumption ratio, which is assumed to be identical for each country 
(symmetric initial condition). Let this ratio equal to 1.  





















′𝑖𝔈𝑖,𝑡  ∀𝑡           5A.58 
 
Equilibrium and Market Clearing 
Aggregate Output  






















′′)(1−𝜎)(1−𝜇−𝜈)  ∀𝑧 









′′)(1−𝜎)(1−𝜇−𝜈)   5A.59 













  is the measure of price dispersion which can be shown (see 
Woodford, 2003) to follow AR(1) process given by: 

































∆𝑡−1     5A.60 
 
Aggregate Profits  











𝑌𝑡(𝑧) 𝑑𝑧  
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Thus, we can obtain the aggregate profit in real term as follows: 














The total output of domestic firms is equal to domestic consumption and foreign consumption 
(or export) plus capital investment and the cost of changing capital and housing.  




+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡(𝑧)  
where  
?̆?𝐷,𝑡(𝑧) = 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐶𝐷,𝑡
′ (𝑧) + 𝐶𝐷,𝑡
′′ (𝑧)  
We follow Gali (2003) in assuming that government purchases a time-varying fraction 𝑡 of 
output of each good 𝑧, financed by lump sum taxation. Consequently, aggregate goods market 
clearing for each good 𝑧 requires: 




+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡(𝑧)   
where −𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝑡) = 𝑔𝑡 

























𝐼𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡(𝑧)     




































𝐼𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡(𝑧)    
Using the assumption of symmetric preferences across countries, we have: 



































𝐼𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡(𝑧)    


































) [𝐼𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡(𝑧) + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡(𝑧)]  



























































           






























































= 1     


























𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡     





















+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡   


















+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡   
As  𝑆𝑡 =
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑃𝑌,𝑡






;      𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑌,𝑡











with 𝑆𝑡 is the effective term of trade of home country. 𝑆𝑡
𝑖 is the effective terms of trade of 
country 𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is bilateral terms of trade between home economy and country 𝑖. 


















.   











+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡  
           5A.62 











Total consumption, housing investment, domestic bonds, housing adjustment cost, and 
housing supply are defined as the followings:  
?̆?𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝑡
′′        5A.64 
𝐼𝐻,𝑡 = 𝐼𝐻,𝑡 + 𝐼𝐻,𝑡
′ + 𝐼𝐻,𝑡
′′        5A.65 
?̆?𝐻,𝑡 = 𝐴𝐻,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐻,𝑡
′ + 𝐴𝐻,𝑡
′′        5A.66 
0 = 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡
′ + 𝐵𝑡
′′        5A.67 
?̆?𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡 + 𝐻𝑡
′ + 𝐻𝑡
′′ ≡ 1       5A.68 
 
 
B.  Steady State 
𝑆 = ?̆? = 𝔈 = 𝑟 = 𝐴 = 𝑧 = 𝑔 = 𝜋𝐶 = 𝜋𝑌 = 𝑌
∗ = 𝜋∗ ≡ 1    5B.1 
𝐵∗ = 0          5B.2 
 




= 1 ⟺ 𝑃𝐹 = 𝑃𝑌        5B.3 
 
Given (5A.46)  




1−𝜛 ⇔ 𝑃𝑌 = 𝑃𝐶 = 𝑃𝐹    5B.4 
 




           5B.5 
 
Given (5A.9)   
Ω𝐶 = 𝛽 (
Ω𝐶
Π𝐶
)𝑅 + 𝑅 ⟺ =
𝛽′−𝛽
𝐶






Given (5A.61)  






⇔ 𝐹 = (1 −
1
𝑋
)𝑌       5B.7 
 
Given (5A.28)   
ΩC




)𝑅 + ′′𝑅 ⟺ ′′ =
𝛽′−𝛽′′
𝐶′′
      5B.8 
 
Given (5A.4), (5A.5), (5A.15) and (5A.23)  
𝐼𝐾 = 𝛿𝐾𝐾           5B.9 
𝐼𝐻 = 𝛿𝐻𝐻          5B.10 
𝐼𝐻
′ = 𝛿𝐻𝐻
′           5B.11 
𝐼𝐻
′′ = 𝛿𝐻𝐻
′′          5B.12 
 
Given (5A.12)  
Ω𝐶(1 + Ω𝐾) = 𝛽Ω𝐶 (
𝜇𝑌𝑃𝑌
𝐾𝑋𝑃𝐶
+ (1 − 𝛿𝐾) + Ω𝐾Ω̌𝐾)   
where:  Ω𝐶 =
1
𝐶






− 𝛿𝑘) = 0  
1 = 𝛽 (
𝜇𝑌𝑃𝑌
𝐾𝑋𝑃𝐶
+ (1 − 𝛿𝐾)) ⟺ 1 = 𝛽 (
𝜇𝑌
𝐾𝑋




𝑌 ≔ 𝜙1𝑌        5B.13 
 
Given (5A.13)   
Ω𝐶(𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ + Ω𝐻) = 𝛽Ω𝐶 (
𝑣𝑌𝑃𝑌
𝐻𝑋𝑃𝐶














𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ = 𝛽 (
𝑣𝑌𝑃𝑌
𝐻𝑋𝑃𝐶
+ (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ) + (1 − 𝜒)(𝛽













     5B.14 
      
Given (5A.21)   
ΩC





′ [(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ + ΩH
′ Ω̌H

















+ 𝛽′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄   



















′′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ + ΩH
′′Ω̌H





















+ 𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ + (1 − 𝜒









    5B.16 
 
Given (5A.3) 
(1 − 𝜒)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻 = 𝑅𝐵 ⟺ 𝐵 = (1 − 𝜒)𝛽
′𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻  
𝐵 = (1 − 𝜒)𝛽′𝜙2𝑌           5B.17 
 















𝑌          5B.18 













































𝐿′′ + 𝐼𝐾 + 𝐴𝐾 + 𝐴𝐻   
where:  𝐼𝐾 = 𝛿𝐾𝐾; 𝑃𝑌 = 𝑃𝐶; and 𝐴𝐾 = 𝐴𝐻 = 0  
𝑌
𝑋









𝐿′′ + 𝛿𝐾𝐾   
𝑌
𝑋













− [(1 − 𝜒)(1 − 𝛽′) + 𝛿𝐻]𝜙2 − 𝛿𝐾𝜙1} 𝑌 ≔ 𝜙5𝑌   5B.21 
 
Given (5A.25) 
[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻
′′ + [ 𝑏]
𝑊′′
𝑃𝐶
𝐿′′ = 𝑅𝐵′′ 
𝐵′′ = 𝛽′ {[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻




𝐵′′ = 𝛽′ {[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝜙4
𝐶′′
𝑌











′′    
where:  𝐴𝐻







)𝛽′ {(1 − 𝜒′′)[1 − 𝑏]𝜙4
𝐶′′
𝑌
+ 𝑏𝑠′′} 𝑌 + 𝑠′′𝑌 = 𝐶′′ +𝜙4𝛿𝐻𝐶
′′  
(1 + 𝜙4𝛿𝐻 − (𝛽
′ − 1)(1 − 𝜒′′)[1 − 𝑏]𝜙4)𝐶




) 𝑌 ≔ 𝜙6𝑌      5B.23 
 
Given (5A.67)      
0 = 𝐵 + 𝐵′ + 𝐵′′ ⟺𝐵′ = −(𝐵 + 𝐵′′)        
𝐵′ = −{(1 − 𝜒)𝛽′𝜙2𝑌 + 𝛽
′ [(1 − 𝜒′′)[1 − 𝑏]𝜙4
𝐶′′
𝑌
+ 𝑏𝑠′′] 𝑌}  
𝐵′ = −𝛽′{(1 − 𝜒)𝜙2 + [(1 − 𝜒
′′)[1 − 𝑏]𝜙4𝜙6 +
𝑏𝑠′′]}𝑌   5B.24 
 
Given (5A.14) 
𝐵′ + 𝔼𝐵∗ +
𝑊′
𝑃𝐶














𝐿′ + 𝐹) + (1 −
1
𝛽′





𝐿′ + 𝐹) − (
𝛽′−1
𝛽′
)𝛽′{(1 − 𝜒)𝜙2 + [(1 − 𝜒
′′)[1 − 𝑏]𝜙4𝜙6 +
𝑏𝑠′′]}𝑌 − 𝛿𝐻𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻
′  
(1 + 𝛿𝐻𝜙3)𝐶
′ = (𝑠′ + (1 − 𝛽′){(1 − 𝜒)𝜙2 + [(1 − 𝜒





(𝑠′ + (1 − 𝛽′){(1 − 𝜒)𝜙2 + [(1 − 𝜒
′′)[1 − 𝑏]𝜙4𝜙6 +
𝑏𝑠′′]}) ≔ 𝜙7𝑌   
            
           5B.25 
 
Given (5A.68) 
?̌? = 1 − 𝐻′ − 𝐻′′   
Recall: 
















































          5B.28 
 
Given (5A.64) 
?̆? = 𝐶 + 𝐶′ + 𝐶′′           
?̆?
𝑌
= 𝜙5 + 𝜙7 + 𝜙6         5B.29 












       5B.30 
 
Given (5A.62) 
𝑌 = ?̆? + 𝐼 + 𝐺          5B.31 
 
C. Stationarisation and Log-Linearisation  
Since some variables in the model are non-stationary, we stationarise the model following 
Justiano et al. (2009). All variables are then log-linearised around their steady state and 



































𝜇𝐻𝜈𝐿′𝜎(1−𝜇−𝜈)𝐿′′(1−𝜎)(1−𝜇−𝜈){𝛬𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡−1 + (?̃?𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝑡) + ℎ̃𝑡−1 +
𝑣(?̃?𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝑡) + 𝜎(1 − − )𝑙𝑡
′ + (1 − 𝜎)(1 − − )𝑙𝑡
′′}  
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝛬𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡−1 + ℎ̃𝑡−1 + 𝜎(1 − − )𝑙𝑡
′ + (1 − 𝜎)(1 − − )𝑙𝑡
′′ − [ + 𝑣]𝑧𝑡 
            













′ − 𝑝𝐶) = 𝐶
′(𝐿′) −1{?̃?𝑡
′ + ( − 1)𝑙𝑡
′} 
?̃?𝑡
′ − 𝑝𝐶 = ?̃?𝑡
′ + ( − 1)𝑙𝑡

















1−𝜛, we can approach it as 𝑃𝐶,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑌,𝑡
1−𝛼𝑃𝐹,𝑡


























′ − 𝑝𝐶) =
𝜎(1−𝜇−𝑣)𝑌
𝑋𝐿′
𝑆−𝛼(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡)  
?̃?𝑡
′ − 𝑝𝐶 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡        5C.3 
Combining (5C.2) and (5C.3) yields 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡
′ + ?̃?𝑡






























′′ − 𝑝𝐶) = 𝐶
′′(𝐿′′) −1{?̃?𝑡




}   
(1 + 𝑏 ′′𝐶′′)?̃?𝑡
′′ + 𝑏 ′′𝐶′′ ̃𝑡
′′ − (1 + 𝑏 ′′𝐶′′)?̃?𝐶 − ?̃?𝑡












[1 + 𝑏(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′)]?̃?𝑡
′′ + [ 𝑏(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′)] ̃𝑡
′′ − [1 + 𝑏(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′)]?̃?𝐶 − ?̃?𝑡
′′ = [1 +
𝑏(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′)]( − 1)𝑙𝑡
′′ + [ 𝑏(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′)]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
   
Define  𝑏(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′) ≡ 𝑚𝑏  
(1 + 𝑚𝑏)(?̃?𝑡
′′ − 𝑝𝐶) + 𝑚𝑏 ̃𝑡
′′ − ?̃?𝑡
′′ = (1 +𝑚𝑏)( − 1)𝑙𝑡
′′ +𝑚𝑏ℰ𝑡
𝛽

























′′ − 𝑝𝐶,𝑡) =
(1 − 𝜎)(1 − − 𝑣)𝑌
𝑋𝐿′′
𝑆−𝛼(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) 
?̃?𝑡
′′ − 𝑝𝐶,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡      5C.6 
Combining (5A.5) and (5A.6) yields 
(1 + 𝑚𝑏)(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) + 𝑚𝑏 ̃𝑡
′′ − ?̃?𝑡
















+ Ω𝐾,𝑡) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (Ω𝐶,𝑡+1 [
𝜇𝑌𝑡+1𝑃𝑌,𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝐶,𝑡+1





) + Ω𝐾,𝑡+1Ω̌𝐾,𝑡+1])   



































































] + 𝛿𝐾) + (1 − 𝛿𝐾)]])    
Log-linearisation (LL): 
LHS 














+ ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡ℰ𝑡+1











(?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑡 −











2(?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 +















) − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾) (
𝜓𝐾
𝛿𝐾




)    
?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + [1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾)](𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + 𝛽𝜓𝐾(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡) +
(𝜌𝛽 − 1)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾)𝐸𝑡ℰ𝑡+1
𝐼𝐾 − [𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾) − 𝛽𝜓𝐾]𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡   
Combine LHS and RHS 
𝜓𝐾(𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡−1) − ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾 = ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + [1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾)](𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 −
𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + 𝛽𝜓𝐾(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡) + (𝜌𝛽 − 1)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾)𝐸𝑡ℰ𝑡+1





𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝛽(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡) +
1−𝛽(1−𝛿𝐾)
𝜓𝐾
(𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) +
1
𝜓𝐾








[1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾)𝜌𝑞]ℰ𝑡








Ω𝐶,𝑡(𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + Ω𝐻,𝑡) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (Ω𝐶,𝑡+1 [
𝑣𝑌𝑡+1𝑃𝑌,𝑡+1
𝐻𝑡𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝐶,𝑡+1
+ (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + Ω𝐻,𝑡+1Ω̌𝐻,𝑡+1] +
(1 − 𝜒) 𝑡𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1π𝐶,𝑡+1]𝑒
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉













+ 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻) 
Stationarisation: 













































] + 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻)]] +
(1 − 𝜒) (
𝐶𝑡
𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝛽) 𝑡𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1π𝐶,𝑡+1𝑒
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉
)      
Log-linearisation (LL): 
LHS 








) + 𝛽(1 −






















































) + (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 𝑃𝐻/𝐶( ̃𝑡 +
𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 + ?̃?𝑡 − ℰ𝑡
𝛽
)     
𝑃𝐻/𝐶{[1 − (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 ](?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) − 𝛽(1 −
𝛿𝐻)(𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝜓𝐻(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡) +
(1 − 𝜒)𝐶 ( ̃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 + ?̃?𝑡) + [(1 − (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 )𝜌𝛽 − 1]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
−
[𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝛽𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡}    
Combine LHS and RHS 
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + 𝜓𝐻(𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑡) = [1 − (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 ](?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡 −
𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 +
𝛽𝜓𝐻(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡) + (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 ( ̃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 + ?̃?𝑡) + [(1 −
(1 − 𝜒)𝐶 )𝜌𝛽 − 1]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− [𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝛽𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡  
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = [𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 ]𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + [1 − (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻)](𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 −
𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜓𝐻  [𝛽(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡) − (𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1)] +
(1 − 𝜒)𝐶 ( ̃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + [(1 − (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 )𝜌𝛽 − 1]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− ([𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) −
𝛽𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 + 𝜓𝐻)𝑧𝑡  
Recall 
(1 − 𝜒)𝐶 = (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 (
𝛽′−𝛽
𝐶
) = (1 − 𝜒)(𝛽′ − 𝛽) ≡ 𝑚𝑒  
𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝜒)𝐶 = 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + 𝑚𝑒 ≡ 𝛾𝑒  
Therefore 
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑒𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + [1 − 𝛾𝑒](𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + 𝑚𝑒( ̃𝑡 +
𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + (
𝜓𝐻
𝛿𝐻
) [𝛽(𝐸𝑡ℎ̃𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡) − (ℎ̃𝑡 −
ℎ̃𝑡−1)] + [(1 − 𝑚𝑒)𝜌𝛽 − 1]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− ([𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝛽𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 + 𝜓𝐻)𝑧𝑡    
          5C.9 
where:  
ℎ̃𝑡 = 𝛿𝐻𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿𝐻)ℎ̃𝑡−1 ⟹ 𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡 =
1
𝛿𝐻
(ℎ̃𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)ℎ̃𝑡−1)     






− 1) ℎ̃𝑡−1 − ℎ̃𝑡−1 ⟹
1
𝛿𝐻
(ℎ̃𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1)     
𝜓𝐻(𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1) = (
𝜓𝐻
𝛿𝐻






′ [𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + ΩH,t









′ [(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ΩH,t+1
′ Ω̌H,t+1

















′ + 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻)   
Stationarisation: 

















































] + 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻)]))       
Log-linearisation (LL): 
LHS 
𝑃𝐻/𝐶{𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + 𝜓𝐻(𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡
′ + 𝑧𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1







′) + 𝛽′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ (?̃?𝑡
′ − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1



















′ + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 2𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡+1
′ − 2ℎ̃𝑡






































) 𝛿𝐻𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ (?̃?𝑡
′ − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1








′) − 𝛽′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(ℰ𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
′ − ℎ̃𝑡




′) − 𝛽′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡 + 𝛽
′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(𝜌𝛽 − 1)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
}       
Combine LHS and RHS 
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + 𝜓𝐻(𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡
′ + 𝑧𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1
′ ) = (ℰ𝑡
𝐻 + ?̃?𝑡
′ − ℎ̃𝑡




𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶,𝑡+1⁄ ) + 𝛽
′𝜓𝐻(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡+1
′ − ℎ̃𝑡
′) − 𝛽′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡 + 𝛽
′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(𝜌𝛽 − 1)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
       
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛽











′ ) − 𝛽′(𝐸𝑡ℎ̃𝑡+1
′ − ℎ̃𝑡
′)} + 𝛽′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(𝜌𝛽 − 1)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
−













′ − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)ℎ̃𝑡−1

















′ )   
𝜓𝐻(𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡
′ − ℎ̃𝑡−1





















′′      
𝐶𝑡
′′ + 𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡(𝐻𝑡





















′′    
Stationarisation: 
?̂?𝑡
′′ + 𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 (?̂?𝑡














































′′) + 𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻
′′(𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + ℎ̃𝑡
′′) − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻
′′(𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + ℎ̃𝑡−1





































































= 𝑆′′𝑌  and  ?̃?𝑡
′′ + ?̃?𝑡




























𝛿𝐻𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 − 𝑆







] 𝑧𝑡  5C.11 
         
From (5A.29) 
ΩC,t
′′ (𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + ΩH,t









′′ [(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ΩH,t+1
′′ Ω̌H,t+1
′′ ]) +





















′′ + 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻) 
Stationarisation: 


















































] + 𝛿𝐻) + (1 − 𝛿𝐻)]]) +












𝑃𝐻/𝐶 (𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + 𝜓𝐻(𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡
′′ − ℎ̃𝑡−1







′′) + 𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ (?̃?𝑡
′′ − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1



















′′ + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 2𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡+1
′′ − 2ℎ̃𝑡
′′ +


































) − 𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻) (
𝜓𝐻
𝛿𝐻
) 𝛿𝐻𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ (?̃?𝑡
′′ − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1





[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ (?̃?𝑡
′′ + ̃𝑡
′′ + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 − ℰ𝑡
𝛽







′′) − 𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(ℰ𝑡
𝐻 + ?̃?𝑡
′′ − ℎ̃𝑡














′′) + [1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′(?̃?𝑡
′′ + ̃𝑡




𝛽′′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡}  
Combine LHS and RHS 
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + 𝜓𝐻(𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡
′′ − ℎ̃𝑡−1
′′ + 𝑧𝑡) = (ℰ𝑡
𝐻 + ?̃?𝑡
′′ − ℎ̃𝑡




𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1) − [1 −
𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′ (ℰ𝑡
𝐻 + ?̃?𝑡
′′ − ℎ̃𝑡









′′) + [1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′(?̃?𝑡
′′ + ̃𝑡
′′ + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 +
𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 − ℰ𝑡
𝛽
) − 𝛽′′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡   
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = [𝛽
′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + [1 −
𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′]𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + [1 − 𝛽
′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻) −







′′ )} + ?̃?𝑡
′′ −
𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
′′ + [1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′( ̃𝑡
′′ + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉) − [𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(1 −
𝜌𝛽) + [1 −
𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− (𝛽′′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 + 𝜓𝐻)𝑧𝑡  
Recall 
[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′ = [1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ (
𝛽′−𝛽′′
𝐶′′
) = [1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′) ≡
𝑚ℎ  
𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + [1 −
𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝐶′′ ′′ = 𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + 𝑚ℎ ≡ 𝛾ℎ  
Therefore: 
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛾ℎ𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛾ℎ)(ℰ𝑡
𝐻 − ℎ̃𝑡
′′) + 𝑚ℎ( ̃𝑡











′′ )} − [𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(1 −
𝜌𝛽) + 𝑚ℎ]ℰ𝑡
𝛽










′′ − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)ℎ̃𝑡−1

















′′ )    
𝜓𝐻(𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡
′′ − ℎ̃𝑡−1






















































































































𝑆−𝛼(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) + 𝐵?̃?𝑡 = 𝐶?̃?𝑡 + 𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻(𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 + ℎ̃𝑡) − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻(𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 +
ℎ̃𝑡−1 + ?̃?𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝑡) +
𝑅𝐵
𝜋𝐶
















(2𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡−1 + ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡−1) − 𝜓𝐾𝐼𝐾(𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡) +
𝜓𝐾
2






(2𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1 + ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡−1) − 𝜓𝐻𝐼𝐻𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ (𝑖̃𝐻,𝑡) +
𝜓𝐻𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄
2




𝐿′ = 𝑆′𝑌 − 𝐹 = (𝑆′ − (1 −
1
𝑋
))𝑌    
𝑊′′
𝑃𝐶
𝐿′′ = 𝑆′′𝑌  
?̃?𝑡
′ + ?̃?𝑡
′ − 𝑝𝐶,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡
′′ + ?̃?𝑡




(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) + 𝐵?̃?𝑡 = 𝐶?̃?𝑡 + 𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻(ℎ̃𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)ℎ̃𝑡−1) + 𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻(𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 −








))𝑌(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) + 𝑆


















(?̃?𝑡−1 + ?̃?𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝐶,𝑡) −
(1 − 𝑆′ − 𝑆′′)(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) +
𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻
𝑌






] 𝑧𝑡  
 5C.13 
From (5A.9) 
Ω𝐶,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (
Ω𝐶,𝑡+1
Π𝐶,𝑡+1






























− ?̃?𝑡) = 𝛽 (
𝑅
𝐶
) (?̃?𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡ℰ𝑡+1
𝛽
− 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + ̂𝑅( ̃𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡)  
𝛽′?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − (𝛽
′ − 𝛽) ̃𝑡 − 𝛽















































′) = 𝛽′ (
𝑅
𝐶′
) (?̃?𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡ℰ𝑡+1
𝛽
− 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
′ + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1)  
?̃?𝑡
′ = 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
′ − (?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1) + (1 − 𝜌𝛽)ℰ𝑡
𝛽





























































− 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1




∗ − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1) + (1 − 𝜌𝛽)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− Δ𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡   5C.16 
Combining (5C.15) and (5C.16), we have the following uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) 
condition: 
?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡

















































) (?̃?𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡ℰ𝑡+1
𝛽
− 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
′′ + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) +
′′𝑅( ̃𝑡
′′ + ?̃?𝑡)  
𝛽′?̃?𝑡
′′ = 𝛽′′𝐸𝑡 ?̃?𝑡+1
′′ − (𝛽′ − 𝛽′′) ̃𝑡






           5C.18 
 
From (5A.3) 
(1 − 𝜒)𝐻𝑡𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1π𝐶,𝑡+1]𝑒
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉
= 𝑅𝑡𝐵𝑡    
Log-linearisation (LL): 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝜒)(𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ℎ̃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡

















[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻
′′(𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶,𝑡+1⁄ + ℎ̃𝑡
′′ + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡








′′)        
[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝜙4𝜙6(𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶,𝑡+1⁄ + ℎ̃𝑡
′′ + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡









) (?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡
′′)         5C.20 
Combine (5C.7) with (5C.20) 
[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝜙4𝜙6(𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶,𝑡+1⁄ + ℎ̃𝑡
′′ + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡







) (?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡
′′)        5C.21 
 
From (5A.4)  
𝑒ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾




𝐼𝐾,𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐾)?̂?𝑡−1 [
𝐴𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡





(?̃?𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐾)(?̃?𝑡−1 − 𝑧𝑡)) − ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾    5C.22 
 
From (5A.68) 
?̆?𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡 + 𝐻𝑡
′ + 𝐻𝑡
′′ ≡ 1   
 
Log-linearisation (LL): 
0 = 𝐻ℎ̃𝑡 + 𝐻
′ℎ̃𝑡
′ + 𝐻′′ℎ̃𝑡











?̃?𝑡 = 𝑝𝐹,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡 ⟺ Δ?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝐹,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑌,𝑡     5C.24 
   
From (5A.46) 










1−𝜛(1 − 𝜛)𝑝𝐶,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑃𝑌
1−𝜛(1 − 𝜛)?̃?𝑌,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑃𝐹
1−𝜛(1 − 𝜛)𝑝𝐹,𝑡 
𝑝𝐶,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝑌,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝𝐹,𝑡 ⟺ ?̃?𝐶,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)π̃𝑌,𝑡 + 𝛼π̃𝐹,𝑡    5C.25 
Substituting (5C.24) into (5C.25) for  𝑝𝐹,𝑡 yields: 









?̃?𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝐶,𝑡 
?̃?𝑡 = ∫ ?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0





?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝐶,𝑡        5C.27 
To link the term trade and the real exchange rate, we combine (5C.24) and (5C.25) to get 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ − ((1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑌,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝𝐹,𝑡)   
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜓𝐹 + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝑡        5C.28 
where  Δ𝜓𝐹,𝑡 = Δ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡

















)𝐶𝐹,𝑡+𝑠    















∗ − 𝑝𝐹,𝑡+𝑠) 
𝑝𝐹,𝑡








Following Monacelli (2005), the above optimality condition can be linked with LOOP gap 
𝜓𝐹,𝑡 by treating the rest of the world as an (approximately) closed economy (with goods 
produced in the small economy representing a negligible fraction of the world consumption 




∗, for all 𝑡. Therefore, an equivalent between 
producer price index (CPI) and consumer price index (CPI) inflation holds in the world 
economy.   
Using the above assumption, we can replace 𝑝𝐹,𝑡+𝑠
∗  by 𝑝𝑡+𝑠
∗  such that we have the following 
relation: 
𝑝𝐹,𝑡







The last equation can be cast in the recursive form.  
𝑝𝐹,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽′ 𝐹)(?̃?𝐹,𝑡 + 𝜓𝐹,𝑡) + 𝛽
′
𝐹𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐹,𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑤      5C.29 
 
From (5A.54) 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = [ 𝐹𝑃𝐹,𝑡−1
1−











) 𝑝𝐹,𝑡 − (
𝐹
1− 𝐹
) 𝑝𝐹,𝑡−1      5C.30 
Substituting RHS of (5C.30) for 𝑝𝐹,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 and 𝑝𝐹,𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑤  in (5C.29) yields 
 ?̃?𝐹,𝑡 = 𝛽


















Log-linearising and integrating it over 𝑖, we get 
?̃?𝑡
′ = ?̃?𝑡
∗ + ?̃?𝑡                    5C.32 












]) 𝑌𝑡+𝑠(𝑧)   















) = 𝐸0∑ (𝛽
























s=0 = 𝐸0∑ (𝛽
′ )𝑠∞s=0 ( ̃𝑡+𝑠
𝑟 − ?̃?𝑡+𝑠)  
 So, combining LHS and RHS yields 
𝐸0∑ (𝛽
′ )𝑠∞s=0 𝑝𝑌,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = 𝐸0∑ (𝛽
′ )𝑠∞s=0 (𝑝𝑌,𝑡+𝑠 − ?̃?𝑡+𝑠 + ̃𝑡+𝑠
𝑟 )   
𝑝𝑌,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽′ )𝐸0∑ (𝛽
′ )𝑠∞s=0 (𝑝𝑌,𝑡+𝑠 − ?̃?𝑡+𝑠 + ̃𝑡+𝑠
𝑟 )   
The last equation can be cast in the recursive form 
𝑝𝑌,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽′ )(𝑝𝑌,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 + ̃𝑡
𝑟) + (1 − 𝛽′ )𝛽′ ∑ (𝛽′ )s∞s=0 (𝑝𝑌,𝑡+𝑠+1 − ?̃?𝑡+𝑠+1 +
̃𝑡+𝑠+1
𝑟 )   
𝑝𝑌,𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽′ )(𝑝𝑌,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 + ̃𝑡
𝑟) + 𝛽′ 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑌,𝑡+1
𝑁𝑒𝑤             5C.33  

























































) (𝑝𝑌,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡−1)                 5C.34 




) (𝑝𝑌,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡−1) = (1 − 𝛽
′ )(𝑝𝑌,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 + ̃𝑡
𝑟) + 𝛽′ (
1
1−
) (𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑌,𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡)   
Thus, the above equation can be written as 
𝑝𝑌,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡−1 = (1 − 𝛽
′ )(1 − )(𝑝𝑌,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 + ̃𝑡
𝑟) + 𝛽′ (𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑌,𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡) 
?̃?𝑌,𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑌,𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 + ̃𝑡
𝑟                   5C.35 
 where:  =
(1− )(1−𝛽′ )
      
 
From (5A.62) 











+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 + ?̆?𝐻,𝑡  













+ 𝐼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐾,𝑡 +
?̆?𝐻,𝑡  
Log-linearisation (LL): 
𝑌(?̃?𝑡) = (1 − 𝛼)𝑆
𝛼𝜛 (𝐶(𝛼𝜛?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑌,𝑡) + 𝐶
′(𝛼𝜛?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡
′ + 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡) +
𝐶′′(𝛼𝜛?̃?𝑡 ++?̃?𝑡
′′ + 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡)) + 𝛼𝐶
′𝑆𝛼𝜛+2( −𝜛)𝔈𝜛 (∫ ?̃?𝑡
′𝑖1
0











+ 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑌,𝑡) + 𝐼𝐾𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐺𝑔𝑡     
Recall 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝑡) = −𝑔𝑡 as Gali 2003 
𝑌(?̃?𝑡) = (1 − 𝛼)𝛼𝜛?̆??̃?𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐶?̃?𝑡 + 𝐶
′?̃?𝑡
′ + 𝐶′′?̃?𝑡
′′) + 𝛼𝐶′ (∫ ?̃?𝑡
′𝑖1
0
𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼𝜛?̃?𝑡 +
( − 𝜛)∫ ?̃?𝑖,𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0







) + 𝐼𝐾𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡 + 𝐺𝑔𝑡   




































































𝑔𝑡                             5C.36 
 
From (5A.64) 
?̆?𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝑡
′′ 
In steady state (SS): 
?̌? = 𝐶 + 𝐶′ + 𝐶′′ 
Log-Linearisation (LL): 
?̌??̃?𝑡

















′′)                 5C.37 
 
D. Model Reduced Forms (Pass Through Incomplete Exchange Rate) 







































′′)      5D.2 
?̃?𝑡
′ = ?̃?𝑡+1
′ − (?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1) + (1 − 𝜌𝛽)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
+ 𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡     5D.3 
𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝛽(𝐸𝑡𝑖̃𝐾,𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡) +
1−𝛽(1−𝛿𝐾)
𝜓𝐾
(𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) +
1
𝜓𝐾








[1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐾)𝜌𝑞]ℰ𝑡
𝐼𝐾 − (𝜌𝑧 [
𝛽(1−𝛿𝐾)
𝜓𝐾
− 𝛽] + 1) 𝑧𝑡   
           5D.4  
𝛽′?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − (𝛽
′ − 𝛽) ̃𝑡 − 𝛽
′?̃?𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 − (𝛽𝜌𝛽 − 𝛽
′)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
+ 𝛽𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡 5D.5 
𝛽′?̃?𝑡
′′ = 𝛽′′𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
′′ − (𝛽′ − 𝛽′′) ̃𝑡










𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑒𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + [1 − 𝛾𝑒](𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + 𝑚𝑒( ̃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 +
ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + (
𝜓𝐻
𝛿𝐻
) [𝛽(𝐸𝑡ℎ̃𝑡+1 − ℎ̃𝑡) − (ℎ̃𝑡 − ℎ̃𝑡−1)] + [(1 − 𝑚𝑒)𝜌𝛽 −
1]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− ([𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝛽𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 + 𝜓𝐻)𝑧𝑡       5D.7 
where: 𝛾𝑒 = 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + 𝑚𝑒  and  𝑚𝑒 = (1 − 𝜒)(𝛽
′ − 𝛽) 
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛾ℎ𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛾ℎ)(ℰ𝑡
𝐻 − ℎ̃𝑡
′′) + 𝑚ℎ( ̃𝑡











′′ )} − [𝛽′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(1 − 𝜌𝛽) +
𝑚ℎ]ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− (𝛽′′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 + 𝜓𝐻)𝑧𝑡        5D.8 
where: 𝛾ℎ = 𝛽
′′(1 − 𝛿𝐻) + 𝑚ℎ  and  𝑚ℎ = [1 −
𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′) 
𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 = 𝛽










′ ) − 𝛽′(𝐸𝑡ℎ̃𝑡+1
′ − ℎ̃𝑡
′)} + 𝛽′(1 − 𝛿𝐻)(𝜌𝛽 − 1)ℰ𝑡
𝛽
− (𝛽′[(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜓𝐻]𝜌𝑧 +
𝜓𝐻)𝑧𝑡            5D.9 
0 = 𝐻ℎ̃𝑡 + 𝐻
′ℎ̃𝑡
′ + 𝐻′′ℎ̃𝑡




 ;  𝐻′ =
𝜙3𝜙7
𝜙2+𝜙3𝜙7+𝜙4𝜙6




?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝜒)(𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡+1 + ℎ̃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡
𝐿𝑇𝑉) − ?̃?𝑡    5D.11 
[1 − 𝑏](1 − 𝜒′′)𝜙4𝜙6(𝐸𝑡𝑝𝐻 𝐶,𝑡+1⁄ + ℎ̃𝑡
′′ + 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝐶,𝑡+1 + ℰ𝑡






) (?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡
′′)          5D.12 
?̃?𝑡 = Λ𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡−1 + ℎ̃𝑡−1 + 𝜎(1 − − )𝑙𝑡
′ + (1 − 𝜎)(1 − − )𝑙𝑡
′′ − [ + 𝑣]𝑧𝑡 5D.13 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡
′ + ?̃?𝑡
′ + 𝛼?̃?𝑡        5D.14 
(1 + 𝑚𝑏)(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
′′ − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) + 𝑚𝑏 ̃𝑡
′′ − ?̃?𝑡
′′ = (1 +𝑚𝑏)( − 1)𝑙𝑡
′′ +𝑚𝑏ℰ𝑡
𝛽
  5D.15 
where: 𝑚𝑏 = 
𝑏(𝛽′ − 𝛽′′) 
?̃?𝑌,𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑌,𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡 + ̃𝑡







(?̃?𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐾)[?̃?𝑡−1 − 𝑧𝑡]) − ℰ𝑡















(?̃?𝑡−1 + ?̃?𝑡−1 − ?̃?𝐶,𝑡) − (1 − 𝑆
′ −
𝑆′′)(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝛼?̃?𝑡) +
𝑃𝐻 𝐶⁄ 𝐻
𝑌































𝛿𝐻𝑝𝐻 𝐶⁄ ,𝑡 − 𝑆




] 𝑧𝑡     5D.19 
?̃?𝐶,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑌,𝑡 + 𝛼𝛥?̃?𝑡          5D.20 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜓𝐹 + (1 − 𝛼)?̃?𝑡          5D.21 
Δ𝜓𝐹,𝑡 = Δ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡
∗ − ?̃?𝐹,𝑡        5D.22 
?̃?𝐹,𝑡 = 𝛽









∗ + ?̃?𝑡          5D.24 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝜙𝑟)(𝜙𝑦?̃?𝑡 + 𝜙𝜋?̃?𝑦,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑒Δ?̃?𝑡) + 𝜙𝑟?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡







Appendix 5.3. Estimation Results: The Distribution of Priors and Posteriors of the 
Estimated Parameters 
 

















Appendix 5.4. Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Diagnostic Check  
































Data Std. Deviation Volatility*) 
Output (𝑦𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠) 2.46 1.00 
Consumption (𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠) 2.06 0.84 
Capital investment (𝑖𝐾,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠) 6.60 2.68 
Interest rate (𝑟𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠) 0.61 0.25 
Inflation (𝜋𝐶,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠) 0.80 0.33 
Real housing prices (𝑞𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠) 2.08 0.85 




















1.00 -0.22 -0.18 0.02 
Interest rate (𝑟𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠) 
   
1.00 0.22 -0.28 
Inflation (𝜋𝐶,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠) 
    
1.00 -0.87 
Real housing prices 
(𝑞𝑡











The design of recovery and prevention policies has led to the discussion about the role of 
monetary and macroprudential policies. Prior to the US financial crisis, policy makers have 
assigned a strong role of monetary policy on price stabilisation. They believe that price 
stability is enough to ensure the economy goes to a favorable condition. Unfortunately, the 
recent US financial crisis has given a lesson that price stability is insufficient to ensure 
financial stability. A low and stable policy rate has caused asset prices, including housing 
prices, increases significantly that creates a bubble in the asset and the financial markets. This 
situation becomes more problematic as the financial system gets more complex and 
interconnect each other, especially through the mortgage market that causes the increase of 
systemic risk. Under such condition, the additional macro policy, i.e. macroprudential policy 
is required to avoid similar crisis in the future.   
This thesis works on this ground of research interest. In particular, we examine the important 
of modelling agents’ expectation in the design of preferred monetary and macroprudential 
policies. For this purpose, we model the expectation either under the assumption of boundedly 
rational (RLS and SG learning) or fully rational agents. Under the RLS learning algorithm, 
agents update their beliefs using an econometric algorithm to learn the REE as the sample size 
of the data set gets larger. The interest is whether this particular learning algorithm eventually 
takes the equilibrium path converges to a unique stationary REE. The E-stability principle 




uniqueness criterion, i.e. determinacy, we consider another criteria, i.e. E-stability in the 
design of preferred policy.    
The study about economic policy design under RLS learning is begun in Chapter 2 by 
assuming macroprudential policy is absent in the model’s structure while monetary policy 
operates in a conventional way by reacting to inflation and output. It is assumed that the real 
economy can be represented by a standard New Keynesian (NK) model with the feature of 
superficial habit in consumption. Our interest is how different degrees of habit persistent in 
consumption affects the choice of preferred monetary policy rule under this learning 
assumption. We can show that the presence of superficial habit in consumption does not only 
increase determinacy but also E-stability. An increase in determinacy happens as aggregate 
consumption is smoother that causes a particular response of policy rate to output that leads to 
indeterminacy, in an environment with no habit in consumption, now it leads to determinacy, 
in an environment where consumption habit matters. Meanwhile, an increase in E-stability 
occurs due to a relatively stable economic condition as a result of consumption smoothing 
behaviour. A more stable economic condition makes agents are easier to learn the equilibrium 
dynamic so that the equilibrium path does not deviate too much from a unique stationary 
REE.  
As habit in consumption gets more persistent, a determinate and E-stable region, under 
plausible policy parameters, enlarges and collides regardless of the type of simple rules 
employed by central bank. This result has allowed us to claim that contemporaneous 
monetary policy rule is superior to other simple interest rate rules as it does not only lead the 
economy to a determinate and E-stable REE with a higher probability but also it is immune to 
parameter uncertainty (i.e. when the persistence of habit consumption is not easily observed). 




transmission matters. It can be shown that the probability of getting a determinate and E-
stable REE declines when this cost channel is present. This happens as monetary policy does 
not only affect the demand side of the economy but also its supply side with an opposite 
direction. This finding is valid not only for a case where consumption habit is less persistent 
but also when it is highly persistent. Yet, considering policy inertia in interest rate rule 
increases the probability of obtaining a determinate and E-stable REE.   
The study about the design of monetary policy is then extended by evaluating the optimal 
constrained policy rule. This is motivated by the fact that there are many possible determinate 
and E-stable policy rules found when consumption habit is highly persistent. We can show 
that, in line with other studies, a decision to choose the optimal constrained policy relies on 
the assumption of exogenous shock that hits the economy. When a positive preference shock 
hits the economy, then responding to inflation and output are necessary to dampen economy 
volatility. In contrast, when a positive technology shock hits the economy, responding to 
output is not necessary as inflation and output move to an opposite direction. We can also 
show that considering policy inertia in monetary policy is useful for dampening the volatility 
of aggregate economy. Recall that the optimal policy rule is constrained in the sense that the 
chosen policy rule is bounded by determinacy and E-stability criteria.  
Unfortunately, a standard NK model with one sector and one market of goods, i.e. 
consumption goods, as used in Chapter 2, is too simple. This causes the previous model is less 
realistic and unable to explain the movement of other economic variables as shown in the 
empirical data. Hence, we add a complexity in Chapter 3 by introducing durable goods, i.e. 
housing in addition to consumption goods. As well, we differentiate the households into two 
types, i.e. patient households (savers) and impatient households (borrowers) that allow us to 




macroprudential instrument in which this ratio is assumed to be operational and used to 
manage the volatility in housing prices or the financial markets (credit). Meanwhile, monetary 
policy works in a standard way by responding to output and inflation.   
In general, responding to the growth of housing prices via the changing of LTV ratio (LTV 
rule) is favourable than to the growth of credit. Yet, the benefit of responding to the growth of 
housing prices depends on the quality of this data itself and of the data used in monetary 
policy. When central bank has accessed to current data of inflation and output and uses them 
in monetary policy, then responding to the growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is 
irrelevant. In contrast, when current data of inflation and output are not used in monetary 
policy, then responding to current growth of housing prices via the LTV rule is beneficial. 
Under this condition, a stronger reaction of the LTV rule on current growth of housing prices 
enlarges the probability of central bank leads the economy to a determinate and E-stable REE. 
When current data of housing prices is also not available, then using forecasted housing prices 
growth in the LTV rule, in addition to forecasted data in monetary policy, is undesirable since 
it shrinks the region of determinate and E-stable policy rules.  
As in Chapter 2, we also conduct the analysis of an optimal constrained policy rule in Chapter 
3. It can be shown that a decision to choose the optimal constrained monetary and 
macroprudential policy rules depend on the assumption of shock that hits the economy and 
the type of housing prices data used in the LTV rule. When housing demand shock hits the 
economy, responding to current growth of housing prices via the LTV rule dampens the 
economic volatility while responding to forecasted growth of housing prices is not useful. 
This argument is valid for any types of standard simple interest rate rule adopted in monetary 
policy. In contrast, when technology shock hits the economy, a benefit of responding to the 




Unfortunately, the concept of E-stability does not in general imply learnability of REE. This 
is true when economic agents slightly deviate from a standard RLS learning and use 
stochastic gradient (SG) learning for updating their belief. The SG learning algorithm is 
different from the RLS learning algorithm in which the former is less efficient from 
econometric approach but more realistic from the view of researchers. Technically, under the 
SG learning algorithm, economic agents are unable to observe the variance of state variables 
in which this second moment will be used in forming their forecast. In contrast, under the 
RLS learning algorithm, the variance of state variables is assumed to be known by agent 
precisely. 
In Chapter 4, we conduct a refinement of learnability of REE in the context of New 
Keynesian (NK) model with housing market and financial constraint. To be specific, we 
extend our earlier work in Chapter 3 by incorporating other criteria in the design of preferred 
policy, i.e. SG-stability in addition to determinacy and E-stability criteria. We show that a 
refined criterion for learnability of REE has made central banks’ task becomes not easy. The 
standard Taylor principle is insufficient to ensure a robust learnability of REE when the 
uncertainty in learning rule arises between the RLS and the SG learning rule. In general, it is 
required a strong response to inflation via monetary policy to ensure E-stable and SG-stable 
REE. Otherwise, central bank may take the economy to unexpected equilibrium e.g. 
indeterminate, E-unstable or SG-unstable REE.  
In this chapter, we also claim that the quality of data remains matter in an environment where 
the uncertainty in learning rule arises. Yet, this argument does not mean that there is no room 
for improvement if current data is not available (current data has better quality than forecasted 
data). It can be shown that responding to forecasted growth of housing prices via the LTV rule 




compared to responding to current growth of housing prices growth. This is a nice finding 
since in reality having access to current data is not always so easy such that forecasted data is 
more realistically used by policy makers. 
We continue the study about economic policy design under slightly different environments in 
Chapter 5. In this chapter, we deviate from a calibrated model and consider an estimated 
model in the analysis of monetary policy. We propose an alternative DSGE model for 
Indonesia by incorporating some relevant features. Following this, we estimate the model 
using a Bayesian technique. A Bayesian technique is chosen as it offers a formal way to 
estimate the parameters by combining prior information about the parameters and the data, 
conditional on the structure of the model. Note that we return to the framework of RE here as 
estimating the model using a Bayesian method while at the same time agents are assumed to 
be boundedly rational e.g. adaptive learning makes our work becomes computationally 
expensive.  
In addition to the topic about monetary policy, we also provide the analysis with the study 
about banks’ lending decisions, the degree of economic dependency and business cycles in 
Indonesia. From the estimation of monetary reaction function, we can show that the Taylor 
principle is consistently used by Bank Indonesia that makes price stability is among their 
main targets. We can also show that BI policy rate is occasionally used to promote economy 
growth, especially during economy down turn, but is rarely used to stabilise the variability of 
exchange rate.  Concerning the issue about banks’ lending decisions, it is suggested that banks 
in Indonesia are likely to set a higher ratio of down payment for households who have only 
housing assets in collateral than the ones who can show both her income and housing assets 
when making an application for housing loan. This happens as the wage income serves as an 




result suggests that the Indonesian economic dependency is not as high as predicted. This is 
reflected from the estimated share of import goods in consumption goods bundle that is less 
than 10%.  
The analysis is then extended by evaluating the source of business cycles fluctuation. Using a 
result from the variance and historical decomposition, it can be shown that there are three 
main drivers in the Indonesian economy, i.e. non-stationary permanent technology shock, 
monetary policy shock and marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock. In regards to the 
variability of housing prices, the result suggests that a housing preference shock is the main 
disturbance of housing prices variation, followed by non-stationary technology shock. 
Surprisingly, the role of monetary policy shock and loan to value (LTV) shock is minimal in 
explaining the variability of housing prices. This exercise also advices that CPI inflation 
variation is dominantly contributed by cost push shock, followed by non-stationary permanent 
technology shock and the world inflation shock.  
We also try to link this chapter with the broad topic in this thesis by addressing the issue of 
news in the formation of the agents’ expectation. In particular, we introduce the feature of 
anticipated shocks, i.e. news shocks into the innovation of MEI, of monetary policy and of 
non-stationary permanent technology. We can show that introducing the feature of news 
shocks, regardless the way of how these anticipated shocks introduced to the model, either on 
MEI, monetary policy, or non-stationary permanent technology does not improve the 
empirical fit of the model to the data. This can be seen by comparing the value of log 
likelihood or log marginal data density (MDD) of different models in which a model with 
news shocks component has lower value of MDD compared to the baseline model, i.e. a 
model without news components. One possible explanation for this result is that the feature of 
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